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Yakovlev Interviewed on Disarmament, New Thinking

AU3006121589 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian
28 Jun 89 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Aleksandr Yakovlev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Central Committee secretary, by Stanislav Polzikov, "dispatched through NOVOSTI especially for TRUD": "Let Us Learn To Live in Peace"; date and place not given]

[Text] [Polzikov] Aleksandr Nikolayevich, first of all I would like to know the philosophical, political, and practical content of the concept of "new political thinking in international relations."

[Yakovlev] This is a rather large question, but first of all let me point out that the new political thinking corresponds to the realities of the present century. In the final analysis it represents the grasping of the fact that under conditions of the nuclear threat it is impossible to live any longer while developing the arms race and that an exacerbation of the confrontation between the two systems is inevitable. In the final analysis this would lead to a catastrophe.

When we discuss the new political thinking in this context it is clear that a true analysis of the situation that has consolidated in the world leads to the conclusion that a new and realistic foreign policy must be constructed. If you will, this means that it is necessary to create a completely new moral atmosphere and finally to learn how to live in peace.

The issue of peace is an ancient one. Unfortunately, in the past the more peace was talked about, the more they sensed that war was approaching. It seems that today we have reached that unique moment in mankind's historical development at which the appeals for peace, and the efforts to establish a peaceful system on our planet correspond with reality. The gap between words and deeds is narrowing, and I think that we shall reach a state at which words and deeds coincide. I think that this is the quintessence of the new political thinking: Study of the realities of the contemporary world compelled mankind to look in a new way at life, its tendencies, and the consequences of the actions of certain persons, states, regions, governments, parties, and so forth.

[Polzikov] Does the thesis on the priority of universal values mean the renunciation of the class approach in relations between the USSR and the West?

[Yakovlev] I do not think that there is a more clearly expressed class interest than the survival of mankind. This applies to the workers' class, the peasants, and the intelligentsia. Therefore we are saying that the idea that could unite all people has been found, namely, the idea of the survival of mankind. Mankind is threatened not only by the nuclear catastrophe, but also by other problems, such as ecological ones. If we do not make a joint effort to adopt serious measures, it could all end very badly for all of us. As you again see, this idea unites us and stands above all other interests.

It is another question whether those universal goals exclude the interests of various social groups, strata, and states. Of course not. There will be contradictions of social and national character. However, there is no more clear class interest than the survival of our planet. There have been contradictions, and they will remain. However, the historical process must continue along a channel that precludes military confrontation. Therefore, when we speak about class interests we speak of the "freedom of social choice for every people," a concept that is in accordance with the new political thinking. If a certain people selects a certain road, it thus implements its interests, and we must take this into consideration no matter what choice was made, provided the choice has really been made by the people.

[Polzikov] How do you see the mutual relationship between the USSR economic problems and the issue of disarmament?

[Yakovlev] There certainly is such a relationship. However, the USSR initiatives in the area of disarmament have not been dictated by economic considerations alone. Far from it. This is a very complex issue. One thing, however, is clear: We made a very serious mistake in the past when we allowed ourselves to be led into the arms race. We strived to respond to a missile with a missile, to a tank with a tank, to a vessel with a vessel, and to a rifle with a rifle. This was not sensible policy. However, we did not invent the arms race. We were those who always had to catch up. We used the parity concept in a somewhat arithmetical manner, despite the fact that it was clear to all that significantly fewer weapons than had been accumulated were needed to annihilate mankind.

It is perfectly clear that disarmament will be most beneficial to our people, as well as to the American and West European peoples. Nobody benefits from the arms race. It causes budget deficits, huge debts, and a waste of intellectual capacity in the effort to invent weapons designed to kill other people. In the final analysis we must relinquish the caveman manner of living and the policy of the stick. However, for this we need serious demilitarization of thinking and human consciousness.

[Polzikov] The Soviet leadership unilaterally decided to reduce the quantity of tactical nuclear warheads on the territory of the European states by 500. Will they be destroyed or just withdrawn?

[Yakovlev] I think that they will be withdrawn. However, we propose to begin talks on eliminating tactical nuclear weapons, and we do not understand why the

West rejects this proposal. The elimination of tactical nuclear weapons would be a very serious step along the road to further asserting peace in Europe. It would open up the possibility of developing cooperation in various areas and remove the psychological nuclear burden that weighs on people's minds.

Deputy Foreign Minister Outlines Arms Proposals

PM3006130089 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 26, 25 Jun 89 p 1

[Interview with USSR Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Viktor Karpov by Vladimir Markov: "Geneva and Further On"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] [Markov] As the US side declares, the control over the sea-based cruise missiles (SBCM) is one of the main problems at the resumed talks. What way out of the situation do you see?

[Karpov] The USSR proposes an all-embracing system of control over the entire "life" of these missiles—from production to deployment, including inspection of submarines and surface ships, besides the limitation of the SBCM and types of submarines and ships where they would be permitted to be placed.

The USSR, to cut down the number of such inspections to a minimum, proposed establishing remote control over the SBCM. But the Americans do not as yet support the Soviet proposal to test this. However, Moscow doesn't lose hope that such an experiment will be held. If not in cooperation with the US Government, then with US scientists early this July.

[Markov] How do you see the entire further process of the strengthening of strategic stability and nuclear disarmament?

[Karpov] Disarmament must lead to a situation when neither side would have the opportunity to deliver a first disarming strike. The strengthening of strategic stability would become a key theme after the 50 per cent reduction of strategic attack weapons and talks on nuclear and space weapons. There is a serious discussion to be held on the structure of the remaining strategic attack weapons. In this connection, limiting ballistic missiles to a single warhead merits attention, as well as banning intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), and MIRV [multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle] ballistic missiles on submarines. Some Soviet scientists, in particular, think that a radical 95 per cent reduction of strategic weapons by the USSR and the US, after which they would be transferred to single-bloc units, would help strengthen strategic stability (for example, MN wrote about one such proposal in No. 23, 1989). This would deprive the sides of the possibilities, and, that means, of the stimuli to deliver a "counterforce" strike and at the same time would guarantee the survival of the means of a retaliation strike against the aggressor in any situation, which would not only be strengthening strategic stability, but would move us considerably nearer to a complete liquidation of nuclear weapons.

Need To Expand Nonproliferation Treaty Stressed

LD3006195989 Moscow TASS in English 1924 GMT 30 Jun 89

[Text] Moscow June 30 TASS—The conclusion of the treaty on nuclear weapons non-proliferation among the USSR, the USA and Great Britain, whose 21st anniversary falls due tomorrow, prevented the spread of nuclear weapons to a large number of states, said Aleksey Manzhosov, expert of the arms control and disarmament directorate of the USSR Foreign Ministry. This agreement prevented the increase of the number of crisis situations and incidents related to nuclear weapons, he told TASS.

The nuclear non-proliferation treaty is a document of international law in arms limitation that has the largest number of participants. As many as 140 countries have already joined the treaty. This means that the principles it stipulates have become part of the foundations of international law. The utmost strengthening of the international regime of nuclear non-proliferation created on its basis has become one of the most important conditions for constant process of nuclear disarmament.

The continued constructive businesslike cooperation among depositories of the treaty—the USSR, the USA and Great Britain—is an earnest of the successful implementation of the treaty, the Soviet expert said. The preparation for another, fourth conference for reviewing the operation of the treaty, to be held next autumn, is under way now. A conference to extend the treaty is planned to be held in 1995. It is held in the Soviet Union that the provisions of the treaty make it possible to fulfil its fundamental tasks most effectively, Manzhosov said. Because of this, it is important not to replace the treaty with some other agreement in the future or relax its regime.

The activity of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) plays an important role in consolidating the treaty. IAEA safeguards are an important instrument for the prevention of nuclear arms proliferation.

Now that important positive disarmament processes are under way, it is of priority importance to increase the number of parties to the treaty and to involve in the non-proliferation regime those countries whose nuclear activity causes most concern of the world community, the Soviet expert said. This will make the treaty comprehensive and promote considerably the advance of humanity to a world without nuclear arms.

Officer Discusses Troop Withdrawals From CSSR

LD0107120889 Prague CTK in English 0822 GMT 1 Jul 89

[Text] Prague July 1 (CTK)—"The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia, in harmony with the plan of the unilateral withdrawal, is to be completed by January 1, 1991", commander of the Soviet troops deployed in Czechoslovakia, Colonel-General Eduard Vorobyev said in an interview published in today's RUDE PRAVO.

He pointed out that the relatively long time limit has been set due to several causes, e.g. capacity of Czechoslovak railways, and possibilities of deploying military contingents, facilities and mainly soldiers in Soviet territory. The process of dissolving units requires a long time. "For the time being, more than one thousand soldiers and officers, almost 200 tanks and 20 aircraft have been withdrawn from Czechoslovakia. Reduction of the Armed Forces, armament and military facilities concerns especially parachute troops and other offensive units, Eduard Vorobyev said. [no closing quotation marks as received]

Dealing with the nuclear shorter-range missiles which were withdrawan from Czechoslovakia last March, the Soviet officer said they have been partly liquidated. Nuclear charges were given for further use to Soviet power engineering, military vehicles, trucks and other equipment were placed at the disposal of Soviet enterprises. [sentence as received] He underlined that the liquidation of the shorter-range missiles is taking place strictly according to the time-table. Observers have stated high professionalism of the Soviet soldiers and officers engaged in this operation.

Answering the questions concerning military cooperation between Soviet and Czechoslovak troops, Colonel-General Vorobyev said that in harmony with the decisions of the Political Consultative Committee and the Warsaw Treaty military doctrine, none of these armies will ever start military operations as the first.

The level of cooperation between Soviet troops deployed in Czechoslovak territory and the Czechoslovak People's Army corresponds with the demands of contemporary combat, the Soviet representative pointed out.

Emphasizing the importance of the Czechoslovak initiative for creating a zone of confidence, cooperation and good neighbourly relations on the line of contact between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO states, Eduard Vorobyev expressed hope that this act of new thinking will bring about active reciprocal actions in the West.

Commenting on the Soviet unilateral steps towards the reduction of Armed Forces and armament, the Soviet officer pointed out that the Soviet Union has not taken them for the sake of publicity, but in the framework of consistent implementation of the policy of detente and reduction of the levels of confrontation and practical realization of new thinking without a demand for counter-measures from the side of NATO. "At the same time we would welcome similar steps from the NATO states, but it is not up to us to give an answer, but up to NATO," Colonel-General Vorobyev said.

Tank Training Regiment Leaves Poland 1 Jul

LD0107121789 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1025 GMT 1 Jul 89

[Text] Warsaw, 1 Jul (TASS)—A tank training regiment of the Northern Group of Forces of the Soviet Army, stationed in the small town of Strachow [name as received] in Jelenia Gora Voivodship, today withdrew from the territory of the Polish People's Republic. Representatives of the Polish community, veterans of the Second World War, and Polish servicemen bade farewell to their Soviet friends.

Speaking at a meeting, Lieutenant General I. Titov, member of the Military Council and chief of the Political Directorate of the Northern Group of Forces said that the Soviet servicemen had fulfilled their international duty with honor, and had helped ensure the security of the socialist achievements of our countries and peoples. As they return to the motherland, the tank crew members take away with them very good memories of the people of the fraternal country, which will mark the 45th anniversary of its national rebirth on 22 July.

General Reports on Tank Reductions, Conversions

LD0307113989 Moscow TASS in English 1104 GMT 3 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 3 TASS—"In 1989-1990 the amount of tanks in the European part of the Soviet Union will be cut down by 10,000, including 5,300 tanks in service with the bodies of troops," Colonel General Grigory Krivosheyev, chief of a main department of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, said in an interview with TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy in view of the start of the scrapping of the first batch of Soviet tanks at Soviet plants.

"This year the overall amount of these combat vehicles will be reduced by seven thousand," the general pointed out.

"Five thousand tanks will be scrapped and the metal will be used for civilian purposes. The other two thousand tanks will be converted for civilian needs and for use as training facilities", he added.

Krivosheyev said a number of defence industry plants had already been reoriented to the accomplishment of these tasks. The first transporters, bulldozers, fire-fighting vehicles and other hardware converted from tanks had already come off the assembly lines.

The general said that subject to scrapping would be those tanks which are inadvisable to convert. "These are in particular uneconomical heavy tanks T-10M—the best vehicles of the armoured troops in the past," Krivosheyev said.

Since the beginning of July tank hulls began arriving at metallurgical plants where they are cut and put into smelting furnaces. Their equipment and engines are intended for economic uses.

"Three thousand tanks will be scrapped at the plants before the end of 1989. The country will get tens of thousands of tons of scarce metal. The economy will get the first hundreds of transporters, bulldozers and other special hardware converted from tanks," Colonel General Grigoriy Krivosheyev said in conclusion.

'Optimism' Being Voiced at Vienna Talks

LD0107230289 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 1 Jul 89

[From the "International Situation—Questions and Answers" program presented by Yevginiy Tikhonovich Grachev, deputy editor in chief of Moscow Radio main news editorial office, with Aleksandr Nikolayevich Antsiferov, editor in chief of the main editorial office of the network of correspondents, and Vladimir Ivanovich Fadeyev and Igor Pavlovich Charikov, foreign policy commentators]

[Text] [Charikov] This year's diplomatic season is essentially entirely confined to the context of the European continent. First there are the talks in Geneva and in Vienna. Then, there are the meetings between statesmen of the major European states. There are Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's visits to the European countries....

[Grachev, interrupting] [word indistinct] China too, and probably a meeting with President Bush, too.

[Charikov] At any rate, I believe that the process of political detente, as we have always said, must be underpinned by military detente. In this sense one can already speak, if not about results, then at least about certain changes for the better in this area. I refer to the Vienna talks of the 23, which started quite recently, and a certain degree of progress has already taken shape at these talks. The Vienna talks should not be confused with the talks that were held for many many years at the Hofburg palace. By the way, the present talks are taking place in exactly the same place. The former were quite different talks—about the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. Now the agenda is a much wider one, with considerably more serious aims.

At the talks, as one knows, following the meeting between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and Secretary of State Baker, a bundle of Soviet proposals has been lying on the table at these negotiations. On 29 May U.S. President Bush submitted a response in the form of a bundle of initiatives on behalf of the NATO bloc at a session of the alliance in Brussels. Our side immediately rated these as a fairly realistic step in the direction of a compromise.

If agreement can be found on the details, a situation can come about in the near future in which an initial agreement will become a reality. The result of such an agreement could be, first, an in-depth reduction of armed forces and armaments which will ensure not only the elimination of the imbalances that still exist between the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, but also the attainment of substantially lower levels for all the destabilizing categories of armaments. Previously, the U.S. side above all, and the NATO countries insisted on just three categories of armaments that would be subject to immediate, initial reductions—tanks, artillery, and armored combat vehicles. But now a full six categories are being discussed, including combat aircraft, helicopters, and personnel.

This is what our Soviet side was insisting on. Admittedly, the present U.S. stand remains vulnerable to criticism in many respects, but for all that, it's the first step that's the most difficult. The process has started, we are moving toward an accord, and we are expressing optimism. Moreover, both sides are voicing optimism.

Warsaw Pact Proposal on Non-Nuclear Forces Viewed

LD0107085889 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1745 GMT 30 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow, 30 Jun (TASS)—TASS political observer Vladimir Matyash writes: The Soviet Union and its partners have taken a step toward the West's approach at the Vienna arms negotiations in proposing a new regional limitation on non-nuclear forces in Central Europe, THE NEW YORK TIMES wrote today in a dispatch from Washington. As far as one can judge, the newspaper admits, the Warsaw Pact proposal satisfies, at least in part, the West's demands for a sharp limitation on Soviet forces in the Baltic and in other Western military districts of the Soviet Union.

As is known, when he spoke in London in early April, Mikhail Gorbachev stressed that the Soviet Union is prepared to take far-reaching steps to demilitarize Europe. The Warsaw Pact Organization's new initiative is convincing proof of that. Our readiness has not only been declared at the highest level, but has also been backed up by specific actions: the large unilateral cuts in the Armed Forces. Moscow is in favor of a radical reduction in the level of military confrontation; that, as is known, is made up of several components. It is not only the largest arsenals of conventional weapons in the world which are confronting each other in the European region, but also tactical nuclear arms and powerful naval forces, which are hitherto outside the sphere of East-West negotiations.

The possibility of reducing radically the levels of conventional weapons—principally, arms for carrying out a sudden attack and large-scale offensive operations—in the general military balance predetermined the fact that the present negotiations have assumed an important place in the Warsaw Pact states' scale of priorities. The intention to pursue a constructive line at the negotiations and to seek the attainment of specific results in a short space of time was stated at the latest conference of the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers in Berlin.

Of course, the Vienna negotiations are not going on in a vacuum; attention was also drawn to this fact at the conference in Berlin. The atmosphere taking shape around them is already causing concern in connection with the demands being heard in a number of NATO countries for a start on modernization of tactical nuclear weapons, although it is well known that plans to step up nuclear might are incompatible with efforts aimed at solving the problems of disarmament on the continent.

Issues concerning other components of the military balance in Europe—tactical nuclear weapons and naval forces—are outside the scope of this particular forum, but they need to be tackled. For, in the process of cutting conventional weapons, the role of these forces will grow steadily, and the asymmetries existing here will have an increasingly destabilizing influence.

In this connection, the call to NATO to accept a mutual renunciation of the modernization of tactical nuclear weapons and to start separate negotiations in the immediate future on this category of weapons, including the nuclear component of dual-purpose arms, acquires particular topicality.

USSR 'Prepared' To Ban Chemical Weapons

LD0107174689 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0930 GMT 1 Jul 89

[Gennadiy Vedenyapin commentary]

[Excerpts] A group of U.S. senators has sent President Bush a letter calling on his administration to take more vigorous steps to reach a worldwide accord banning the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. According to the authors of the letter—and they are 75 senators from both the Democratic and Republican parties—the aim of the appeal is to show the White House that more than two-thirds of the members of the Senate of the U.S. Congress are ready to vote for such an agreement. This would guarantee the ratification of an agreement of this kind. Here is our commentary; at the microphone is Gennadiy Vedenyapin:

[Vedenyapin] It is not hard to understand the U.S. congressmen's concern over the White House position on the chemical weapons issue. The point is that in words the U.S. Administration is always in favor of ridding the world of that means of mass destruction, while in practice, it does nothing to prevent the Pentagon from replenishing its arsenal with new dangerous kinds of chemical weapons. [passage omitted] It goes without saying that the creation of new kinds of chemical weapons only threatens to provoke a new spurt in the race for that sort of weapon and that it impedes the successful development of the talks on a complete ban.

Incidentally, I will remind you that this question was discussed during the summit meeting between the USSR and U.S. leaders. The Soviet-U.S. joint statement expressed devotion to the cause of drawing up a verifiable convention on the banning and destruction of chemical weapons. [passage omitted] We think that such a document could be signed this year. Its main political knots now have been untied, in theory, although there still are a number of questions requiring agreement. At any rate, as far as the preparation of the technical aspects is concerned, a vast amount of work has been done already. Participants in the multilateral talks on a chemical weapons ban within the framework of the Geneva conference voice the hope that the U.S. position will nevertheless swing toward realism, just as, let us say, there has been a change in the position of France, which has declared that if a convention along these lines comes into force, all production of chemical weapons must be halted.

There undoubtedly exists all the preconditions for making this year a crucial one with regard to the conclusion of a convention. Our country, at any rate, is as prepared as ever for the forthcoming responsible work of formulating and concluding such a document providing for the banning of the development [razrabotka], production, stockpiling, and use of all kinds of chemical weapons, and for their destruction.

Toward security through trust: That is the main purpose of our position. It is, in fact, the only one.

U.S. Urged To Join Moratorium on Nuclear Testing

LD0207183289 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 2 Jul 89

[Gennadiy Vedenyapin commentary]

[Text] Fifteen years have passed since the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests was signed in Moscow during a Soviet-U.S. summit. Up to now this document has remained unratified by the U.S. Senate. What is the state of affairs today? Over to commentator Gennadiy Vedenyapin:

[Vedenyapin] First of all, I will remind you that the treaty placed a ban on the conduct of underground nuclear weapons tests over 150 kilotonnes in yield. At that point, the U.S. side did not consider it possible to agree to a lower limit for the individual yield of a nuclear explosion, which we were proposing. The yield limit set by the 1974 treaty thus ended up being ten times that of the atomic bomb the United States dropped on Hiroshima. Nonetheless, it was a victory, the victory of common sense, which led to the limitation of nuclear explosions.

Since the U.S. senate has refused to ratify this document, under the pretext of insurmountable verification problems, the treaty exists on paper only, as they say, up to the present day. It is true, however, that both sides have observed its conditions in practice. The times have made it necessary to revise the doubtful view of the impossibility of carrying out effective verification of nuclear explosion yields. It has been proved that it can be fully guaranteed by using national-technical monitoring means. A great deal of joint preparative work has been done in this area. The Soviet Union and the United States have exchanged visits of specialists at their testing grounds in order to work out verification measures and determine the extent of their effectiveness.

At present, both the Soviet and the U.S. delegations at the Geneva negotiations on the limitation and halting of nuclear tests have quite sufficient material at their disposal to validate [obosnavat] the effectiveness of national-technical monitoring means.

It must be said that in the 20 months that have passed since these talks opened in Geneva, the two sides have managed to achieve a significant rapprochement of positions and create a good basis for achieving practical results as early as the present stage. What specifically is involved? Judging by everything, the two delegations could really get started now on formulating a draft verification protocol to the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests. The adoption of this document is, in fact, the main practical aim of the current round of negotiations. This would make it possible finally to move on to the discussion of other important problems: The further limitation of the yield and number of nuclear tests, on the way toward completely halting them.

Our country's position is as clear as it can be. The Soviet Union's proposal to halt nuclear tests immediately has been on the negotiating table since the first round. Here it is worth recalling that in the summer of 1985 we announced a unilateral moratorium on our nuclear tests, and it operated for 18 months long. The proposal to resume it remains in force today, too, but with one condition: that the United States join the Soviet moratorium.

It is scarcely necessary to say that the achievement of agreement on the issue of halting nuclear tests does not depend on the time of the negotiations or on the number of rounds in them. The determining factor here is the political will of their participants, and above all of the United States. At the present time, both delegations seem to be assessing future prospects with optimism. It seems that a favorable situation is being created for the achievement of concrete results as early as the current round. This kind of progress would be all the more desirable since success in the limitation and halting of nuclear tests undoubtedly would promote forward progress at the Soviet-U.S. negotiations on nuclear and space weapons, which are being held in parallel in Geneva.

USSR Foreign Ministry Holds News Briefing 30 Jun

France Visit, Afghan Situation Discussed

LD3006183889 Moscow TASS in English 1610 GMT 30 Jun 89

[Text] Moscow June 30 TASS—The essence of the upcoming Soviet-French summit is to confirm a traditional, continuous and stable character in the development of the entire range of relations between the Soviet Union and Europe, Vsevolod Sukhov, deputy head of the First European Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry, said at a briefing here today. He spoke to journalists on the eve of the visit by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to France.

Speaking of the themes to be examined at the talks, the Soviet Foreign Ministry representative named problems of Europe, European security, construction of "a common European home" and the entire range of issues of European and international security. During the visit, much attention will be given to the entire range of issues of bilateral relations and cooperation, he also noted.

Continuing the briefing, Yuriy Gremitskikh, first deputy head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Foreign Ministry, called a proposal made by Senator Albert Gore at the U.S. Senate interesting and timely. Along with a group of senators, Gore introduced for debate a draft resolution calling on the Nobel Prize committee to institute a special prize for outstanding accomplishments in the environmental control area. Under the conditions of constantly deteriorating state of the environment, he said, the institution of such a prize would help raise the importance of ecological problems in the international community and would create an additional impetus for more intensive work by scientists, politicians and public figures in the sphere of nature protection.

Touching on the situation in Afghanistan, the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman said that on June 29 the Afghan Foreign Ministry sent three more notes to the U.N. Good Offices Mission for Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), where it pointed to seven new violations by Pakistan of the Geneva accords. Since the time they came into force, Pakistan violated them 4,768 times. Protesting against these violations, the Afghan Foreign Ministry sent 633 notes to the UNGOMAP, Gremitskikh pointed out.

Early Tactical Weapons Talks Urged

LD3006143389 Moscow TASS in English 1412 GMT 30 Jun 89

[Text] Moscow June 30 TASS—The Soviet Union declares for an early opening of the talks on tactical nuclear weapons and without the linkage of this question to other questions, against the modernisation of tactical nuclear weapons which might considerably complicate such talks, Yuriy Gremitskikh, first deputy head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Foreign Ministry, told the briefing here today.

"We welcome the fact that in Brussels the NATO countries accepted part of the Soviet proposal about talks on tactical nuclear weapons, even though the Soviet side is concerned over the conditions advanced, he said. It does not regard as convincing the arguments used to reject its proposal for parallel talks on tactical nuclear arms and conventional armed forces. The Soviet side holds that the reduction of the conventional armed forces can ensure the necessary stability only if it is accompanied by the advance toward the reduction of tactical nuclear arms of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO.

Other variants are also proposed, Gremitskikh went on to say. If NATO countries are not prepared to embark on such talks at once, it would be possible to start consultations at which questions of preparation for the talks could be discussed. And these consultations could be bilateral or multilateral. They could discuss, specifically, the procedure of the destruction of 500 nuclear charges being removed by the USSR from the territories of its allies.

The Soviet side regards as the best way of solving the question of tactical nuclear arms the complete elimination of short-range missiles and all other kinds of tactical nuclear weapons, not only Soviet but also American. If this decision is unacceptable for NATO countries at a given stage, the Soviet side is prepared to consider the possibility of an intermediate stage, that is the reduction of all the kinds of tactical nuclear arms to the amounts lower than any of the sides has at present.

Moves Toward Mideast Peace Discussed

LD3006161389 Moscow TASS in English 1454 GMT 30 Jun 89

[Text] Moscow June 30 TASS—A resolution of the session of the European Council on the summit level held in Madrid on June 26-27 that discussed an approach to the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict was described as evidence of a more constructive attitude and the growing feeling of responsibility by Yuriy Gremitskikh, first deputy head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry Information Directorate who spoke at a briefing here today.

The session adopted a declaration on the Middle East which said, among other things, that the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) should be all means take part in the U.N.-sponsored conference on the Middle East.

This step measures up to the scope and spirit of positive changes that have been taking shape of late in the Middle East affairs, Gremitskikh said. These include, in the first place, a new, realistic and constructive approach to a peaceful political settlement displayed by the PLO which is supported by Arabs, the resumption of a dialogue between the United States and that organisation and the activisation of Palestinian-European contacts. The resolution of the Madrid summit session opens up new favourable opportunities for cooperation and coordination of efforts by the USSR and Western Europe, as well as by the world community in general in working for the Middle East settlement.

Deportation of Palestinians Viewed

LD3006142389 Moscow TASS in English 1342 GMT 30 Jun 89

[Text) Moscow June 30 TASS—An obvious defiance to the will of the international community which declares for an end to the occupation and for the exercise of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, this is how the deportation of another group of Palestinians by the Israeli authorities was assessed by Yuriy Gremitskikh, first deputy head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Foreign Ministry at a briefing today.

He said history shows that violence and reprisals do not lead to peace and security. They only lead to the spiralling of tension. The developments in the Middle East require a different approach, different principles of conduct and way of thinking. It is necesary to use the existing favourable opportunities for launching peace process in the region. Well-considered and realistic decisions of the Palestine National Council session in Algeria and firm support of the world community for the plans to hold an international Middle East conference open good chances to get the matter of the settlement off the ground, Gremitskikh said.

UNITA Activities Criticized

LD3006142889 Moscow TASS in English 1348 GMT 30 Jun 89

[Text] Moscow June 30 TASS—Yuriy Gremitskikh, first deputy head of the Information Directorate of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, said at a briefing here today that it was necessary to call UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] to order and to prevent the disruption of efforts of African countries and the world community in general aimed at settling the internal Angolan conflict.

He read out a statement saying that despite the agreement on ceasefire and termination of hostilities in Angola that came to force on June 24, UNITA groups continue their subversive activities. Luanda, capital of the country, is also a target of these activities. As a result of it, the city's electricity supply system was put out of action.

For this reason, the Angolan delegation had to walk out from the talks in Kinshasa with UNITA representatives held with the mediation of Zaire and to return home. The agreement that has just been reached at a conference of 20 African countries in Gbadolite has been put in jeopardy, the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman said. This can have grave consequences for the situation in Angola and for the settlement process in South-Western Africa in general.

Youth Festival in DPRK Noted

LD3006223689 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1334 GMT 30 Jun 89

[Excerpt] Moscow, 30 Jun (TASS)—Journalists were told at a briefing today at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press center about the participation of Soviet young people in the 13th world festival of youth and students that will take place in Pyongyang 1-8 July.

Yuriy Gremitskikh, first deputy chief of the Information Directorate of the USSR Foreign Ministry, reported that a delegation composed of 600 people and 400 tourists will travel from the Soviet Union to the DPRK capital. Different from past festivals, which were prepared by the Soviet preparatory committee which was set up on the departmental principle, the Soviet preparatory committee in Pyongyang [words indistinct] of public organizations: All-Union Leninist Communist Youth Leaque, the USSR Committee of Youth Organizations, creative unions, the Soviet Culture Fund, and others. [passage omitted]

'Observers Roundtable' Highlights Arms Control

LD0207203389 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1130 GMT 2 Jul 89

["International Observers Roundtable" program with Viktor Pavlovich Karpov, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs; Nikolay Fedorovich Chervov, head of a directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces; and Vladimir Georgiyevich Pasko, a commentator for all-union radio]

[Text] [Pasko] Hello, comrades. I would like to start off today's meeting with the decision of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies on the basic directions for our country's domestic and foreign policy, and more specifically with a chat about section six of the decision which deals with the international activity of the Soviet Union and with the underlying principles of this activity.

The granting to these principles of the force of a document of state provides a good excuse to recall the radical changes that have occurred in our foreign policy course during the years of restructuring.

[Karpov] These principles reflect the main point around which our foreign policy should revolve. To wit, the maintenance of security not by force of arms, but above all by political means. In the process of demilitarization of humanization, democratization in international relations, a reliance on force and on the threat of force does not accord with the demands of the time and should be replaced by a search for politically-based solutions.

At issue, moreover, is how, in reinforcing this precept, to continue to scrap nuclear weapons, or at any rate to go down the road of reducing them; to go down the road of implementing our proposals designed to bring about a deep and substantial cut in conventional troops and armaments, and by all available means to bolster confidence-building measures not just in Europe, but in other regions of the globe, too, where these steps could lead to the adoption of other agreed measures that would promote the strengthening of regional security and international security as a whole.

[Pasko] It is clear that now, what with the new circumstances, the role of the Supreme Soviet is on the increase in determining foreign policy directions and major steps in this field. And I would imagine that in this respect glasnost and debate in the Supreme Soviet will provide an opportunity for the continued search for fresh ideas and fresh initiatives in our foreign policy activity. Any major foreign political actions should undoubtedly be the subject of prior debate at the legislative level, so that all possible consequences of these actions for the Soviet Union, her interests and the interests of her security, and for the international situation generally and the development of internal relations, could be weighed and examined from all angles.

[Chervov] In practice this would mean that both our allies and those states with which we have dealings will be clear as to our foreign policy. It will be predictable and will be aimed at peace and cooperation.

[Pasko] We have now started speaking about the limits of reasonable sufficiency. What does that mean—limits of reasonable sufficiency? I ask this question because, following the March decree on the reduction of our Armed Forces, we started receiving quite a lot of letters which voice not merely perplexity over this decision, but even protest. In other words, people do not understand our approach and do not understand our decision.

[Chervov] Mankind is sitting astride mountains of weapons. Astride mountains of nuclear and conventional weapons. War now would be madness. Not just nuclear war, but conventional war, too. In just a couple of weeks Europe would lie in ruins. We have reached the stage when it is essential to reduce military potential. What are the limits of reasonable sufficiency? As we see it, this means cutting the military potential to levels needed purely for the defense of the state and allied states. They would not have the capability of unleashing war or of launching major offensive operations. This is a very great problem. At first glance it would appear possible to consider it in theoretical terms. But in practical terms it would mean the radical restructuring of all military potentials. The radical restructuring of the Armed Forces and their deployment. And it goes without saying that it would mean deep cuts in the Armed Forces—both nuclear and conventional. Quite clearly, this task can only be resolved on a basis of reciprocity when the two alliances put this principle of reasonable sufficiency into practice on a reciprocal basis. However, to demonstrate its workability and its practicability, we have embarked on major initiatives, on major steps to cut our Armed Forces.

I would just like to add something to what Nikolay Fedorovich has said in response to the letters that you cited to show that people are concerned. True enough, we have taken the decision to make deep cuts in our Armed Forces of half a million men; 10,000 tanks; 8,000 artillery pieces and so on. This is a substantial force that is to be scrapped....

[Chervov, interrupting] Unilaterally.

[Karpov] Unilaterally. And so, apparently there are some misgivings that this might lead to a reduction in our security. When this decision was made, all the circumstances were weighed. The general state of affairs with regard to our relationship with Europe was weighed, as were the new trends in the development of European politics, including the matter of security. And in this respect the point that was determined was the limit of the possible cuts which we could make unilaterally without damaging our security interests. And therefore, though I can understand their concern, anyone who is apprehensive can, on this point, rest assured....

[Chervov, interrupting] Yes.

[Karpov continuing] That there are limits to our unilateral reductions and that we cannot unilaterally cut further than these limtis. And as Nikolay Fedorovich [Chervov] has said, only on the basis of reciprocity with NATO can we make really deep cuts in the military potentials of both blocs and create a new system for the security of Europe that would be based not on confrontation between the two enormous military potentials of the two alliances but on the principle of defensive adequacy. Moreover, it would be based on a principle that would be linked to confidence-building measures throughout the continent of Europe. These confidence-building measures would provide additional guarantees of security and of predictability in the military situation. In that case, there could be very far-reaching and deep reduction steps; to the extent of—let's say—creating a system for the armed forces in Europe that would guarantee just the internal security of each state. Incidentally, at its session in Brussels NATO declared this to be its goal. Ideally, ultimately we would endorse this goal, and are in favor of approaching this by cutting and scrapping both nuclear and conventional weapons. Nor must chemical weapons be forgotten. These, too, are an indication of military potential and should likewise be scrapped. On this score as well, some very grave problems are cropping up at the talks in Geneva, but I think we will return to this.

[Pasko] Yes, we'll return to this. And so, reasonable sufficiency always takes account of external factors?

[Karpov] Most certainly. And it takes account not just of external factors, but of the sum total of the factors that ensure the security of the state and of our allies, of course. We always take account of that factor.

[Chervov] Definitely.

[Pashko] I would like to turn now to the talks that are currently in progress: in Vienna and in Geneva. I believe talks are now under way on all the main tracks....

[Chervov] Apart from tactical nuclear weapons.

[Pasko] Tactical nuclear weapons....

[Chervov] And naval forces.

[Pasko] Yes, and naval forces.

[Chervov] And naval armaments.

[Pasko] And I believe one can now detect a certain convergence of positions on all these tracks.

[Karpov] I believe there are indeed positive trends at all the talks you have mentioned. If we start with Vienna: Talks are going on in Vienna both among 23 states on reductions in armed forces and armaments, and among 35 states of Europe, the United States and Canada on confidence-building measures on the continent of Europe. If we are to speak of the talks among the 23, then it is true to say that the discussion is currently developing in a fairly dynamic way. We have tabled a specific program for the reduction of armed forces and armaments that would be a first stage—a first agreement—on the road to cuts in the armed forces and armaments in Europe and that would lead to a sharp reduction in the level of military confrontation. There would be a 50 percent cut in the total numbers of the armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. There would be a cut in the number of tanks to 20,000 for each of the alliances. There would be a cut in the number of artillery pieces to 24,000 for each of the alliances. And so on. In other words, the establishment of much lower ceilings for these weapons than there are at the moment.

To start with, the NATO countries wanted to discuss just cuts in tanks, artillery pieces, and armored personnel carriers. We proposed a wider approach, including cuts in strike and tactical aviation and strike helicopters, and of course cuts in armed forces personnel. For if we are to talk seriously about restructuring in the armed forces of both alliances, then we cannot manage without a reduction in the number of the armed forces. And, of course, restructuring is required. That is, a reduction in the number of organizational units that could later be increased should the need suddenly arise. On the whole, then, that is what must be borne in mind. But now, following the Brussels session of NATO it turns out that the NATO countries are prepared to discuss with us not just armored personnel carriers, tanks, and artillery, but also aircraft and helicopters, and furthermore they are prepared—though not totally—to examine the possibility of a reduction in armed forces personnel. What they have in mind are, first and foremost, the U.S. and Soviet Armed Forces deployed on European territory outside the United States and the USSR.

A certain narrowing of the positions has thus occurred. And this has also occurred as far as levels are concerned. On tanks the levels coincide. On artillery pieces one could no doubt find common criteria and resolve the problem and establish a common level. On helicopters, the levels proposed by NATO and the Warsaw Pact are also fairly close. The situation is more difficult with aircraft. Here, although NATO in principle agrees to discuss aviation systems, there is a difference of approach. There has been agreement that offensive systems are to be discussed first. At the same time the NATO approaches propose that purely defensive aircraft systems should be included in the aircraft systems that should be reduced—interceptor aircraft belonging to the air defense network. The underlying reason is clear to us—it is because NATO is armed with multi-purpose aircraft, while the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries have purely defensive interceptor-aircraft in its air defense network which do not perform offensive functions and cannot be used for waging large-scale offensive operations. Thus, naturally, they should not be among the systems to be reduced, and this is particularly true in that they maintain the air defenses of the Soviet Union and the other countries of the Warsaw Pact including defense against other strategic aircraft systems of the United States, for instance, which are not subject to reduction under the Vienna talks. But I think that there are good prospects here despite these differences on aircraft. Talks are currently under way on quite specific matters. There is a certain delay in the discussion of aircraft, helicopters, and troop strengths because the NATO countries have not yet officially tabled their proposals—they will only table them after 7 September. Our delegation, however, continues, even unofficially, its quest for opportunities to also discuss these problems.

[Chervov] I must say that from the first day of the talks they have gotten off to a great start. First, both sides immediately tabled their proposals and put them on the negotiating table. They are, moreover, very specific ones. And a particular impetus was imparted to the talks by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's proposal set out here in Moscow to Secretary of State Baker, which specified the actual final levels to which both alliances should cut their armaments. Viktor Pavlovich has already mentioned this. But it seems to me that the main thing is that if I analyze and compare the old talks and today's talks, I see that those talks got bogged down in discussing numbers. Actually, they spent 15 years arguing about figures. The advantage of the new talks now is that both sides are striving to avoid such a discussion about numbers, and they have focused principally on the final reduced levels. And that is the advantage of these talks.

[Karpov] But I must add, Nikolay Fedorovich, that we do not rule out the possibility of looking at the initial data—if this is necessary, let's do so.

[Chervov] That goes without saying, of course. Yes, yes yes. But we shall not argue about figures.

[Karpov] Quite right.

[Chervov] And another positive thing I see at these talks—and this is the reason why I also have an optimistic view on the results of the talks—is that both sides and almost all 23 states can see the aim of the talks and they are striving to achieve that aim. And that is the main thing at negotiations. When all parties can see the aim and strive to achieve that aim, a result will be achieved. Of course—and I fully agree with Viktor Pavlovich here—the new proposals that have just been tabled by President Bush at the Brussels NATO session, which are effectively the NATO program, contain an imbalance on aircraft and on the numerical strength of the armed forces, but this is not NATO's last word on the subject; it is not their last word. After all, the position of the sides is determined by the proposals that are put on the negotiating table. When they are on the negotiating table, we shall be able to judge them in specific terms. Thus, overall I am optimistic, all the same. The Soviet Union is opting for unilateral reductions, and it is compelling the other side to go some way toward meeting us.

[Karpov] Talks with the United States have been continued in Geneva on nuclear and space weapons and on the halting of nuclear weapons tests. A session of the Soviet-U.S. standing consultative commission is under way; it was set up to promote the implementation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile [ABM] Treaty. And at the disarmament conference there is a discussion of the problems of banning chemical weapons and drawing up a convention to cover this. On nuclear and space armaments, the first week has so far just elicited the general approaches of the United States to the problem of nuclear and space armaments in light of the examination of military-strategic goals that the Bush Administration has been undertaking for the past 6 to 7 months. What has now emerged as one of the main thrusts of the U.S. position is a stress on the necessity of carrying out a number of experiments in the sphere of verification by way of preparing for the conclusion of a treaty. That is perhaps an element that has now emerged in addition to the main points that were confirmed by the delegation and which are based on what was already achieved at the Geneva talks in the past. Thus, a new element has emerged here. As far as other issues are concerned—issues such as the correlation between compliance with the ABM treaty and a 50 percent reduction of strategic offensive weapons or limitations on sea-based cruise missiles, regrettably no positive shifts in the U.S. position have been in evidence to date. As far as further discussions are concerned, our delegation will be aiming to use the time at the talks as effectively as possible to carry out in parallel both the work on the precise wording of the documents that have already been on the negotiating table and documents which are in preparation and the treaty itself and the protocols to it, and to discuss with the U.S. side the new proposals that have been tabled on verification.

[Chervov] I would just like to add that in the new proposals on verification that the U.S. side has just tabled at the talks there are still a fair number of elements of imbalance and a desire to obtain certain one-sided advantages. I believe that on such fundamental matters affecting the chief strength of a state—strategic nuclear armaments—everything can only be resolved on an equal basis. That is what we are calling for with regard to the American side.

[Karpov] At the talks on nuclear tests, too, we are, for our part, also pursuing a policy aimed at completing as rapidly as possible the working out of a verification system for the Treaty on Limiting Underground Explosions to 150 kilotons—this is the 1974 treaty—and at presenting for ratification the 1974 treaty and the 1976 treaty on peaceful underground nuclear explosions in order to proceed immediately to further discussions: on how to limit the number and yield of nuclear explosions. Here we are prepared to go just as far as the United States will be prepared to go—to reduce the number of blasts to three or four per year. And we are ready to establish even one kilotonne as the maximum yield.

[Chervov] It seems to me all the same that there is an opportunity and a desirability to speed up these talks. Everything necessary now exists there. There are absolutely no grey areas there. There are no vaguenesses. A joint experiment has been held on nuclear tests, and if only both sides will have an interest in completing work as rapidly as possible on the 1974 protocol and the 1976 is effectively....

[Karpov, interrupting] It is ready.

[Chervov] The protocol is ready—only the 1974 one remains—we will effectively be able to consider the first stage of the talks as complete. The treaties will have to be ratified, and then we can proceed to the next stage.

[Karpov] As far as the Soviet-U.S. standing consultative committee is concerned, regrettably no new elements have emerged to date in the U.S. stance here. Discussions are currently under way concerning both our well-known complaints to the United States about the deployment of radar stations such as Thule and Fylingdales, which we consider not to conform to the ABM treaty. For its part, the United States continues to affirm that the Krasnoyarsk radar station also runs counter to the treaty, despite the fact that it has been effectively frozen and has not been commissioned.

[Karpov] Bilateral consultations are now being held with the United States on chemical weapons, in the course of which our main task is to determine the possibilities for active interaction with the new administration in the framework of the conference on disarmament, so as to be able to finish as quickly as possible work on the text of the convention, and to complete this work next year, if not before the end of this year. The main questions here are with ensuring reliable verification. Here we are prepared to go to the end. We are in favor of verification which would indeed ensure the full confidence of the sides that neither side is trying to circumvent the agreement. The second question, which is also very important, concerns how after the conclusion of the convention, on the one hand, to guarantee the elimination of the possibility for the chemical industry to manufacture chemical weapons, and on the other hand, how to guarantee a certain commercial secrecy within reasonable limits to chemical manufacturers to ensure the competitiveness of the private chemical industry. These are the two main problems which at present need to be resolved at the talks.

I think that the talks which are taking place testify to the fact that everywhere, in each of these directions, there are still untapped reserves. And these reserves require concentrated attention. If we use them, it will probably be possible to move further toward positive results.

And I would like to say a few words on tactical nuclear weapons. On 11 April, the Warsaw Pact put forward a quite specific proposal to NATO that they start talks which could cover that which is not covered by the Vienna talks, in other words: missiles already with nuclear, specifically nuclear, tactical warheads, and also the actual nuclear warheads for tactical nuclear and dual purpose weapons. Our proposal would supplement the whole picture of the correlation of forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe and could eliminate a very important factor in supporting offensive operations—tactical nuclear weapons.

There were many arguments in NATO. You know about this. A great deal has been written about this. What is important, in our view, is that the West German view has taken the upper hand—that no decision should now be taken on modernizing NATO's tactical nuclear weapons, in particular, tactical nuclear missiles, but that it should be postponed until 1992. Yes, this is still a compromise. But nevertheless, it is a step in the right direction. It is important that in principle NATO recognize the need for talks on tactical nuclear weapons. If we now complete quickly our work on conventional armaments in Vienna, there will not be any essential obstacles left—even from the viewpoint of the NATO position—to starting such talks. So, our task now—and we are proposing this to NATO—is to embark on specific consultations on this subject.

[Chervov] Nevertheless NATO is afraid of these talks. For banking on nuclear weapons, and banking on nuclear deterrence, as Mikhail Sergeyevich has said, is a mixture of the new and the old thinking. Therefore, the fear of parting with nuclear weapons has created a myth that they are a guarantee of peace.

[Pasko] concerning this I have this question. NATO's adherence to nuclear weapons and the strategy of deterrence sets an automatic limit to the possibility of advancing in the talks which we are holding. Up to what point can these talks advance?

[Karpov] As for strategic means, for example, we are now holding a conversation with the United States about halving our arsenals. After this, we think, along with continuing the dialogue with the United States on some additional measures in regard to the strategic nuclear arsenals of the USSR and the United States, we will also have to raise the question of involving other nuclear powers in the talks on reducing nuclear weapons. This will be necessary to move along the path of levelling out the strategic situation. As for tactical nuclear weapons and as far as Europe is concerned, we are prepared to go as far as the zero option. We are prepared for the complete elimination of tactical nuclear weapons.

It is NATO that is not ready. But then we are saying: Alright, you are not ready. Let us then agree, as a stage in the full elimination, to deep cuts in tactical nuclear weapons down to certain minimum levels, and let us agree on these levels. Let them be lower than the levels existing in NATO and the Warsaw Pact. But this is not just a matter of missiles. This is very important. The West frequently reduces the whole problem of tactical nuclear weapons to missiles. But it is not just missiles.

[Chervov] Yes, yes, yes, yes. [words indistinct]

[Karpov] It is also a matter of other systems for delivering nuclear weapons: both atomic artillery, air force means of delivering nuclear weapons, and of course, the actual warheads. They, too, must be taken into account. In Europe the Americans alone have 4,600 such warheads. This is a great deal. And it is worthwhile talking about it and it is necessary to talk about it.

[Pasko] Viktor Pavlovich, do you allow for the possibility of the NATO countries abandoning the strategy of nuclear deterrence altogether at some stage in the future.

[Karpov] You know, it is, of course, difficult to look ahead. But the situation is quickly changing.

[Chervov] One must not rule this out.

[Karpov] Yes, I would also say that if the reduction of conventional weapons proceeds successfully, and if we also succeed in agreeing on deep cuts in tactical nuclear arsenals, I do not rule out that the whole situation will be conducive to changing over to the new principles of

European security, in which there will not be any place for tactical nuclear weapons and hence for the actual nuclear deterrence principle.

[Pasko] The abandonment of dogmatism, realism in the approach to various phenomena and processes of international life, the return to the values common to all mankind of the significance that they have lost, the removal of ideology from interstate relations—all these are distinguishing features of the new thinking. By no means does everyone in the West believe that we have chosen this path forever and that we do not intend to change it. And even in our country not everyone understands the fundamental essence of our foreign policy based on the new thinking. By the decision of the supreme organ of the state power we have again confirmed that the foreign policy line based on the new thinking is of a fundamental and lasting nature. Everything that you have talked about, comrades, confirms this convincingly. I am grateful for this meeting and for the very interesting conversation and for everything that you have told us. Many thanks to you. Good-bye.

[Chervov] All the best.

Conference Held on USSR-German 'Secret Protocols'

LD0107182689 Moscow TASS in English 1755 GMT 1 Jul 89

[Text] Tallinn, Estonia, July 1 ESTONIAN NEWS AGENCY and TASS—The international conference "Legal Assessment of the Soviet-German Treaties of August 23 and September 28, 1939" ended in the Estonian capital on Saturday.

The conference was attended by scientists from Lithuania, Latvia, Moldavia, the Ukraine, Belorussia, Estonia, Moscow, and lawyers from Finland, Poland, West Germany and Canada.

Speakers said they have no doubts that the secret protocols to the so-called Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact existed.

While the August 23, 1939 treaty accords to norms of international law, "the German-Soviet secret protocols of August 23 and September 28, 1939 and January 10, 1941 on the division of Eastern Europe into German and Soviet spheres of influence and interests legally are treaties aimed not only against third countries but also against their sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity", they said.

The conference pointed out that the secret protocols should be declared null and void.

United States & Canada

Secretary Baker's Remarks to Congress Viewed

LD0207021589 Moscow in English to North America 2200 GMT 1 Jul 89

[Text] And now our weekly commentary contributed by Valentin Zorin.

In his recent speech at the House Foreign Affairs Committee the secretary of state, James Baker, dealt with the subject of East-West relations. He interpreted rather freely the essence of the new thinking, of which the Soviet Union is a proponent, by declaring that it originated from the failure of the entire Soviet policy. He claimed besides that the new thinking concept appeared as the result of the pressure exerted by the West.

All that I know about James Baker and my personal impressions of meeting and talks with him suggest that he is a clever person, a man of a broad horizon capable of producing an unmistakable analysis of difficult situations. If this is so, then it's most unlikely that Baker told congressmen what he really thought. I am sure that he is no party to the primitive interpretations of such an important and complicated concept as the new thinking. And this gives me reason to suggest that the state secretary was pursuing purely propagandist purposes. In any event, such statements made in the American Congress, of all places, testify in no way to the readiness of the Washington administration to take steps in the direction of easier tensions, though James Baker spoke repeatedly about the need of such steps during his visit to the Soviet Union and in his television statements.

No matter what question dealing with Soviet-American relations is discussed, one gets the impression that some American politicians have only one approach to it, that is the United States' attitude to it is that of wait and see. Though the Soviet Union is much less blamed today than before, the new thinking is still interpreted as the need for the Soviet Union to make unilateral concessions. It looks as though there exists no mutual interest in resolving such problems as the reduction of the level of military confrontation, the prevention of an ecological catastrophe threatening the globe, and many others. When I interviewed James Baker on television on 11 May, I asked him what was required to ensure progress in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. Should the Soviet Union alone take steps towards reaching agreements while it is enough for the United States just to observe and give assessments to the Soviet Union's actions? The secretary of state replied then that in order to ensure a positive and constructive development of Soviet-American relations, the efforts of the two sides are required. But does this really happen? I think that the time is ripe now for casting aside the stereotypes of the past and renouncing the one-sided approach to Soviet-American relations. In this sense the problem of the new thinking seems to be topical enough for Washington.

Baker Speaks in New York on U.S. Asian Policy

OW2806095889 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1150 GMT 27 Jun 89

["The World Today" program presented by Viktor Lyubovtsev]

[Text] U.S. State Secretary James Baker outlined U.S. Asian policy in New York on the eve of his departure for Southeast Asia. In Baker's words, the prosperity of the Pacific region is dependent on peace and security, and therefore the U.S. military presence there is necessary as never before. In the words of the secretary of state, peace in Asia is being threatened by two hotbeds of conflict—the Korean peninsula and Cambodia.

Baker said that Washington is ready to facilitate dialogue between North and South Korea and is also ready to support the implementation of peace in Cambodia by means of reaching normalization and the signing of an all embracing agreement in this country with international participation and UN supervision.

Touching upon the present situation in China, James Baker said that—and I quote—the cruel events that have taken place the last months have shown that hopes for political reforms in this country have not been justified. At the same time, the secretary of state noted that the United States, though condemning the repressions in China—these are his words—must, as before, facilitate the deepening of economic reforms in that country. In the words of Baker, a hasty break in constructive Sino-American relations is not in the interest of either the United States or China.

New Military Agreement Shows 'Favorable Influence'

18070673 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 20 Jun 89 p 3

[Article by Yuriy Ustimenko under the rubric "Opinion of a Commentator": "In the Interests of All People"]

[Text] A U.S.-Soviet agreement on preventing dangerous military activity was recently signed in Moscow. This is the result of the activity of a joint Soviet-U.S. working group which was set up as a result of an agreement between the defense establishments of both countries, and also between Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Akhromeyev and Admiral W. Crowe, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Major General George Butler, who accompanied Admiral Crowe during his recent visit to the USSR, declared at a news conference that the new agreement, which goes into effect on 1 January of next year, will raise the trust of the two great powers and their armed forces "to a much higher level." The assessment that representatives of the Pentagon are giving is being reiterated with commentaries in the American press.

In the opinion of the PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, "in our time of good feelings between the two great powers, Admiral Crowe's visit to Moscow is one of a series of exchanges that are promoting a reinforcement of trust." The agreement, which was signed in the capital of the Soviet Union, will establish new procedures that will make it possible for command authorities of the USSR and the U.S. armed forces to contact each other quickly in the event a crisis situation develops. Hundreds and thousands of soldiers from both sides will undergo training and will learn to use visual signals and radio phrases that will be readily understood.

On his part, Admiral Crowe acknowledged that his visit to Moscow was "something that I could not have predicted just several years ago." "We," he said, "are going through a transitional period that I consider very reassuring." And before his departure from Washington, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, declared that he no longer looks at the Soviet Union as "an enemy."

In other words, even before it goes into effect, the new Soviet-American agreement is beginning to have a favorable influence even on the highest-ranking representatives of the U.S. Defense Department. The policy of new thinking is bearing fruit.

Primakov on Changing USSR-U.S. Relationship

LD2506154889 Moscow World Service in English 0210 GMT 25 Jun 89

[From the 'Restructuring' program]

[Text] Dr Yevgeniy Primakov looks at this country's changing relations with the United States. A member of the Communist Party's Central Committee, Dr Primakov has been elected chairman of the two equal houses of the national parliament, the House of the Union.

Many observers in other countries seem to have failed to understand when perestroyka began, so they often size up the events in this country superficially. Otherwise it's difficult to explain why many Americans believe that perestroyka in this country is identical to the actions of every new U.S. President, and some even wonder whether the Soviet Union launched perestroyka to find a way out of a crisis that prevents it from opposing the United States as best it can. What fuels an opinion of this kind is deeply rooted in American centrism—the claim that the world pivots on the United States and that the other nations adopt decisions that take into account relations with the United States. A view of this kind naturally pushes to the background the main thing, the internal causes of perestroyka.

Perestroyka has made foreigners take a fresh look at us, and we too look at the world from a new angle. Take international relations—a complicated area indeed. Soon after April 1985 the Soviet Union began displaying new approaches that developed into new political thinking. I was in the group of experts in Geneva, Reykjavik, Washington and Moscow and I could see up close how difficult a dialogue was beginning and how great an effort the Soviet Union had to make to avert a danger from the world. When, on 16 January 1986, the Soviet Union published a statement to gradually abolish nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction by the end of the century many in the West dismissed the statement as utopian. But a year later the Soviet Union and the United States signed in Washington an agreement to get rid of medium and shorter range missiles. For the first time in history up to date weapons were being scrapped.

The law that has prevailed in international relations seems to be this. If ideas are to get action they must be measured up to realities and an end must be written to the principle that was followed sometimes in the past, either everything or nothing.

It's easy to prove this country was the follow up rather than leader in the arms race. This country did not initiate the race and it didn't whip it up, but with its actions it did give a pretext sometimes to speed the race up. But the race was conducted on American rules. We mirrored the United States, building up the military potential both in quality and in quantity. That could be justifiable at a time when this country was pressing hard to create a parity with the United States in strategic weapons. What was that leading to? It's easy to answer the question if we bear in mind that this country's GNP in real terms was less one half of America's, and to produce one unit of the national income we used 80 percent more main funds, 60 percent more materials, 110 percent energy and 100 percent more transportation than the United States. Transition to reasonable sufficiency would put paid to the American so-called game of exhausting the Soviet Union. This is of key significance for solving the problems facing this country.

We press for new approaches to international affairs not only because changes of this kind are vitally important, but also because they are absolutely feasible. We must (?state) the growth of realistic sentiments among some of the Western leaders, and we can forecast with a great degree of probability that these sentiments will continue to snowball in the future.

House Majority Leader Gephardt Profiled

PM2706143989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Jun 89 Second Edition p 6

[Own correspondent V. Gan dispatch under the rubric "Portrait Against Backdrop of the News": "Richard Gephardt"]

[Excerpts] Washington—[Passage omitted] When, in the middle of this month, Richard Andrew Gephardt was elected leader of the Democratic majority in the U.S. Congress' House of Representatives, the newspapers wrote that "the torch has been handed over to a new generation of leaders" on Capitol Hill. He began to be groomed for this important post—the second most important post in the House party hierarchy—after it became clear that a shakeup in the Democratic leadership was inevitable. [passage omitted]

All the years he has spent in the House of Representatives are marked by inexhaustible dynamism. People in the Senate and the House itself speak with one voice about Gephardt's capacity for work and diligence, about his reasoning powers, and a rare quality in the case of lawmakers—the ability to listen. He has a lot of stamina, is always self-disciplined, smart, and attentive. Naturally, "there is no pleasing all people," and there are people in Congress who regard Gephardt as an opportunist, as someone who is too flexible in his views and stances. It is true that he stands out for his willingness to enter into compromises which he seems to elaborate with relative ease. However, even his critics admit that there are principles which Gephardt is not willing to sacrifice under any circumstances. His constant striving to put himself in the other person's position, for instance, and his high ethical standards.

He also has another reputation—that of a telegenic politician who is able to exploit the services of the "electronic monitor." Gephardt brilliantly demonstrated this skill during the last election campaign in which he ran as a presidential hopeful. It was the skillful use of television which brought him victory in the first trial of strength in Iowa and helped him to win quite decent results in the subsequent primaries.

One of the duties of the majority leader is "pushing through" his party's legislative agenda. That means that sometimes he has to be hard-line and aggressive. "This is what I will be," Gephardt has said.

China

TV Broadcasts Report From Tiananmen Square

LD0207174389 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 2 Jul 89

[Video report by Vladimir Kulikov in Beijing; recorded—from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Video shows Kulikov standing in Tiananmen Square] [Kolikov] With permission from the People's Government of Beijing, Soviet television is conducting its report from the capital of the PRC. It is our first report since the introduction of martial law in the town, and we are beginning this report from Tiananmen Square. This was the focus of the political events which agitated the whole world during the last few weeks. The last time I was in this spot was the day before the declaration of martial law. The square was in ferment. Political passions were inflamed to the utmost. I can state that on that day it was not only slogans calling for democracy to be broadened and for a struggle against corruption that could be heard. There were also calls for violence. The most evil rumors crept from here around the city. In the numerous tents and shacks and buses taken from the city, the headquarters of newly-created associations were working. Today the square has returned to its former appearance, but it is still appears unusual. As you can see, it is empty.

The foreign press and radio reported that many people died from gunshots and under the wheels of tanks when the square was being cleared of demonstrators. Was that right? We journalists coming to the square asked one of the commanders of the corps whose units were in the square that day.

[Li Yunzhi, identified from screen caption—in Chinese, with superimposed Russian translation] As one of the commanders who took part personally in the action on the square, I can say with complete responsibility that there were no bloody events during the liberation of Tiananmen Square. Not a single person died here. The students left the square peacefully under an agreement with us. Yes, there were tanks here, and shots were heard. The tanks were protecting the soldiers from the stones that were being hurled at them, and the shots were warning ones: We were firing into the air. This is what happeened, and not something else. And I take full responsibility for my words. We gave the square—a sacred place for every patriot—back to the town without spilling a drop of blood. [Video shows square with soldiers patrolling.]

[Kulikov] If it was possible to avoid a tragedy on Tiananmen Square, it did find its victims in other squares and streets in Beijing. This is recalled by the military patrols, and mourning wreathes displayed on spots where there were clashes between demonstrators and Army units. This is recalled by the tears of soldiers' mothers as seen on Chinese television and the black armbands on the sleeves of passers-by. [Video shows people looking at wreathes.]

In that moment, which was so difficult for the country, to the very great regret of the Chinese people and of all its friends abroad, they did not manage to find political methods to solve the problems which would have protected the patriotic surge of the young people from the ever faster movement of provocation. Today, in tackling these problems as their own internal affairs—and I am convinced that it is only in this way that such a problem can be tackled—the people and the leadership are examining the sources of the tragedy and are taking essential measures to draw lessons from what they have experienced. Rank and file activists [boyevik] guilty of killing people and of arson have been punished. Investigations of the organizers of illegally-created associations are under way. The recent plenum of the CPC Central Committee named persons at the upper echelon of power—first and foremost the former secretary general of the party—whose stance contributed to the tragic development of events. The authorities have declared their readiness to continue the dialogue on all urgent questions that have arisen in society. [Video shows street scenes of normal life in Beijing.]

USSR Should Learn Lessons From PRC Situation

LD0207171189 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 2 Jul 89

[From the "International Panorama" program, presented by Aleksandr Bovin]

[Text] Comrades, you know of course about the implementation of the decisions of the Fourth CPC Central Committee Plenum; Zhao Ziyang, general secretary of the Central Committee, has been removed from all his party posts. Comrade Jiang Zemin, first secretary of the Shanghai provincial party committee, has been elected as the new general secretary. Well, they say he is quite a tough politician, with a technocratic type of mind. The communique of the plenum says: The plenum believes that, at a crucial moment for the fate of the party and state, Comrade Zhao Ziyang committed errors consisting of support for disorders. He bears direct responsibility for the rise and development of the disorders. The nature and the consequences of his errors are extremely serious. He took a passive attitude toward the course of defending the four basic principles and the struggle against bourgeois liberalization. He seriously neglected party construction, as well as the construction of the spiritual level and ideological-political work, and caused enormous damage to the party's cause.

Well, there is a familiar ring to that, as they say. Yes, well, the mass youth demonstrators and the disturbances in Beijing and throughout China under slogans of democratization were described by the CPC Central Committee as a wave of bourgeois liberalism and as a counterrevolutionary revolt. Here the press has particularly stressed the role of the Taiwanese authorities which, papers say, sent in spies to raise an anticommunist wave. As we have already read and as you know, troops were brought in to put down this wave and to supress the revolt. Many were killed or wounded. According to various estimates, several thousand people were killed or wounded in Beijing. There were casualties in other cities, too, and both arrests and executions are continuing. The plenum also placed particular emphasis on the contribution of proletarian revolutionaries of the older generation and the contribution of Deng Xiaoping in this turn of events.

Of course, everything that has taken and is taking place in China is the internal affair of our Chinese comrades. Incidentally, this can no longer be said about us, because in signing the Helsinki and Vienna documents we raised a whole complex of personal and human rights and liberties to the level of international, rather than internal problems. However, the Chinese are, of course, entitled to act as they consider necessary. But I believe that China's friends are just as entitled to express their opinion about what has taken place. I recall Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, and well, the theory of a counterrevolutionary revolt somehow does not convince me; it is too simple a description of the situation. In general, inhumanity is inhumanity, whether it takes place in Tbilisi or Beijing.

Let us ponder the causes. In my opinion, the main one is the marked lag in political transformations behind economic ones. Probably it is not so important where you begin transformations, the renewal of socialism: with the economy or with politics. You can start with the economy or with politics, but in the long term there must, without fail, be an alignment. If this does not happen from above, as it were, then such demands arise from below. As you know, there have been radical economic changes in China, and the openess of the society in which this has been established—growing contacts with the West, and sending tens of thousands of young people to study in the developed capitalist countries, the spread of modern communications media and information—all this decisively changes the situation. All this insistently demands political reforms, democracy, and glasnost. And I do not know whether this was deliberate or whether they simply do not ascribe any significance to it, but the moment for the painless synchronization of economics and politics was missed. And it has turned out that, in effect, the leadership itself provoked these mass demonstrations, and unfortunately, proved unready to respond to them in a democratic fashion, so to speak, and to apply democratic methods in tackling acute political problems.

Well, comrades, all this is sad, of course. Already there has been so much bloodshed, and now it has happened again. Inevitably, there have been rumors and all kinds of suspicions in the West. Look at what they are saying about us. You see how easy it is to apply the brakes—yesterday there was Zhao Ziyang and today he is no longer there; today there is Gorbachev, but tommorrow there will be tanks and we do not know who there will be. Therefore, they say, there is no need to be hasty in rejoicing, there is no need to be hasty with credits, there is no need to be hasty in disarming. This is the kind of wave there has been.

Well, as you know, in our country political changes are outstripping economic reform, unlike in China, but in principle, the result could be the same. If this gap between the economy and politics were to grow, it would become very difficult to monitor the situation, and it would be desirable for us to learn the lesson now being taught to us by China; to learn it so as not to repeat it.

PRC Foreign Policy Under Jiang Zemin Viewed

LD3006231689 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1315 GMT 30 Jun 89

[Excerpts] Moscow, 30 Jun (TASS)—Vladimir Oreshin writes: [passage omitted]

Recently changes have occurred in the CPC leadership. At the 13th meeting of the 4th CPC Central Committee Plenum 23-24 June, Jiang Zemin was elected general secretary of the CPC Central Committee. The plenum communique stressed the resolve of China's Communists to continue pursuing the policies and fundamental directives set forth at the December 1978 CPC plenum which laid the foundations for economic reform in the country.

The invariable nature of China's foreign policy was also affirmed. "The PRC," the communique noted, "will continue to develop friendly relations with other countries on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence and make its contribution to the cause of peace."

In a congratulatory telegram to Jiang Zemin on the occasion of his election as general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, M.S. Gorbachev expressed confidence that "Soviet-Chinese relations will develop in the spirit of friendship and good-neighborly cooperation for the good of both countries and in the interests of peace throughout the world."

M.S. Gorbachev's visit to the PRC, the first Soviet-Chinese summit meeting in 30 years, has become an important event of the year. A significant result of the visit, and this is acknowledged not only in the two countries but in the world communist and workers' movement, is the normalization of relations between the CPSU and the CPC. The contacts between the two major ruling communist parties of the world will undoubtedly further the strengthening of good-neighborliness and friendship between the Soviet and Chinese peoples.

It is believed both in Moscow and Beijing that the principles of equality, mutual respect, and non-interference in each other's affairs should form the basis of links between the CPSU and the CPC. No one is entitled to claim a monopoly on the truth. On the contrary, a mutual exchange of information and specific experience in socialist construction can result in benefits.

CPC Discipline Body Backs Plenum Decisions

PM2606142589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
26 Jun 89 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Important Decisions Adopted"]

[Text] Beijing, 25 Jun—According to PRC Central Television, a regular session of the CPC Central Discipline Inspection Commission was held in Beijing Saturday. Its participants examined and discussed the results of the Fourth CPC Central Committee Plenum of the 13th Convocation and expresssed "unanimous support for the report on the mistakes committed by Zhao Ziyang during the antiparty and antisocialist disturbances, which was delivered at the plenum by Li Peng, member of the CPC Central Committee Politburo Standing Committee and premier of the PRC State Council," and also for the decision to relieve Zhao Ziyang of all his posts in the CPC.

The commission members called on all party organizations to strictly observe party discipline. It was pointed out that it is necessary to strictly punish party members, as far as their expulsion from the CPC, for "deviating from the line, course, or position of the CPC and violating discipline during the recent disturbances and counterrevolutionary mutiny." Party members were exhorted to resolutely combat "bourgeois liberalization" and to "strengthen the unity and cohesion of the party's ranks."

Support for the decisions of the Fourth CPC Central Committee Plenum was also expressed by a session of the CPC Central Advisory Commission held on the same day.

Wide Support in PRC for CPC Plenum Decisions

PM2706145189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
27 Jun 89 Morning Edition p 4

[Own unnamed correspondent dispatch: "Situation in China"]

[Text] Beijing—All China's central newspapers report on Monday the reaction of the People's Liberation Army, party and public organizations, and people of various strata of society to the CPC Central Committee plenum that finished at the weekend. They express support for the published communique, which speaks highly of the "suppression of the antigovernment revolt and determination to proceed along the path of modernization and reforms under the CPC Central Committee's leadership."

RENMIN RIBAO gives a selection of reports from various cities in the country. They express support for Jiang Zemin's appointment as general secretary of the CPC Central Committee. Red banners with large letters welcoming this event have appeared in Beijing.

XINHUA reports certain safeguards for the "open-door" policy. Branches of the National Insurance Company in the coastal city of Xiamen have informed foreign investors of a new insurance policy which takes account of "political risk." Safeguards are provided "in case of war, strikes, and revolts."

Party workers in Tianjin, for example, consider the decision "on the nature and consequences of the mistakes committed by Zhao Ziyang, former general secretary of the CPC Central Committee," objective and just. Xu Jialu, rector of a teacher training institute in Beijing, considers that "Zhao Ziyang should bear responsibility for the fact that the disturbances developed into a revolt." People from Xian note the "plenum's timeliness." Prof Huang Tianji from Guangzhou focuses attention on "readiness to tenaciously continue the struggle against corruption and tackle the problems that worry society." That is the only way "the party will be able to enhance its prestige," in his view.

XINHUA reports that 13 party and administrative workers in the city of Liaoyang (Liaoning Province) have been expelled from the party for corruption. This was announced recently at a mass rally. Here are just two examples: The deputy chairman of the committee of the regional assembly of people's representatives has been expelled from the party and dismissed from his post for bribery. The deputy chief prosecutor of the region has been expelled from the party, dismissed from his job, and taken into custody for illegal appropriation of public funds.

According to RENMIN RIBAO, 126 members of illegal organizations in Shanghai surrendered themselves to the police last week.

The numerous court cases now under way in China demand particularly close attention on the part of law-enforcement agencies. The Ministry of Justice is urging them to help lawyers play a professional role in the current trials. Ministry of Justice representative Li Bida stated, for example, that lawyers should safeguard defendants' rights, but added that "they should clearly realize the reactionary nature of the disturbances which spread from Beijing to other cities of the country at the beginning of June."

Chinese Official Says Reforms To Continue

LD2806091789 Moscow TASS in English 0753 GMT 28 Jun 89

[Text] Beijing June 28 TASS—By TASS correspondent Vladimir Kashirov:

China will continue the policy of reforms and openness to the outside world and will do it firmer, better and quicker after summing up past experience and correcting previous mistakes, Wan Li, chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, said here on Tuesday.

Speaking first at a meeting with a visiting Bolivian delegation and then at a reception given in honour of the MP's [members of parliament], the Xinhua news agency said, the Chinese leader emphasised that China would continue to pursue an independent foreign policy of place.

A small group of people, Wan Li went on to say, tried to use the recent student unrest to stage serious social disturbances which later grew into a counterrevolutionary revolt. It was aimed at toppling the Communist Party leadership in China, undermining socialism in the country and turning China into a pro-imperialist state. However, the counterrevolutionary plot was foiled.

Wan Li said that the Chinese Government was very stable now and fully controlled the situation in the country. But, it had learnt from recent events.

The crackdown on student disturbances and the counterrevolutionary revolt is China's internal affair, Wan Li went on to say, but, some countries which like to interfere in other countries' domestic affairs have tried to exploit recent events.

'Thoughtful' Analysis of Student Protests Urged

18070317 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 18 Jun 89 p 3

[Article by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA special correspondent A. Platkovskiy: "People in the Square"]

[Text] Quite recently the entire world was watching events in China. Mass manifestations by young people in Beijing became the focal topic in the world press; all major television and radio services reported from Tiananmen Square. Alas, this interest was not unambiguous. Forces surfaced which attempted to use this complicated moment in the history of the country to bring economic and political pressure to bear on China, "having forgotten" that solving its internal political problems independently is an inalienable right of any sovereign state. It is a matter for the Chinese people to tell the right from the guilty, to evaluate the patriotic impulse of the young people and denounce those who have tried to exploit it for extremist ends.

Hasty evaluations should not replace a thoughtful and responsible analysis of the political situation in China. "No matter how hot tempers are at times, it is important to patiently seek such adequate political solutions as would follow from the goals of social consolidation," said the statement of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies on events in China.

The drama in Beijing was preceded by attempts to resolve the situation, to find mutually agreeable compromises. Our special correspondent A. Platkovskiy, who visited China in mid-May, recounts the course of events.

At present China is going through a critical moment. There is no doubt that the recent tragic events will yet be the subject of a detailed analysis. We are going to recount what preceded this.

On 15 April former General Secretary Hu Yaobang, member of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, died. It was indicated in the obituary published in the newspaper RENMIN RIBAO that a massive infarction was the cause of death. The first heart attack occurred on 8 April when Hu Yaobang was attending a meeting of the CPC Central Committee Politburo.

The first groups of students from Beijing colleges appeared at the Monument of People's Heroes in the center of Tiananmen Square on the following day. Young men and women marched through the streets of Beijing in an organized and disciplined manner. They carried banners: "We mourn you, Yaobang," "Yaobang—A Fighter for Democracy." A mountain of flowers around the Monument of People's Heroes was getting taller with every passing hour. From this moment on Tiananmen became the focus of unprecedented student activities.

TRUD correspondent Aleksandr Sukhotin and I measured the square in paces and estimated the number of people, agreeing on the figure 27,000. This is how many people gathered in the square on this day, 18 April, according to approximate calculations. The students of virtually all colleges in Beijing (and there are over 70 of them) were here, as well as delegations from Tianjin and other cities...

The people stepped aside in silence and a procession of students wearing bands of mourning went through the living corridor. They carried a large portrait of Hu Yaobang. The canvas, 6 meters tall and painted in black-and-white, was set up at the base of the Monument of People's Heroes. Thousands of voices started singing the Internationale. The sound was powerful and solemn. Red flags flew overhead.

Passions were beginning to rage at university campuses at this time while thousands of students remained in the square day and night through the heat of noon and downpours. Rallies and meetings in the dormitories, auditoriums, and sports arenas continued nonstop, and heated debates went on.

Activists maintained exceptionally good organization and order in the square, as well as during the march of student columns through the streets of Beijing. The students demanded that democracy be enhanced, that the processes of economic reform be speeded up, and that a reform of the political system be carried out.

In the evening, after a day at work, entire families of the citizens of Beijing came to the square with children. At that time up to 40,000 to 50,000 people a day gathered there. Enterprising storekeepers set up mobile kitchen stands and sold soft drinks briskly. Not once did I see a single drunk person in the crowd. On one occasion something happened—it could have been a trick by hooligans or a provocation—and people, thousands of people stampeded... At that moment, I felt how uncontrollable the situation in the square was. On 19 April the first incident occurred at the gate of the Chinese leadership residence located next to the square. The newspapers reported that a small group of people who attempted to penetrate the grounds of the residence was stopped by guards. One of the guards was wounded by a bottle splinter in the skirmish.

On 22 April China paid last respects to Hu Yaobang. National flags in Tiananmen Square flew at half-mast. The farewell ceremony took place at the House of People's Congresses. At the time over 100,000 students and citizens of the city stood in the square in mournful silence. More than a million citizens of Beijing walked into the central streets with flowers in their hands.

On this day groups of hooligan elements attacked shops and committed robberies in provincial centers, the cities of Changsha (Hunan Province) and Xian (Shenxi Province). The police put an end to the excesses and made arrests. RENMIN RIBAO issued a warning: "If anyone believes that the tolerance by the government is a sign of its weakness, he is in grave error."

After the funeral of former General Secretary Hu Yaobang, the stage of the students and the government "coming to terms" began. Both the elements of serious confrontation and the attempts of both sides to resolve the situation through dialogue became apparent. As events have shown, a special role was played by the RENMIN RIBAO editorial of 26 April which referred to student manifestations as "disturbances." On the same day Li Ximing, member of the CPC Central Committee Politburo and Secretary of the Beijing City Committee, speaking at a conference of cadre functionaries of the party, called for taking resolute measures with regard to those who "put up wall posters," conducted agitation, organized "combat units," and created "illegal student organizations."

A stormy response followed; the students went out into the streets of the city. According to estimates, there were between 100,000 and 150,000 of them. The manifestations lasted for 12 hours. The demonstrators attempted to go to Tiananmen Square, but were stopped by the public security forces. Luckily there was no clash. The students proposed to begin negotiations with the government. This appeal was heard despite the central press still writing that among those demonstrating in the street were many irresponsible individuals who provoked disturbances and encouraged antiparty and antisocialist appeals.

In late May, 45 students of 16 Beijing colleges talked for several hours with the representative of the PRC State Council Yuan Mu and Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Education He Dongchang. On behalf of Premier of the PRC State Council Li Peng, the students were assured that the fire of criticism in RENMIN RIBAO was directed against a small number of people who had violated laws, not against the masses of students. It was acknowledged by the government that the patriotism of a majority of students and their protest against corruption were in line with the goals of the PRC leadership.

However, the dialogue did not take place. The government refused to recognize the association of student self-government created during the demonstrations. A proposal to raise the level of representation in the talks to the level of members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo and deputy premier of the State Council was also turned down.

However, we should note that an attempt at accommodation was made nonetheless. At any rate, some results of the talks held caused enthusiasm in the student community. As seen by public opinion, the position of the government looked flexible and reasonable. For example, it was promised that the bookkeeping records of companies in which government officials work would be audited and the results would be released to the public. Students studying economics and law were invited to take part in investigating the cases of abuse of official positions.

Beginning on 4 May, student manifestations began to wind down. Many students went back to school and discontinued the boycott of classes. This was received as a hopeful sign that the young people would calm down soon and would be entirely wrapped up in textbooks and notes by the time of the final exams.

Meanwhile the discussion on campuses went on. The main issue on the agenda was whether to go on demonstrating or not. Many people voiced apprehension that the students, who were inexperienced in politics, would become pawns in the game of those who would try to exploit them for their own purposes. Others saw a threat in the fact that in the event demonstrations continued, the opponents of reforms would get a trump card and would mount an offensive along the entire front. A third group insisted on going all the way... At present, they said, the issue is: either a China with democracy or a backward China. "If someone is afraid for his own skin and hopes to secure a soft job, he can go. However, the people will not forgive the renegades," called the voices of student tribunes. "The people won't support us anyway. Everyone is preoccupied with the same thing—money, money," the skeptics said.

Events have shown that in these days political awareness was rapidly developing in the student community. This was a time of responsible choice.

By mid-May, there still was an opportunity to turn off the path leading into the abyss of confrontation. However, it was forsaken, and this had fatal consequences.

The Chinese are brought up on difficulties and privation. One cannot but agree with this widespread opinion. However, what about the wounded sense of social justice? The working class, the intelligentsia, an overwhelming majority of the peasantry cannot put up with the fact that the main advantage of socialism, which distinguishes it from capitalism, keeps disappearing every day. The stratification of society into those who have succeeded and those who vegetate due to the market economy is not at all the issue. The main point is for everything to be fair and honest. However, this is drowned in the troubled waters flooding China. All levels of the bureaucratic apparatus turned out to be contaminated by corruption, bribery, abuses of official positions, favoritism, and nepotism.

On 13 May General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee Zhao Ziyang met with the workers of Beijing. He spoke about "the Central Committee preparing to thoroughly solve the problems of concern to the popular masses." Various measures and steps were being prepared aimed at speeding up the process of democratization, reinforcing legal institutes, and creating a state apparatus working selflessly. "Certainly our work may only be built on the basis of real conditions, and it is impossible to bring about universal harmony overnight," Zhao Ziyang stated.

In the afternoon, students in Tiananmen Square began a hunger strike. The square resembled a burning-hot pan. The rays of the sun were beating down mercilessly. It was hard to breathe because of tremendous throngs of people. The students were driven away to the howling of ambulance sirens—not only those who were on a hunger strike, but also those who were there to show support for the strikers. Young people went hungry and did not get enough sleep. Physical and nervous exhaustion took its toll very quickly. Cars with red crosses shuttled between the square and hospitals more than 2,000 times a day. Physicians from the Beijing Red Cross Hospital and other hospitals were on duty close to the students around the clock.

University professors and instructors went to the students on a hunger strike. They asked the students to come home and resume their studies. However, they left the square with tears in their eyes, bewildered. It was hard to look at the elderly parents. They stood in the crowd, at the fence behind which their children lay in the beams of searchlights. From time to time people in white gowns called for paramedics with stretchers.

On 17 May the streets of the city were filled with demonstrators. There were more than a million of them—workers of the factories and plants of Beijing, clerical employees of state offices, college instructors, scientists and creative arts intellectuals, trade union activists, functionaries of democratic parties, and journalists. At the Beijing railway terminal people greeted with applause still new student delegations from various cities of the country. About 40,000 or 50,000 of them a day were given free passage to the capital by railroad employees. Banners were hung on the facades of residential buildings: "We will not let our children die!" Students in the square unfurled a white canvas which read "Democracy or Death!" Trucks filled to the brim with young people wearing white and red headbands cruised the streets. They lifted their hands giving V signs and chanted in unison: "Smash the corrupt officials!" Characters demanding the resignation of individuals in the government were painted on buses and trolleys. On the same day the newspapers published a written appeal by CPC Central Committee General Secretary Zhao Ziyang to the students. On behalf of the Standing Committee of the CPC Central Committee Politburo, he acknowledged the value of their patriotic movement for democratization, the enhancement of reforms, and against corruption.

The Central Committee of the Communist Youth Union, the leadership of the All-China Youth Federation, and other organizations called on the government and party leaders to go to the students immediately. "We do not want the lives of the students to suffer, and at the same time we do not want the course of the reforms of economic construction to come to a halt," the appeal said.

It is difficult to say at present why the step everyone was expecting was not taken, why precious time was wasted, and the necessary words were not spoken. Silence was the response to the appeal to save the country and save the reform. During these hours the crisis could still be averted. I read the following slogan on one of the sheets glued to a lamp post: "When one speaks and does not listen to the people, words are lost. When one should speak but does not, people are lost."

"I have come here too late, too late," this is how Zhao Ziyang addressed the students on a hunger strike in the square. He met with them at dawn on 19 May. As subsequent events have shown, the phrase he uttered was full of tragic meaning.

With tears in his eyes—this was apparent even in TV reports—Zhao Ziyang asked the students to discontinue the hunger strike. "You must live and witness the modernization of China," argued Zhao Ziyang, but to no avail.

Together with the general secretary, Premier of the PRC State Council Li Peng came to Tiananmen. The students did not want to listen to him. The day before Li Peng met with the leaders of the student movement. The meeting also did not produce any results.

On the following night, Li Peng spoke at a meeting of party, government, and Army cadres of the central and capital city echelon. He placed the responsibility for the critical situation in the capital, bordering on anarchy, on an insignificant number of people who "are trying to exploit the disturbances for their political ends—overthrowing the government and eliminating the leading role of the party." "Under such circumstances, we are forced to resort to resolute measures," the premier stated.

At 1000 in the morning on 20 May martial law was imposed in the central neighborhoods of Beijing pursuant to an order signed by the premier of the State Council. A decree of the city people's government issued at the same time said that the organs of public security, armed police, and the Army were empowered to use all the necessary means to put an end to the disturbances...

...Too many periods of "trouble and chaos" have befallen China throughout its history. Will the peace and quiet attained in the past decade be preserved successfully? It is certain that the Chinese people and their government will find a way out of the situation which has emerged, a way out worthy of a great country.

Northeast Asia

Japan Refuses To Observe Pacific Fleet Maneuver

OW2406034089 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1200 GMT 19 Jun 89

[Text] As we have reported, the Japanese Government has formally refused to send observers to military training by the Soviet Pacific fleet, which is scheduled to be conducted before long. In connection with this, commentator Dmitriyev says the following:

I think that this attitude of the Japanese side toward the invitation from the Soviet side is difficult to understand. For a long time, Japan has clearly indicated the danger of Soviet naval forces in the Far East. We cannot but say that this refusal by the Japanese side—that is, the refusal to send observers—is unthinkable. The Japanese Government has taken a negative stance toward easing military tensions in the Far East and its refusal to send observers is an expression of such a stance. We can easily understand this way of dealing with matters by the Japanese side when we consider recent major developments on the part of the Soviet side. These began with the Soviet decision to withdraw medium- and short-range missiles from the Soviet Asian region. At the time the Soviet side made this decision, the Japanese side expressed its view that no specific change would take place in the situation of the Far East. This Japanese attitude of ignoring Soviet initiatives and the Soviet unilateral and specific measures remains unchanged. At the time the Soviet side announced that the Soviet Union would reduce troops in the Far East by 120,000 and reduce the Pacific fleet by 16 ships, the Japanese side took an indifferent attitude. New Defense Agency Director General Yamasaki asserted that there has been no change; his remarks represent Japan's intention to continue a military buildup at the same pace as in the past. Japan's military spending has been increasing at a faster rate than other Western nations; current spending stands at approximately Y4 trillion. Under this situation, we cannot say that Japan is making contributions in one form or another to strengthening security in Asia. The Japanese Government is refusing to cut back its huge military budget and make an important political decision, as seen in its refusal to send observers to the maneuver.

The Japanese side has refused to dispatch observers on the grounds that the size of the Soviet Pacific Fleet maneuver scheduled for July is not big enough. However, as you are aware, the Soviet Union has unilaterally reduced the number and size of naval maneuvers in recent years. The Soviet Union has decided not to expand the planned maneuver from Kamchatka to the Philippines so that Japan would not view the maneuver as a large military exercise. We cannot understand the reason cited by the Japanese side. Their refusal to send observers represents the fact that the Japanese Government has no intention of making any contributions to easing tensions in the Far East. If Japanese observers participate in Soviet military training, it will strengthen trust in the military area and promote openness. In view of the remarks by Foreign Ministry Spokesman Watanabe, the Japanese side missed this good opportunity and is attempting to extract concessions from the Soviet side on the territorial issue.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Commentary on Arrests in Burma; Future Problems

BK0107120989 Moscow in Burmese to Burma
1030 GMT 1 Jul 89

[Commentary by station observer]

[Text] According to reports from Yangon [Rangoon], opposition leaders have been arrested in Myanma [Burma]. Our Moscow Radio observer comments on these reports as follows:

Widespread arrests have been carried out in Yangon following last week's events during which hundreds of Yangon residents gathered on the roads, in violation of the martial law regulation, to commemorate students who were killed last year. The events of 21 June show that it is still early to say that the situation in the country has become stable.

July and August still lie ahead, and these months could stir memories of last year's mass uprising and bloodshed. It appears that General Saw Maung is determined to prevent a new wave of mass protests by carrying out arrests and issuing stern warnings to leading political parties.

Is there a danger of a reemergence of the events of last year? To answer that question one has to take into consideration the abolition of the one-party system in Myanma and the present existence of over 200 political parties. Some of these parties are capable of securing seats in the future parliament. The Elections Law has also been approved. Furthermore, in the economy the government has passed laws to pave the way for participation of local and foreign private entrepreneurs. Therefore, it appears that many of the demands made by the demonstrators last year have been implemented. However, prospects for confrontation between political groups still exist. In particular, General Saw Maung's government has been unable to eliminate its image as an inheritor of the policies of the previous government. The opposition alleges that the National Unity Party is the same as the previous Burmese Socialist Program Party and that it has close contacts with the military government.

At this point it should be asked why the current government is still in power. Last year's events have shown the extent to which the Burmese people will go in demonstrating their displeasure of an unpopular government. The situation in Myanma can be easily explained by pointing to the strength of the Defense Services.

There is another lesson to be learned from last year's events. That is, it is not enough to overthrow a government; it is also necessary to suggest a replacement. Even now the leading political parties are unable to present firm platforms on how to overcome the existing political, social, and economic problems in Myanma. For instance, can the opposition present economic programs different from those being implemented by General Saw Maung's government? It will not be easy to find solutions if confrontation and suppression continue in the complicated situation in Myanma.

The Moscow Radio observer concludes by saying that difficult days lie ahead for Myanma if the opposition continues to stage public protest movements and the military government continues suppression of such movements.

Laos's Contributions to Regional Peace Viewed

BK2506123589 Moscow in Lao to Laos
1300 GMT 21 Jun 89

[Station commentary: "Contributions of Lao People's Democratic Republic to Cause of Peace and Cooperation in Southeast Asia"]

[Text] In the past one and a half years, the situation in the Southeast Asia region has been very complicated. During that time, disputes connected with the Cambodia issue deteriorated ever more crucially. Armed conflicts repeatedly took place in areas bordering the Kingdom of Thailand and Laos. No relations in the economic, trade, scientific, technical, and cultural fields were maintained between Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia on one side and the ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] countries on the other. After the past one and a half years, the situation has greatly changed. Certainly, many issues remain completely unsettled. Nevertheless, we can say that the situation in Southeast Asia has not improved much but the consistent stand of the three Indochinese countries—which have jointly struggled for the achievement of peace and stability and for the promotion and expansion of cooperation in this part of the world and throughout the world—has encouraged the said process.

The role of the Lao People's Democratic Republic [LPDR] has grown daily in the process. It is the LPDR leadership that has taken an initiative in turning Southeast Asia into a region of peace, stability, neutrality, friendship, and cooperation, a region without nuclear weapons. The LPDR has called on all countries in this part of the world to respect each other's independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political systems and to oppose aggression and interference in the internal affairs of other countries. The LPDR has also encouraged the comprehensive promotion and expansion of cooperation which brings about mutual benefits.

The Kingdom of Thailand was the first country to respond to the call of the LPDR. First and foremost, the two neighboring countries have settled various border problems. The two countries have exchanged top-level delegations. In the past year, the volume of trade between the two countries increased by 2.5 times. At present, a total of some 40 joint ventures between the two countries have been set up. In addition, the two countries have broadened exchanges in the scientific and cultural fields. Seminars and roundtable conferences on various issues of common interest between the LPDR and the Kingdom of Thailand have become common events in the relations between the two countries. In late May, a cooperative seminar was held in Vientiane with the participation of representatives from (?70) organizations and companies of the two countries. At the seminar, the representatives discussed both the weak and the strong points of the cooperation between the two countries.

In the recent past, the relations between the LPDR and the PRC have also improved. Recently, an LPDR delegation paid an official visit to the PRC. It was the first visit to the PRC by a delegation from the LPDR in 10 years. During the visit, representatives of the two countries discussed ways and means to promote and expand the economic and cultural relations between the two countries. On 8 June, the first round of Lao-Chinese talks on the draft protocol on border affairs was concluded in Vientiane. PASASON, the organ of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee, said that the talks on this occasion were held amid an atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding. The outcome of these talks will boost the enhancement of the friendship and principles of good-neighborly coexistence between the two countries. It will also bring about the turning of the border between the two countries into a border of peace and friendship. Besides, the talks will contribute to creating favorable conditions for the promotion and expansion of relations in the border areas of the two countries.

At the same time, the relations between Laos and other countries in Southeast Asia have also been promoted and expanded. Now, Laos has set up a joint airline company with Brunei. Laos has also set up a joint bank with Malaysia and set up joint ventures on (?wood processing) with Indonesia. The LPDR's relations with other countries in the Southeast Asia region have continued to be successfully developed. This is seen as a very significant contribution to the achievement of peace and cooperation in Southeast Asia.

Philippines Congressman Cited on U.S. Bases

18070321 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 21 Jun 89

[Article by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA Manila staff correspondent Yuriy Kulikov: "Life After the Bases"]

[Text] Is the normal development of the Philippines possible if the Americans leave the country, or is the elimination of U.S. military bases the equivalent of economic suicide for Manila? Now, while there are only 2 years left until the expiration of the agreement on the bases, this issue is being stormily discussed in the pages of the press.

Advocates of the U.S. presence on the archipelago cite arguments which cannot be brushed aside and which call to attention the complex situation in the country. Indeed, 55 percent of the Filipinos live below the poverty level, and these U.S. facilities are the second most important employers after the government. Some 70,000 Filipinos are employed at Clark Field and Subic Bay alone. The United States spends half a billion dollars on salaries for the local population, payment for services of local firms, housing, etc. According to the assertion of one of the newspapers, ordinary people do not care that the Subic Bay Naval Base is one of the most important support facilities of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, and that Clark Field, 50 miles outside Manila, is the second largest U.S. Air Force base. For many of the native people, being deprived of such earnings means being left without funds for existence.

Apparently it is not easy for the republic's government, whose foreign debt has reached $30 billion, to fail to take into consideration its "special" relations with the United States under which U.S. capital investment in the former colony reaches $4 billion, and the monthly compensation for the bases is $481 million.

What will become of the country if President Corazon Aquino decides not to renew the treaty on the bases?

"Life will not end after the departure of the Americans," asserts Jose de Venecia, a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress. My interlocutor is one of the state figures who promoted the concept of alternative use of the territories occupied by the U.S. bases. "The land where the Americans are now situated is very broad. Naturally it will be freed up. The camp of the Philippine Army quartered for the time being in Manila (and in a significantly smaller area) could be transferred there. Thus, 2,500 hectares of land—it is especially expensive in the capital—will be sold to private individuals at a profit. By my calculations the state will realize almost $4 billion from the sale of the Manila land alone. As far as the Clark Field areas are concerned, the government can divide the 20,000 hectares there among peasants of low resources within the framework of the agrarian reform that is being conducted. We will also transfer the international airport to Clark Field from Manila, where the airport today inconveniences the city with its noise. A portion of the territory of the former base will be turned into an industrial zone.

"Now, as for Subic Bay," continues the congressman. "We will move our own naval vessels to the deep-water harbor with its ideally defended ports; we will open world-class docks for repairing and servicing the ships of various countries. And this represents no small amount of hard currency. It must be said that the Americans are not paying the Philippine personnel enough. For example, in South Korea, the pay at the U.S. bases is five times higher, and in Japan, seven times higher..."

What is your opinion of the Soviet Union's decision not to service its naval vessels at the Vietnamese Cam Ranh Bay?

"This is an extraordinarily positive step, although I worked in the embassy in Vietnam and know that little Cam Ranh and the Philippine bases are not comparable. However, I assess the significance of the Soviet initiative very highly. I am in favor of the creation in Southeast Asia of a zone of peace and prosperity. Life begins with the closing of the bases!

U.S. Bases Viewed as Threat to Peace

HK2806034589 Moscow in Tagalog to the Philippines 1300 GMT 27 Jun 89

[Commentary by Aleksander Godin]

[Text] For the past few weeks, the American military bases have once again been the topic of discussion among Philippine Government officials, newsmen, and the general public. Much attention has been paid to the report about Soviet nuclear missiles allegedly directed at the Pentagon's facilities stationed on Philippine territory. I cannot understand the motives of the persons spreading this report. If they think that by saying this it will become necessary to retain the American military facilities in the archipelago, then their methods contradict their own aims.

On the other hand, what remains, as always, is the other issue concerning the bases. This is the issue about whether or not there actually are nuclear weapons on the United States' military bases. The newspapers regularly carry reports that such weapons do exist on the bases. Jose Ingles, deputy minister of the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs [title as heard] did not reveal a secret when he said that United States' nuclear weapons transit through Philippine territory. But he was among the first to speak up about this situation, after the signing of the agreement last year between the United States and the Philippines.

The agreement stipulates that Washington should inform Manila each time the Americans plan to transport their nuclear weapons to the country. However, Washington does not abide by this agreement and continues to follow its own principle to neither confirm nor deny the existence of nuclear weapons on its ships and aircraft.

Of course nuclear weapons are being carried by America's Seventh Fleet, which regularly enters the country. American cruisers do not jettison their Tomahawks each time they land in Subic Bay. Indeed, this American principle of maintaining secrecy about nuclear weapons on board their planes and ships has a sinister character. Promoting one's self-interest does not breed trust. American strategists seem to think that in the event of a nuclear war, the Soviet Union will direct its missiles at American facilities in Asia. American nuclear weapons directed at the Soviet Union could be stored in any of these locations. In this way, strategic plans formulated inside the Pentagon's walls ensure that missiles will not land on American territory, but on their allies' territories instead.

Clearly, negotiations and agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States have slowed down at the present time. High-ranking Soviet and American military men who have been confronting each other now realize that the time of issuing dire threats involving military plans is over. However, what can be done if the Pentagon continues to carry on with its overall plans? It has ensnared other countries into becoming its reluctant partners.

It is obvious that the United States knows it is violating agreements aimed at trying to reduce the nuclear confrontation in the Asia-Pacific region. The Pentagon apparently does not wish to hear what other countries, including ASEAN, to which the Philippines belongs, desire as far as setting up a nuclear-free zone is concerned. Furthermore, the impression given is that Washington plans to transfer its center of military activity to the Pacific region. However, there is a growing perception in the ASEAN countries that military force should be removed and a peaceful and equal cooperation should take its place. This is what should be done with the American military bases.

Each year the American military bases in the Philippines receive up to 50,000 tons of various military equipment. We cannot guess where and how these will be utilized. What is apparent is that the bases are a real threat to peace. They will continue to be an impediment to the success of normal and equal cooperation. Agreements between the United States and the Philippines are affected by these bases. Problems involving trust arise during discussions between the Soviet Union and the United States on military matters in the Pacific region. The bases are an unhappy hindrance in the process of extensive international dialogue, as countries of the Asia-Pacific region consider the principles of perestroyka, or the new political thinking.

In my opinion, the real threat to peace and security in Asia emanates from these Pentagon facilities.

Near East & South Asia

TASS Cites MENA on Sudanese Coup

LD3006183289 Moscow TASS in English 1546 GMT 30 Jun 89

[Text] Cairo June 30 TASS—A coup in Sudan was staged by armoured and airborne units deployed in the area of Khartoum, the MENA news agency of Egypt reports. Paratroopers put under their control the international airport in the Sudanese capital, the presidential palace and the building of the central radio broadcasting station. Tank units captured bridges connecting Khartoum with Omdurman, as well as strategically important points in the city. All the prominent politicians are under home arrest. Telephone and telex communication with the rest of the world has been interrupted.

At midday, local time, the Khartoum broadcasting station circulated two constitutional decrees which, according to MENA, were signed by General 'Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir, leader of the coup.

The first one lifted the transitional constitution of 1986 and disbanded steering bodies—the Supreme Council and the government. It also announced that the "salvation revolution command" would exercise the supreme legislative and executive power in the country. The command is authorised to issue decrees and make amendments to them. The decree said that the commander of the Revolutionary Council would appoint ministers, the commander of the armed forces and officials to the senior executive posts.

The second decree announced the disbandment of all the political parties, trade unions, regional bodies of power, non-religious organisations. It also banned the publication of newspapers and magazines. The activities of the opposition to the revolutionary movement that came to power are categorically forbidden. Those who violate the decrees will be punished by imprisonment for a term from one to ten years. Special tribunals will operate in the country in accordance with the law on the emergency situation.

Statement by New Sudanese Leader Cited

LD0207153389 Moscow TASS in English 1518 GMT 2 Jul 89

[Text] Cairo July 2 TASS—The MENA news agency reports from Khartoum that Brigadier General 'Umar Hasan al-Bashir, chairman of the "council of revolution's leadership on national salvation", said at a meeting with ambassadors of foreign countries accredited to Sudan that the new regime in the country intends to pursue a course for reaching national reconciliation, restoration of peace and quietude in the country's south. The new regime firmly intends to fulfil Sudan's obligations before the international community, follow the non-aligned policy, strengthen cooperation with the developing countries and, together with them seek to overcome economic backwardness, he said.

The situation in the capital and provinces is gradually coming back to normal after the military coup. The international airport in Khartoum started operations. Communications with the outside world were restored. The new regime called on the country's population to resume work. Army officers arrested by the former regime on charges of an attempt at coup on last June 18, were released from prisons.

Shelling in Kabul Damages Soviet Embassy

LD0207170289 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1625 GMT 2 Jul 89

[Text] Kabul, 2 Jul (TASS)—Extremists today once again shelled the Afghan capital. One of the missiles exploded in the immediate vicinity of the USSR Embassy. The fencing around the mission buildings close to the Soviet Embassy were damaged. There were no casualties among Soviet citizens. Yesterday 8 Afghan citizens died, 14 civilians were wounded, 2 motor vehicles were burned out, and residential buildings were damaged in the Kabul shelling by bandits.

Delegation Meets Afghan Opposition on POW's

LD3006183789 Moscow TASS in English 1802 GMT 30 Jun 89

[Text] Islamabad June 30 TASS—A delegation from the people's and the coordinating committees for the release of Soviet servicemen captured in Afghanistan held another meeting in Islamabad with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, "foreign minister" in the "interim mujahideen government."

Hekmatyar said that he will not be able to hand over to the Soviet committees any of the captured Soviet officers or men since, in his words, this step may displease other members of his group.

He was also unable to provide any information about four Soviet soldiers whose parents came to Pakistan with the delegation from the people's committee.

Hekmatyar said that the "interim government" is considering the question of sending to the USSR a delegation of Afghan women whose children went missing during the war in Afghanistan.

Gromov on Efforts To Free POW's in Afghanistan

LD0107171689 Moscow World Service in English 0310 GMT 1 Jul 89

[Gromov's remarks in Russian, fading into superimposed English translation]

[Excerpts] Soviet diplomats and representatives of Afghan opposition groups held talks this week on an exchange of prisoners in the Afghan conflict. A Soviet spokesman told newsmen in Islamabad that for the first time the talks were conducted in a constructive way and signs of progress emerged. The Mujahidin authorized the International Committee of the Red Cross to visit captured Soviet soldiers. Our reporter talked to General Boris Gromov, the last commander of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. While in that country General Gromov took personal interest in the fate of Soviet POW's. What is known about those men? Where are they being held? General Gromov:

[Begin Gromov recording] No, we don't know everything about them; we don't know about all of them. We also know that, unfortunately, many of them are dead. We have a general figure of 318 men, but we realize that among them are those who are missing in action, those who (?succumbed) to disease. So this figure of 318 names includes men who are unaccounted for during more than 9 years of conflict.

We know that some of them took up residence in the United States and other Western countries, and they have no desire of ever returning to the Soviet Union, so it is a pretty complicated question. It is compounded by the fact that operating in Afghanistan are the so-called Mujahidin field commanders, who actually take orders from no one, and they are holding some of our men captive. [end recording]

General Gromov was personally involved in dealing with Mujahidin field commanders over the fate of Soviet prisoners of war, and he recounted it was extremely difficult to gain freedom for the soldiers held in their capitivity:

[Begin Gromov recording] When we were still there, we did everything possible to gain their freedom. In the month preceeding the final troop withdrawal last February we managed to obtain the relase of four of our men, and believe me, this was extremely difficult to do. We actually bought them out. It was a (?tradeover), in fact, and we used all available resources, including material incentives, to win their freedom, and our efforts to some extent proved successful. Shortly before the troop withdrawal was completed we established contacts with Mujahidin representatives and they led us to believe that as soon as the withdrawal was completed there would be no problem with our men held in captivity, that there would no longer be any need to continue holding them. These hopes of ours, however, proved to be shortlived. [end recording]

At the latest round of talks in Islamabad on the question of prisoners of war, a (?collective) exchange principle was worked out. Some Mujahidin rebels are known to be held by the Afghan Government side and the opposition wants them released in exchange for the Soviet prisoners. The Soviet Union earlier denied that any rebels are being held on Soviet territory and said the question of their release should be discussed with the government in Kabul, but at the talks in Islamabad the Soviet side promised to help in this matter. What is now preventing the release of Soviet prisoners of war? General Gromov:

[Begin Gromov recording] Basically speaking, it is the same thing that prevented their release before the withdrawal. It is something that is preventing normalization of the situation in Afghanistan right now, and that is their refusal to accept the idea of national reconciliation among the various groups making up the Afghan society. Newsmen often refer to the situation inside Afghanistan, which I think is incorrect and incomplete. We should consider the situation not only inside Afghanistan, but also around Afghanistan and that situation applies to the question of prisoners of war. [end recording] [passage omitted]

[Begin Gromov recording] I believe that it is primarily the United States authorities that can play a major role here. Pakistan, as we know, is totally dependent on Washington in all major policy decisions, whether political, economic, or military matters are involved. Therefore, I believe that a nudge from Washington with regard to the question of prisoners of war might resolve the issue once and for all. Mujahidin groups are likewise totally dependent on Washington for their survival. [end recording]

Comment on U.S. Envoy's Afghan Remarks

LD3006175289 Moscow TASS in English 1725 GMT 30 Jun 89

[Text] Moscow June 30 TASS—By a TASS diplomatic correspondent:

The Soviet diplomatic circles view pronouncements of Peter Tomsen, U.S. envoy to the armed Afghan opposition, as another evidence that Washington is not interested in an early settlement to the bloody conflict in Afghanistan. Addressing a news conference in Islamabad on Thursday, Peter Tomsen rejected the proposal that the Soviet Union and the United States sign an agreement to stop supplying arms for the warring Afghan sides. Tomsen motivated Washington's refusal by asserting that the correlation of forces in Afghanistan is now clearly not in favour of the "transitional government" of the rebels backed by the United States. But his statements that "all assistance to the Afghan resistance will continue" and that "the resistance will have sufficient weapons" even after the current U.S. appropriation ends in September, can hardly be assessed as other than urging the armed Afghan opposition to continue hostilities.

Tomsen repeated U.S. ultimatums that President Najibullah and the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan he heads should be virtually barred from the process of political settlement. These statements look naive, to say the least. The U.S. Administration actually demands that the rebels be granted what they try in vain to achieve by force of arms.

Washington predicted that the Kabul government will fall in a matter of days after the Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan. But the Kabul government proved its viability. The hopes of foreign patrons of the rebels that with the assistance of the Pakistan Army the rebels will easily seize Jalalabad proved futile too.

The entire course of events in Afghanistan shows that the attempts at a military solution to the problem are hopeless. The sooner they in Washington realise this, the sooner one more dangerous hotbed of international tension will be stamped out. And the United States assumed this pledge to the international community when it became a guarantor to the Geneva accords on Afghanistan.

AFP Report on Kabul Party Dismissals Refuted

LD3006134289 Moscow TASS in English 1137 GMT 30 Jun 89

[Text] Kabul June 30 TASS—Reports that the entire leadership of the Kabul City Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan was relieved of their duties are wholly false, according to the general director of the Afghan BAKHTAR News Agency.

The France Presse News Agency alleged that this decision was made at an extraordinary meeting held by Soltan 'Ali Keshtmand, chairman of the Afghan Council of Ministers Executive Committee.

The general director of BAKHTAR News Agency clarified the situation. He reported that a plenary meeting of the Kabul City Party Committee did take place in the Afghan capital on June 28. It considered, among other things, organisational matters. Some of the City Committee staff were appointed to other state posts. Such personnel changes also take place in other countries, not only in Afghanistan, the general director said.

Bessmertnykh Receives Iraqi Ambassador

LD2706115389 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1016 GMT 27 Jun 89

[Text] Moscow, 27 June, TASS—First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, received Sa'd 'Abd al-Majid al-Faysal, ambassador of Iraq, in Moscow, at his request today.

During the conversation, questions of Soviet-Iraqi relations were discussed, as was the situation arising in the area of the Near and Middle East.

Special Envoy Bessmertnykh Visits Iraq, Syria

Departs for Baghdad

LD3006093989 Moscow TASS in English 0915 GMT 30 Jun 89

[Text] Moscow June 30 TASS—Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, first deputy foreign minister of the Soviet Union, left for Baghdad on Friday as a special representative of the Soviet leadership.

He will exchange views with Iraqi leaders on issues of mutual interest.

Talks in Iraq; Leaves for Syria

LD0207085989 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0650 GMT 2 Jul 89

[Text] Baghdad, 2 Jul (TASS)—From 30 June to 2 July A.A. Bessmertnykh, USSR first deputy foreign affairs minister, was in Baghdad in the capacity of special representative for the Soviet leadership. He was received by Iraqi President Saddam Husayn to whom he conveyed an oral message from M.S. Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee general secretary and USSR Supreme Soviet chairman. Also negotiations took place with Tariq 'Aziz, deputy prime minister and foreign affairs minister.

During the Soviet-Iraqi meetings an exchange of opinions was carried out on a wide range of questions of mutual interest. Noting the high level of Soviet-Iraqi relations, the sides advocated their further development and improvement in all spheres, fuller use of the existing potential for cooperation and the implementation of new forms of links.

During a review of the prospects for an Iraqi-Iranian settlement, the importance of continuing to intensify the negotiation process, resulting in practical accords which take account of the interests of Iraq and Iran in equal measure on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 598, was noted. The difficulties encountered by the negotiations and possible means of overcoming them were carefully analyzed. The Soviet representative confirmed the unchanging readiness of the USSR to assist in every way possible the process of a peaceful settlement between Iran and Iraq.

A detailed conversation on the situation developing in the region of the Near and Middle East and ways of promoting an all-encompassing settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and of achieving of national accord in the Lebanon took place there. At the same time it was emphasized that the USSR, in developing its relations with the states of the region, is ruled primarily by the interests of consolidating peace and stability here and acts in a principled manner, not to the detriment of third countries.

The meetings and talks in Baghdad were friendly and constructive. On 2 July A.A. Bessmertnykh flew on to Damascus.

Arrives in Damascus

LD0207100189 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0924 GMT 2 Jul 89

[Text] Damascus; 2 July (TASS)—Today A.A. Bessmertnykh, USSR first deputy foreign affairs minister, has arrived in Damascus as a special representative of the Soviet leadership. He will hold talks with Syrian leaders on issues of mutual interest.

East Europe

Honecker Visits Magnitogorsk, Returns to GDR

Exchanges Toasts With Vorotnikov

LD3006190489 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1351 GMT 30 Jun 89

[Excerpt] Magnitogorsk (ADN)—The dominant theme of speeches made by Vitaliy Vorotnikov and Erich Honecker during a banquet given today by Mayor of Magnitogorsk Mikhail Lyssenko in honor of the GDR guests was that of the metallurgical combine of Magnitogorsk as a symbol of the future and its importance to the Soviet Union, to the friendship between the GDR and the USSR, and to world socialism.

All those who took part in the celebrations to mark the 60th anniversary of the legendary town had feelings of satisfaction and pride, said Vitaliy Vorotnikov, Politburo member of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium, satisfaction and pride about the fact that workers, farmers, and intelligentsia had established with the active support of the foreign class brothers the foundations of this mighty metallurgical combine in the most difficult years for the young state.

We are gratified, he added, that in the first, certainly most difficult stage of the combine and the town Comrade Erich Honecker was also involved. Equally, we pay tribute to the representatives of German youth and the German specialists who have also made a great contribution to building the town and combine. Naturally, we also pay tribute to all those who continued that work and are today working on the second birth of Magnitka.

Vitaliy Vorotnikov underlined that the importance of the visit by Erich Honecker and his entourage extends far beyond the framework of the Magnitogorsk anniversary. It is of great importance for the people of the USSR and GDR, and for the friendship between the two states, and it has met with a great response in the world.

Particular attention was paid in this respect to the meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Erich Honecker in Moscow, which was very substantive and was marked by friendship, openness, and mutual trust. These talks between the two comrades, Vitaliy Vorotnikov said, again confirmed the agreement of our countries on the basic issues of socialist construction, whereby agreement also exists that each country must seek its own path in the construction of socialism, taking into consideration its specific conditions and historical factors. The talk underlined their mutual solidarity and mutual understanding.

We are gratified by the great successes scored by the GDR people under the leadership of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED], said the speaker. We recognize that you in the GDR have a very positive view of our process of restructuring. This process is not simple. It requires far-reaching changes in all social spheres, whereby difficulties and problems naturally also arise.

The comrades from the GDR are also able to see evidence of this in Magnitogorsk, Vitaliy Vorotnikov noted. Achievements exist here, but there are also problems and untapped reserves. We have also seen the efforts of the city party organization in solving the problems and exploiting the reserves jointly with the working people. We are convinced that the militant tradition and enthusiasm of Magnitka lives on.

In conclusion, Vitaliy Vorotnikov proposed a toast to all those who have built up the city and are today working on implementing the new tasks. Turning to the comrades from the GDR, he said: To the 2004 Olympic Games in Leipzig; to the strengthening of friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the GDR and between the CPSU and the SED.

In his reply, Erich Honecker said: We all are still under the strong influence of what we experienced yesterday and today. It was rightly noted that Magnitka and Magnitogorsk are of great significance not only for the Soviet Union, but also for the development of world socialism as a whole.

When people first tackled the construction of the metallurgical combine, internationalists and experts came from everywhere to help. Even then we were already aware that this was the creation of a strong backbone for the USSR and at the same time a strong force for world socialism. Today one can say that in the ups and downs of world history Magnitogorsk has stood the test of time and has developed into a center of Soviet metallurgy without parallel. Today people speak of the second birth of Magnitka, and one can already imagine what it will be like here in 60 years time. What is important, of course, is that peace is preserved.

Indeed our visit to the Soviet Union is receiving a broad international response, Erich Honecker said, referring to a remark by Vitaliy Vorotnikov. All those media that are friendly toward us pay tribute to the results of the visit. Those that do not like us so much talk of a journey into the past. In reality it is a journey into the future, for what we have experienced here bears witness to the immense power of the Soviet people in socialist construction and the solution of all those problems on today's agenda.

Amid huge sacrifices the Soviet Union survived the aggression of Hitler's Germany and smashed fascism, Erich Honecker noted. With the liberation of the people of Europe the German people were given the opportunity to take a new path. We availed ourselves of this opportunity, and in spite of all resistance our German Democratic Republic developed.

All who have visited the GDR and know its history know that it emerged from the destruction of World War II to become a powerful industrial and agricultural state, Honecker said. One of its characteristics is its close unshakable friendship with the Soviet Union. In cooperation with the USSR and the other socialist countries, our country has worked itself into the circle of the ten most powerful industrial states in the world. Today we are breaking through one imperialist embargo after another in the sector of microelectronics and are learning to master high technologies.

Speaking about his exchange of views with Mikhail Gorbachev, the general secretary of the SED Central Committee noted that the talk, which lasted about 3 hours, was extraordinarily fruitful for joint development and for friendship and cooperation between the GDR and the USSR, as well as for further socialist development in each of our two countries.

Comrade Gorbachev had rightly pointed out that on issues relating to the securing of world peace and socialist construction, there is great agreement. Erich Honecker expressed his conviction that the results of the talks between him and Mikhail Gorbachev, because of their significance for the workers of the GDR, will stimulate new initiatives in the preparation of the 40th anniversary of the Republic and the 12th SED Congress.

With reference to the recent twinning of the GDR steel town of Brandenburg and Magnitogorsk, Erich Honecker stressed that this links not only the metallurgists and inhabitants of the two cities. It also underlines how indestructible the friendly bonds between the GDR and the Soviet Union and between the SED and the CPSU are. [passage omitted]

Addresses Magnitogorsk Pioneers

LD3006212489 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 30 Jun 89

[Excerpts] As we have already reported, Erich Honecker, general secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany Central Committee and chairman of the GDR State Council, has arrived in Magnitogorsk as part of his working visit to the Soviet Union. He is being accompanied on his trip by Comrade Vorotnikov. Our special correspondents report from Magnitogorsk.

[Aleksandr Zholkver, identified by caption] [passage omitted] Numerous pioneer camps have been set up in the most picturesque and salubrious parts of the Pri-Uralye area. One of them is called Mountain Ravine. Erich Honecker visited it today. He was received here by honored pioneers. Addressing the children, he recalled his pioneer and Komsomol years. He recalled his work in an internationalist youth detachment on the construction of the Magnitka works. Erich Honecker passed on to Soviet pioneers cordial greetings and gifts from the young people from the GDR. Here, in the course of the summer, hundreds of children of the workers of the Magnitogorsk Combine gain strength and health. These ceramic items are something they can be proud of. They can even be presented to the guest of honor. These children are interested not only in computer games, but in the computers themselves. Erich Honecker wished them much success. [video shows Magnitogorsk; Honecker shown wearing a red scarf around his neck as he addresses the pioneers; Honecker then shown being presented with a porcelain animal and watching children operating microcomputers]

Views Magnitogorsk Visit, Soviet Ties

LD3006215289 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1743 GMT 30 Jun 89

[Text] Magnitogorsk (ADN)—Erich Honecker, general secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany Central Committee and chairman of the GDR State Council, said to the newspaper MAGNITOGORSKI RABOTSCHI:

Eventful and moving days in the land of our friends lie behind us. I feel pleasure and satisfaction concerning the warm, substantive meetings with Comrade Mikhail Gorbachev and the other comrades of the party leadership in Moscow and concerning the visit to Magnitogorsk, all of which add a further chapter to the impressive history of German-Soviet friendship. During these days I have been strengthened in my conviction that the relations betweeen our parties, states, and peoples, which are exemplary in their intensity and variety, will deepen on all sides in the interests of consolidating peace and strengthening the positions of socialism.

Our talks were shaped by complete agreement, complete trust, and the deep conviction that our cooperation will develop further in all directions and in all areas. The agreements reached between Comrade Gorbachev and me and between our parties and states are being filled with life. The close cooperation between the German Democratic Republic and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics is thereby achieving a higher level. This is because our friendship and trusting coexistence is deeply rooted in the consciousness and in the hearts of the people. These bonds stretch back decades, and our friendship is more alive than ever today, as was apparent during this visit.

Complete agreement exists between the GDR and the Soviet Union concerning the question of international relations, which dominates everything, and how to make peace on our planet more secure and to preserve mankind from a nuclear holocaust. The far-reaching peace and disarmament initiatives set out by Comrade Mikhail Gorbachev find our complete support. Our own commitment and our initiatives accompany these, in order to do justice to our obligation to do everything so that war will never again emanate from German soil.

The preservation of peace is essential for the fulfillment of the new, varied, and complicated tasks we face now and in the future in developing and strengthening socialism on the road toward the next millenium. We master them in accordance with national conditions and possibilities, each in our own way, as well as in mutual support and respect, and thereby make our joint contribution to the strengthening of socialism in the world.

I thank my hosts warmly for the hospitality shown during the unforgettable hours in Moscow and Magnitogorsk. I convey my best wishes to the Soviet people for the successful realization of the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference.

Comments Before Leaving Magnitogorsk

LD0107110589 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0730 GMT 1 Jul 89

[Text] Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] Central Committee and chairman of the GDR Council of State, left Magnitogorsk today for home. He has been in our country on a working visit at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee, and attended celebrations marking the 60th anniversary of Magnitogorsk. The visitor was seen off at the airport by Comrade Vorotnikov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium; Comrade Shvyrev, first secretary of the Chelyabinsk Oblast party committee; Comrade (Isayev), chairman of the oblast Executive Committee; Comrade (Stode), first secretary of the Magnitogorsk Town party committee; and other officials.

The eventful and exciting days in the land of friends are now over, Erich Honecker said just before departure. With joy and satisfaction I recall the substantive and cordial meetings with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and other members of the party leadership in Moscow as well as the visit to Magnitogorsk, which have written a new chapter in the rich history of German-Soviet friendship. These days have further strengthened my conviction that the relations between our parties, states and peoples, which are unrivaled in their intensity and variety, will continue to be comprehensively deepened in the interests of consolidating peace and strengthening the positions of socialism, Erich Honecker said.

Hungary's MSZMP Convenes Plenum 23-24 Jun

New Chairman Nyers Profiled

PM2706161989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Jun 89 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Plenum Held"]

[Text] Budapest, 25 Jun—A plenum of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP] Central Committee was held here 23-24 June. It discussed proposals submitted in the report of K. Grosz, general secretary of the MSZMP, in connection with the convocation of and preparations for a party congress.

According to MTI, a decision was adopted to convene the 14th MSZMP Congress 7 October in Budapest. Its agenda will be defined by the MSZMP Central Committee in July. It is planned to prepare the party forum documents through coordination and consultations with delegates.

As a result of an in-depth discussion, the plenum participants adopted decisions on cadre questions and the implementation of organizational changes. The plenum elected R. Nyers, member of the MSZMP Politburo and minister of state, chairman of the MSZMP. A four-man MSZMP Presidium was elected for the day-to-day leadership of the party. Its members are R. Nyers, K. Grosz, M. Nemeth, chairman of the Hungarian Council of Ministers, and I. Pozsgay, minister of state. At the proposal of the MSZMP Presidium, the Central Committee expanded the Politburo, which will continue to act as the political executive bureau of the MSZMP, comprising 21 people.

J. Barabas, secretary of the Budapest City MSZMP Committee, and J. Kovacs, chief of the MSZMP Central Committee Party Policy Department, were elected MSZMP Central Committee secretaries. J. Berecz was relieved of his duties as MSZMP Central Committee secretary. He will be given another party post. An MSZMP delegation was elected to the tripartite political talks which are being held in Hungary to coordinate interests. It is headed by R. Nyers and its members are G. Fejti, P. Ivanyi, and I. Pozsgay.

Rezso Nyers was born in Budapest in 1923. Until 1944 he worked as a typesetter in a printing firm. In 1940 he joined the Social Democratic Party of Hungary. He was elected assistant secretary of the party's organization in the Budapest district of Kispest. In 1948 he became Pest Megye secretary of the Hungarian Workers Party. He was a member of the political staff of the Hungarian Workers Party central leadership.

He has worked within the system of the Hungarian Ministry of Internal Trade, was deputy chairman and later chairman of the National Council of Consumer Cooperatives, Hungarian minister of finance, and a consultant of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Economics Institute. He was elected secretary of the MSZMP Central Committee and member of the MSZMP Central Committee Politburo. He has been a member of the MSZMP Politburo since May 1988. Lately he has combined his work in the Politburo with the duties of minister of state.

Gorbachev Congratulates Nyers

PM2706151589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Jun 89 Second Edition p 1

[M.S. Gorbachev message to Rezso Nyers on Nyers' election as MSZMP chairman]

[Text] To Comrade Rezso Nyers, chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party [MSZMP]

Esteemed Comrade Nyers!
I cordially congratulate you on your election to the post of chairman of the MSZMP.

I express the confidence that the comradely cooperation between our two parties will continue to serve to renew socialism and develop friendship, mutual understanding, and lasting relations between the Soviet Union and Hungary.

[Signed] M. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee

'Tension' From Party Restructuring Noted

PM2806100989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Jun 89 Second Edition pp 1,5

[PRAVDA correspondent V. Gerasimov dispatch under the "Correspondent Comments" rubric: "MSZMP: Quest and Reforms"]

[Text] Budapest, 26 Jun—Important decisions were made at the recent Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP] Central Committee Plenum. They concern a whole series of cadre changes in the leadership and the structure of management organs. The party's tasks and its political aims for the immediate future were determined and a decision was elaborated regarding the convocation of a congress, elected representation at the congress, and its agenda.

The plenum elected Rezso Nyers chairman of the MSZMP. He is 66 years old. He began his political activity in the social democratic movement. He has been a member of the Communist Party since 1948 and has held a number of leadership posts. He has been involved in the cooperative movement and has been minister of finance. He is one of the country's prominent economists. He is described as the "father" of the Hungarian economic reform.

Another innovation in the cadre and structural changes is the creation of the MSZMP Presidium. It has four members. They are Rezso Nyers; Karoly Grosz (general secretary of the MSZMP); Miklos Nemeth (chairman of the Hungarian Council of Ministers); and Imre Pozsgay (state minister, who has been put forward as an MSZMP candidate for the post of president of the Republic). The Hungarian press stresses that this organ was created in the interests of ensuring coordination within the political leadership. R. Nyers said on television that every member of this collective guiding Presidium is equal.

The MSZMP Political Executive Bureau of 21 members will now act instead of the MSZMP Central Committee Politburo.

The MSZMP Central Committee plenum noted in its documents that the party will continue to take resolute steps in the interests of developing the political system and creating a rule-of-law state. Economic reforms will be accelerated and a new economic market model is being formed. But this restructuring within the party has provoked tension. This has been manifest in overt demonstrations by various groups. Some groupings within the party oppose multiparty representative democracy and a socialist-type economy with mixed forms of ownership and call into question broad ties with the world economy. These groups, MSZMP Central Committee documents say, propose an erroneous approach, whereby the problems of the Hungarian economy can be resolved exclusively by relations with socialist countries.

The plenum also said—and this is reflected in the resolution—that the Central Committee does not agree with the assessments of certain foreign politicians and press organs to the effect that political pluralism and a transfer to a market economy based on mixed forms of ownership constitute a betrayal of socialism and a kind of "peaceful counterrevolution." The MSZMP clearly distinguishes between the defense of socialist values and the fear of losing power, which does not rule out the use of force.

The Central Committee cannot fail to mention the rightist and sometimes extreme inflammatory manifestations that have provoked—particularly in the last few weeks—dissatisfaction in broad strata of the Hungarian public. The MSZMP Central Committee condemns most resolutely the anti-Soviet views that threaten the country's interests.

The Central Committee documents point out that Hungary's future can only be built thanks to the implementation of a policy based on the development of ties with neighboring countries, Europe, and the whole world. Those who implement a different policy in an endeavor to win cheap popularity engender distrust in Hungary and endanger the Hungarian people.

The MSZMP is in sympathy with the reforms being mounted in the Soviet Union. The Central Committee backs a foreign policy course that serves national interests while taking international realities into consideration. Under current international conditions Hungary must act as a member of the Warsaw Pact in the interests of mutual reductions in armed forces and arms and the simultaneous dissolution of military blocs.

The Central Committee plenum said the following in response to speeches by representatives of the opposition forces: We reject false anticommunist views that depict the MSZMP as an obstacle in the path of democratic restructuring. It is a historical fact that since the sixties the MSZMP has taken progressive steps in the sphere of reform that have also won international recognition. The Central Committee confirms that socialism in Hungary can only be implemented within the framework of new economic and political models. The party's aim is democratic socialism, a rule-of-law state, parliamentary democracy based on a multiparty system, along with a market economy based on the determining role of public ownership. The MSZMP is committed to Marxist values and left-wing, socialist, and humanist ideas. As it is renewed, the party wants to become a force that advocates a new synthesis of communist and social-democratic values and serves the interests of workers and the entire nation.

The Central Committee plenum planned that the MSZMP Congress will open 7 October this year. A final decision on the congress' agenda will be made at the MSZMP Central Committee July Plenum, with a consideration for the opinions of party organizations.

'Lessons' of Hungary's Economic Reform Discussed

PM2906192189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
23 Jun 89 Second Edition p 5

[Interview with Professor Ivan Horvath by V. Sharov: "Hungary: Lessons of Reform"; date, place of interview not given; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Today's discussion is about the economic reform in Hungary. In view of the point that our restructuring has reached, the successes and failures in the use of market relations are of particular interest. Our interlocutor is Professor Ivan Horvath, Hungarian scientist, doctor of sciences, and deputy director of the International Scientific Research Institute of Management Problems (Moscow).

[Sharov] The economic reform in your country is now into its 21st year. And judging by the press and official documents, the goals set in the past have still not been achieved. What is the main lesson of the reform?

[Horvath] Our experience enables us to draw the conclusion that the restructuring of socioeconomic life must be comprehensive and integrated. In practice, however, there was a deviation from that principle, which also engendered the present serious contradictions and difficulties in Hungarian society.

The two decades of implementing the reform have convincingly shown, for instance, that within the old management structure market improvements in themselves lead to price increases. The independence of enterprises has no effect without competitiveness and competition. Competition cannot function without sufficient goods. I could name other individual elements and aspects on which the fate of the reform depends in one way or another. For example, price formation, the tax system, finance and credit policy, the elimination of management methods based on administration and command, the assimilation of new methods of centralized management, and much else. Everything in society and the national economy is interlinked. Without a systematic approach to the development of the economy, reform cannot be accomplished. That is the main lesson of Hungary's 20-year experience.

[Sharov] Many thousands of Soviet people, and I am among them, have seen an abundance of foodstuffs and industrial goods in your country and experienced Hungary's considerable social achievements. Is that not connected with the economic reform and the use of commodity-money relations?

[Horvath] I can answer briefly: Yes, it is. And that would be the truth, but not the whole truth. Let us examine all this calmly.

Since 1968 our enterprises have had complete independence and their plans have not been approved by ministries. Individual general indicators are coordinated with suppliers and customers within the framework of economic contracts. Profit became the main motive of highly efficient production. Profit determines wages, including those of economic leaders, and the social benefits of collectives. I will not hide the fact that these steps were not understood everywhere abroad at that time, even among our close friends.

The reform deepened. In the eighties a whole series of measures was implemented. The banking system changed: The national bank retained the function of issuing money and managing foreign currency. All the remaining functions—the organization of scientific and technical development, the introduction of new technology, and so on—were assumed by commercial financial institutions and an innovations [innovatsionnyy] bank. The number of economic production organizations grew rapidly. Many of them received the right to conduct independent foreign economic activity. Opportunities were offered for private initiative—in the form of individual or collective enterprise—and for the lease contract. For many years there has been a system of competition for leading posts at enterprises.

Thus individual elements of the market mechanism found broad application in our practical activity, and on that basis major economic achievements could be expected.

How is the present state of the Hungarian economy to be assessed? It is not easy to produce an objective picture because the reality is highly contradictory. The successes cannot be denied. National income, the volume of industrial and agricultural production, and labor efficiency have increased. The stores have an adequate stock of foodstuffs and industrial goods, as Soviet tourists rightly note.

We can be satisfied with the quantitative growth. But it was deceptive. It was accompanied by a fall behind the world level. We discovered this in 1978 when the time came to repay our debts in convertible currency. It was necessary to sharply increase exports to Western countries. However, many of our goods were not competitive. Even the most reliable product—agricultural produce—did not always stand up to the competition from similar output from countries such as Portugal, Spain, Greece, and Turkey. It was suddenly revealed to us that our goods were too expensive, inferior in quality, and simply out of date. That was a bitter lesson. Goods were often sold at a loss, which undermined the basis of the national economy.

All this demonstrates that overcoming stagnation by means of a partial reform is as impossible as trying to resolve new problems by old methods. The administrative-bureaucratic approach of departmental organs reduces the effectiveness of progressive methods of management and drastically restricts the development of the people's intellectual capability. That is the **second** lesson of Hungary's 20-year experience.

[Sharov] Could you give us the figures on Hungary's foreign debt?

[Horvath] Of course. The gross debt figure (inclusive of accumulated interest) in convertible currency is already approaching $20 billion. The net debt is over $12 billion. This sum is more than double Hungary's entire annual exports in convertible currency. In 1988 the interest on credits borrowed in hard currency amounted to $3 billion.

We made inefficient use of our hard currency credits. Vast sums were spent on building new plants instead of modernizing existing ones. In the Western markets, as a rule, we bought only individual sections and production line assemblies instead of comprehensive machinery systems. Unfortunately, we were not the only ones to make such mistakes.

There are other problems, too. For instance, in the past 3 years national income has not matched consumption. This situation is familiar not only to Hungary: The volume of the debt and the state budget deficit continued to grow while social consumption and the population's consumption increased at the same time. Ultimately, this resulted in comparatively high inflation, stagnation, and even a decline in living standards.

Quite recently THE NEW YORK TIMES published an article by Bill Bradley, an influential U.S. senator. The article notes, in particular, that "cheap credit plays into the hands of the opponents of restructuring because it delays the day when the decisions will have to be taken. Without addressing the fundamental questions, it is possible to offer only temporary solutions to such problems as deficits, inflation, corruption, and declining labor productivity that afflict the economy."

I am sure that Hungary's 20-year experience fully confirms the U.S. senator's opinion. What Hungary needs from the West is not credit but help in creating a more efficient economy. That is the **third** great lesson of Hungary's experience.

[Sharov] In one of your articles I came across some very trenchant assessments. I quote: "It is absolutely clear to everyone today that the Hungarian economy, despite high local indicators, has suffered a failure in the world market." And again: "In Hungary a crisis of a distinctive character is gradually and imperceptibly developing, a crisis that has intensified acutely since 1980 with all the negative consequences. By the mid-eighties it undermined the foundation of the Hungarian economy." Are those still your views? And what do you mean by a "crisis of a distinctive character"?

[Horvath] Our reality gives no grounds for changing those assessments. But on the essentials of that crisis I can say the following: It is a crisis of overproduction of uncompetitive goods in conditions of the relative stagnation of technical development (compared to the highly developed Western countries).

In the resolution of 2 June 1987, the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP] Central Committee put forward the task of developing a program to stabilize the Hungarian economy and accelerate its socioeconomic development. That program was approved by the State Assembly in December that year.

In 1988, however, the negative processes in the economy continued. Industrial production growth was insignificant and occurred mainly in the primary raw materials sector: Despite rigorous restrictions there was a rapid increase in the volume of capital investments, which attested to the extensive character of development; the disproportions in the state budget exceeded the planned amounts.

Economic growth based on an uncompetitive production structure and sectoral fragmentation inevitably leads to a deepening of technical stagnation. Expanded reproduction under conditions of an outdated structure sharply deepens the crisis situation in a country. That is the **fourth** lesson of the Hungarian reform.

[Sharov] From this it emerges that it is necessary to clearly distinguish two aspects of restructuring in the material production sphere: the development of the economic structure and the improvement of the management system.

[Horvath] Absolutely right. These processes are mutually determining. If one lags behind, that prevents progress in the other sphere.

In July 1988 the MSZMP Central Committee Plenum examined two options for Hungary's socioeconomic development within the framework of the stabilization program. The alternatives were called "A" and "B." The plenum generally favored the first option. It is based on the involvement of foreign financial organizations and commercial banks in the solution of economic tasks. In that connection it is anticipated that there will be an expansion of market competition, a change in foreign currency rates, and a rise in domestic prices. The influence of the market mechanism will intensify. Structural transformations and the modernization of production will take 6-8 years by this route. Hungary will stop falling behind the Western countries, in my opinion, in 7-8 years. It is possible that it will approach their level in 20 years. But at the same time social tension can be expected to increase as the standard of living falls and differences in incomes increase. The number of unemployed will reach 80,000-100,000 a year. That will lead to a worsening of the overall political situation in the country. The MSZMP believes that it will be able to control the situation and cope with the difficulties.

Under alternative "B," the structural transformations will proceed more slowly, with less social and political tension, although the danger of a return to stagnation in society will persist.

[Sharov] The term "unemployment under socialism" has a somewhat unusual ring. It was always believed that full employment is one of the fundamental gains of our countries.

[Horvath] I am not going to doubt the historic achievements of socialism. They are beyond dispute. I am talking about the specific conditions in which our country has found itself. Although I would note that the problem of job placement under socialism did not originate in Hungary.

Yes, we believe that such painful surgical intervention in society's life is inevitable. However, it must be stressed that permanent unemployment will not be tolerated. It will be temporary for each person left without work. At the same time, as a rule, he will retain his wages in full.

[Sharov] So you believe then that the difficulties can be overcome only within a comprehensive reform of the management system and an integrated review of the economic mechanism. What direction is work in Hungary taking?

[Horvath] I should like to highlight six spheres of activity, six fundamental tasks that we are now tackling within the framework of the program. They are the restructuring of financial policy as the most important means of achieving stabilization; the introduction of a standard taxation system; the transfer to a flexible organizational structure and the elimination of sectoral fragmentation; the creation of a banking system that meets the new requirements; improved management of scientific and technical progress; and the refinement of the state leadership of economic life.

The range of concrete measures already being implemented is so vast that it is impossible to describe everything in detail. I shall cite just a few facts.

In the recent past state organs considered it quite legitimate to collect resources from collectives that were working well and use them to support unprofitable enterprises. Now a course has been adopted to eliminate unviable and unprofitable enterprises. Dozens of economic production organizations ceased operations in 1988.

Another innovation relates to foreign economic activity. Since 1 January last year every economic organization has had the right to engage in foreign economic activity. But that does not mean that they can all trade in everything. There are definite restrictions. They are quite rigorous.

There have been profound changes in the taxation system. Prior to 1988 it consisted of 12 types of tax. In addition, there were thousands of different individual benefits and subsidies. It was impossible to objectively gauge the effectiveness of the work of individual economic production organizations and economic organs in general. There are three standard taxes in operation now—a general turnover tax, an income tax on the population, and a business tax for partnerships and "private operators." Within the framework of this system it has been possible to resolve a whole series of problems, in particular to take a considerable step toward the creation of normal proportions in prices and to encourage the production of export goods, consumer goods, children's items, and medicines.

State subsidies on food, raw materials, fuel, and imported goods were abolished. That led to an increase in retail prices. But full compensation was not provided, of course. The population's real incomes fell. Social tension increased. Such, unfortunately, is the "price" to be paid for stabilizing the economy at the present stage.

A whole series of new elements have appeared in the regulation of financial and economic relations. A market in shares has appeared and a stock exchange has opened. A law has been adopted on the introduction of treasury notes.

A law has also been adopted on the creation of economic associations [assotsiatsiya]—companies [soobshchestvo]. It is aimed against sectoral fragmentation, the departmental principle of management, and against the monopolism that caused the socialist market so many problems. The introduction of flexible forms of communication and cooperation among economic production organizations is envisaged. The partners choose for themselves the form of company they find the most expedient and effective. This can be a simple or deposit partnership [prostoye ili depozitnoye tovarishchestvo], an economic corporation [obyedinyeniye], a joint venture, a limited liability company, or a joint stock company.

Hungarian party and state organs realized that the socioeconomic and social goals could not be achieved without a modern management system and the combination of various forms of ownership and new methods of economic management, where the decisive role is played by the market mechanism and personal initiative. Therein lies the **fifth** lesson of Hungary's 20-year experiment.

[Sharov] Does such a system leave any scope for intervention in economic affairs by central management organs?

[Horvath] We can already mention the directions that the improvement of the state leadership of economic life is taking. We are trying to eliminate sectoral fragmentation. The functions of the six remaining ministries have changed, their role has been enhanced, and their powers expanded. A number of state commissions have been abolished and a committee of the planned economy has been formed on their basis. It has been given the duty of elaborating economic policy and monitoring the fulfillment of national economic plans, the state budget, and nationwide programs. The innovative nature of the present moment is reflected in the fact that the committee apparatus consists of just 13 people!

[Sharov] The socialist countries are taking part in an increasingly active way in world trade and economic ties. That, indeed, is one aim of the Hungarian reform, too. What is new in that sphere?

[Horvath] The main innovation of the past year has been the establishment of official relations between CEMA and the EEC. Hungary was among the first CEMA members to normalize contacts with the EEC. We attach great significance to the agreement on trade and also on commercial and economic cooperation signed between Hungary and the EEC in Brussels. Under the agreement the EEC countries will lift the quantitative restrictions in our reciprocal trade—which are essentially an act of discrimination—by a set date.

At the same time, it must be stressed that, because of technical and economic backwardness, the Hungarian economy is out of "alignment" with the Common Market's requirements. Economic integration between Hungary and the Common Market is hardly relevant or feasible before the next century. We must continue to strengthen our cooperation with the socialist countries, broaden direct ties between enterprises, and as far as possible develop market methods of cooperation—first and foremost with Soviet enterprises. That is the **sixth** and perhaps most significant lesson for Hungary.

In conclusion, I should like to note that implementation of the stabilization program will reinforce socialism's positions in Hungary and open up prospects for the accelerated development of the national economy and the people's prosperity, which has always been and remains the MSZMP's main concern.

Reasons for PZPR Election Defeat Viewed

18070675 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 22 Jun 89 p 7

[Article by Irina Pirogova, SOVETSKAYA KULTURA special correspondent: "Time To Gather Stones"]

[Text] Could we say that the failure of the party coalition in the elections came as a surprise to the members of the PZPR [Polish United Workers' Party], both those holding responsible positions in the Central Committee and the government, and the rank-and-file? It is hard to give an unambiguous answer to this question.

Over the time of somewhat less than a month that I spent in Poland I happened to meet and talk with responsible party and state functionaries, journalists, culture and art personalities, and to visit Czestochowa, Olsztyn, and Gdansk in addition to Warsaw. In a word, I had an opportunity to observe the pre-election atmosphere in the country, as they say, from the inside, and relate what I saw to what I was told. The first thing that jumped out at me was the altogether exuberant vigor of the Solidarity election campaign. Its posters, appeals, and declarations covered the walls of houses, shop windows, bridge spans, and tree trunks—in a word, any flat space to which something could be glued. Everything was dominated by group portraits of the leader of Solidarity, as they would say, "in an embrace" with its candidates: Lech Walesa and well-known actor Andrzej Lapicki; Lech Walesa and an economist from Gdansk, Solidarity expert Krzysztof Bielecki; Lech Walesa and an architect from Sopot, Krzysztof Dowgiello; and so forth.

Activists of the Solidarity Civic Committee (SCC) handed out propaganda materials—handbills, lists of candidates—eagerly and free of charge, especially in front of churches. On the TV screen faces already familiar from the posters appeared continuously. You have to give it to them; they communicated with the TV audience in a very professional manner. (According to the terms accepted at the roundtable, Solidarity receives one 30-minute program a week on TV and a 1-hour program on the radio, and within the framework of the election campaign it received 23 percent of the air time). GAZETA WYBORCZA of Solidarity also played its appointed role.

It is impossible to deny that Solidarity propagandists made very skillful use of the word both in the press and in visual agitation. On election day in Gdansk, I encountered many times the following pronouncement among a lot of Solidarity proclamations, appeals, and information bulletins: "Only the best will do for Gdansk." At first sight, it does not appear to be something special. If you think, though, it becomes clear that this and similar slogans are aimed at bringing out in the inhabitants of the city a feeling of superiority over other citizens of the country, sowing the feeling of collective egoism and the conviction that Gdansk allegedly has special rights and privileges.

In the rampage of pre-election advertising, in the chorus of well-trained voices, the candidates of the coalition sort of got lost, and were relegated to the background, or further yet.

"How did it happen? How is this to be explained?" I asked my authoritative interlocutors. The answers were different, and each one of them was an adequate characteristic of the person giving it.

"The PZPR expects that by the end of the election campaign Solidarity will run out of gas, and this is when we enter the fight," said some.

"Solidarity is repeating our mistakes. The people have become tired of slogans in 45 years, tired of direct pressure on their consciences; this is why we count on their reason and wisdom," said others.

A bitter admission by a PZPR Central Committee functionary on the eve of the election came as a revelation:

"The weakness of our pre-election agitation is caused by the bewilderment of the apparatus. This is a consequence of getting used over many years to elections as simple voting, when the results were a foregone conclusion, when our candidates did not have to fight for their social authority, when it sufficed to say: He is a good comrade, he is ours. Unfortunately, at present there are very few people with us who cooperate with the party sincerely and selflessly. Among our candidates there is no one popular in all strata of society: I mean well-known writers, actors, and singers capable of speaking to the people in their own language. Besides, Solidarity is receiving weighty support from the West, not only material and technical, but also ideological. It is no accident that on the eve of the elections American political scientist and Sovietologist Zbigniew Brzezinski, famous American singer Stevie Wonder, and Yves Montand, who accepted the invitation of Andrzej Lapicki, came to Poland...."

Bitter as it is to acknowledge, the coalition indeed suffered a serious defeat. The reckoning was brought on by the burden of many years of mistakes and errors, the difficult Stalin-Bierut heritage, which in the eyes of many generations has not lost its gloomy destructive power, despite the PZPR conference held in May openly raising the issue of their negative consequences in Poland. After all, the frightening losses inflicted on the socialist countries by the influence of Stalin, Beria, and his apparatus are not a secret anymore for anyone—the consequences and limits of this influence are hard to determine even now. This is why the interest of the Polish public in this topic is so painfully heightened. They are saying here: Since Roy Medvedev has written the book "Stalin's People," someone here should write a book about "Bierut's People."

The truth and nothing but the truth may win back the trust of the people, the truth without silent omissions, without black-and-white pictures, without manipulating historical facts. After all, this process has affected both us and the Poles, regardless of the generation, having produced certain stereotypes of perceiving history, which now cannot be broken down painlessly.

Several years ago, on a trip to Krakow, having visited the tomb of Jozef Pilsudski and seen the truly universal adoration with which it was treated, I, at the time a person informed about Polish history only by my school and college textbooks, was at a loss: Why in a fraternal country do they worship a sworn enemy of Soviet power? I think I was not the only one with such doubts. After all, the Polish postwar propaganda also painted Pilsudski as a reactionary and anti-Soviet figure. It turns out that some of those evaluations were very lopsided and superficial. Certainly, there are no grounds to believe that the head of prewar Poland was a friend of the Soviet Union. However, we should not forget that, for example, Pilsudski was one of the leaders of the Polish Socialist Party, which cooperated with the RSDRP [Russian Social-Democratic Workers Party] as early as the 1905 revolution. It recently became known that during the civil war Pilsudski refused to deal with the top brass of the White Guards, clearly perceiving that the restoration of Russian monarchy would have posed a great danger for Poland. As they say, you cannot drop a word out of a song. For some reason, facts were omitted from history with great ease. This is a disease we share, and we have yet to cure it by our joint efforts.

It is not worthwhile to search history for examples paralleling what is happening in Poland at present. There are none. The optimism that we were so fond of quite recently is all the more unacceptable in this kind of situation. However, as the Russian saying goes, one person who has been bruised is worth two who have not been.

Having risen to the peak of power, Solidarity has accumulated formidable experience in criticizing the PZPR program and the government system. As far as a constructive program and a clear vision of the path that can lead out of the economic and social crisis are concerned, the proponents of Lech Walesa thus far have offered nothing definite to their fellow countrymen, except, of course, their hopes for Western "aid." (Some 62 percent of the citizens of the country took part in the first round of voting, and even fewer took part in the second round; this means that a large segment of the populace is indifferent, trusts neither side, and waits to see what is going to happen). To some degree this "aid" has already materialized: Let us recall the fate of the Gdansk Shipyard, the majority share in which was purchased by the widow of an American multimillionaire.

It is apparent at present that Solidarity has not avoided this sin. It is another matter that in the environment of political struggle nomenclature is unavoidable. However, it is difficult to explain how the nomenclature of Lech Walesa is better than the old one to the citizens of the country who are tired of the pressure brought to bear by the bureaucracy, and who have not yet received specific economic returns on changes in the political situation. After all, the pace at which this system regenerates itself is common knowledge.

I also think that many Poles gave their votes to Solidarity not out of a particular love for Lech Walesa and his comrades-in-arms, but rather as an expression of disagreement with the order of things currently existing in the economy.

It was difficult to venture a bold prediction of how the events would develop after the second round of elections. However, common sense suggested that, since the

PZPR and coalition parties had deliberately agreed to legalize the constructive opposition, the latter, having acquired this considerable political power, would not see fit to reject this principle, maintaining cooperation with the PZPR on the conditions of democracy and pluralism.

Two weeks after the second round of voting ended, this reasoning was confirmed. Since the SCC had already taken virtually all the seats reserved for it according to the roundtable accords, the opposition, according to a statement by the spokesman of the Warsaw Solidarity committee, considered the second round to be a formality.

Thus, the problem of creating a broad coalition of main social forces based on an agreement on the primary, most significant issues for the country presented by First Secretary of the PZPR Central Committee and Chairman of the State Council Wojciech Jaruzelski is being endowed with real content.

"One person who has been bruised is worth two who have not been..." This is a paradox: By now the PZPR has become considerably younger and... wiser. You perceive this when you see the collected manner in which many members of the party, without wringing their hands, received the defeat they consider deserved, without separating their fate from that of the party, the people, and the state.

"The issue is not only and not mostly what we have been. The issue is what we are going to be, what kind of qualitative changes are underway at present within every one of us, because only then will the entire party change. To paraphrase Ilya Ilf, I may say that we have been fighting for cleanliness too long instead of sweeping," Jerzy Lipinski, an executive official of the political information commission of the PZPR Central Committee, told me.

...Sooner or later, "the time to gather stones" comes. It has also come to Poland. The people have stated convincingly that they do not want to live the old way. Time will show what the new path—which requires unanimity, selflessness, and highly intensive work by all citizens—will be. One thing is clear: You cannot count on a miracle, and no one will help Poland but the Poles themselves, because "life on credit" must be paid for dearly.

Having gone through a severe test, the party intends to show the entire society that it remains the driving force of the reforms.

In a recent conversation with journalists, Wojciech Jaruzelski stressed that the honesty and consistency of the party shown at the roundtable talks and during the elections, as well as the future turn of events, would be the best proof of the fact that the PZPR has been and remains the force inspiring the development of Poland and implementing the reforms aimed at reinforcing socialism in the country.

May it be so!

West Europe

Turkish Foreign Minister Given Gorbachev Message

TA2806175289 Ankara TRT Television Network in Turkish 1700 GMT 28 Jun 89

[Text] Foreign Minister Mesut Yilmaz has said that it is not a question of the Soviet Union mediating officially between Turkey and Bulgaria. He said: The Soviet Union made a unilateral move, a move of goodwill.

The foreign minister was replying to reporters' questions after he emerged from the Council of Ministers meeting. He stressed that Turkey appreciates the Soviet Union's goodwill initiatives regarding the Bulgarian Turks issue.

Asked to comment on the talks held with Soviet Ambassador Albert Chernyshev, Yilmaz said: We explained our own position. He will hold further contacts. If he sees a possibility of reconciliation between the positions, then the status of mediator might be seriously considered.

Asked whether there are any signs that Bulgaria might change its position on negotiations without preconditions, Foreign Minister Yilmaz said: There is no reason for being optimistic at this stage.

Yilmaz said Chernyshev brought a verbal message from Gorbachev, and that he [Yilmaz] delivered this message to Prime Minister Ozal. The foreign minister did not disclose the contents of the message.

Admiral 'Concerned' About Turkey-Bulgaria Ties

TA2906154689 Ankara ANATOLIA in English 1515 GMT 29 Jun 89

[Text] Istanbul (A.A.)—Soviet Black Sea Fleet Commander Admiral Mikhail Khronopulo today said he felt "concerned" over the present relations between Turkey and Bulgaria.

Answering a question at a news conference on the occasion of a visit to Istanbul by two Soviet warships, the "Kerch" and the "Komsomolets Ukrainy," with the participation of the Soviet Ambassador to Ankara, Albert Chernyshev, Khronopulo said, "The Soviet Union is making efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the problem. The Soviet people regret the incidents."

He said that the start of friendly relations between the two countries in the military sphere had been laid when Turkish President Kenan Evren, then deputy chief of the Turkish General Staff, paid a visit to the Soviet Union in 1976.

Reciprocal visits of warships has become a tradition since then. A Turkish warships will visit Odessa in August.

Asked about the existence of a Soviet aircraft carrier called the "Kremlin," the admiral said no aircraft carrier of that name existed. "There are battle cruisers which carry aircraft. They are built in the south, and the stipulations of the Montreux Treaty are carefully observed," he said.

Council of Europe President Visits Moscow

Received by Petrovskiy

LD2706213289 Moscow TASS in English 2041 GMT 27 Jun 89

[Text] Moscow June 28 TASS—Vladimir Petrovskiy, Soviet deputy foreign minister, today received a delegation of the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe led by its President Anders Bjorck. An interested exchange of views on a wide spectrum of international issues was held during the meeting.

The sides paid particular attention to the concept of a common European home, the development of the relations of partnership, cooperation and collective creativity in Europe relying on the community and balance of states' interests, the role of European countries' parliamentarians in promoting the atmosphere of mutual understanding and trust.

On the same day, the delegation had a talk at the Soviet Academy of Sciences' Institute of Europe.

Meets With Lukyanov

PM2906111189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jun 89 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Meeting With Parliamentarians"]

[Text] Anatoliy Lukyanov, first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet and candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, received 28 June a Council of Europe parliamentary assembly delegation, headed by its President Anders Bjorck, which is in our country at the invitation of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

A detailed and constructive conversation on a wide range of European problems on approaches and prospects for implementing concepts of a common European home took place.

Anatoliy Lukyanov emphasized that the implementation of the idea of the integrity of Europe is possible only through cooperation and a search for joint solutions to topical problems of the continent on the roads of peace and cooperation. The parliaments and parliamentary associations of Europe, which have great opportunities for mobilizing broad political and social forces, can make a weighty contribution to implementing these noble tasks. It is especially important today to fill, by joint efforts, the provision accepted at the meeting in Vienna in the final document with real substance. It represents a good basis for further developing the Helsinki process in various directions.

It was noted that the Soviet Union attaches great importance to the regular contacts established recently between the USSR Supreme Soviet and the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe and other European parliamentary organizations. The profound transformations that have affected all spheres of Soviet society's life, including its political and legal superstructure, will undoubtedly have a favorable impact on the expansion and deepening of this dialogue and will promote the harmonization of relations on the continent and the creation of a kind of legal framework for the common European home.

The delegation members expressed gratitude for the opportunity to become acquainted with contemporary Soviet reality and the process of renewal. The work of the Congress of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet is being perceived in Western Europe as evidence of the irreversibility of the changes taking place in Soviet society. They gave information on the recent changes in the Council of Europe and about its policies in relation to Eastern Europe. The guests declared that great importance is being attached in the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe to the forthcoming speech by M.S. Gorbachev at its plenary session.

Both sides stressed the importance of the fact that the parliamentary dimension is becoming an increasingly important element in the emerging political cooperation between the USSR and the European communities. A desire was expressed for further development of contacts between the USSR Supreme Soviet and the parliamentary assembly in fields that could be of mutual interest.

Also today the guests had conversations at the USSR State Committee for the Protection of Nature and at the Council for Religious Affairs attached to the USSR Council of Ministers.

Discusses Rights, Environment, Consulate

AU3006082489 Paris AFP in English 2111 GMT 29 Jun 89

[Text] Moscow, June 29 (AFP)—Anders Bjorck, president of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, ended discussions here Thursday convinced of the strenghtening relationship between the Soviet Union and the Council of Europe.

In a press conference Mr Bjorck said discussions had been "very constructive and very concrete."

Talks were reportedly focusing on human rights, environmental and cultural issues and the opening of a Soviet consulate in Strasbourg, home of the 23-member panel.

Preparations were also made for an East-West debate to be held in Strasbourg on July 7 that will be attended by Soviet officials.

The Council of Europe has granted the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Poland and Hungary special observer status in order to facilitate relations with parliaments in these more reform-minded East European countries.

Mr. Bjorck, who headed a delegation of eight MP's, met with Vice President Anatoliy Lukyanov as well as Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy.

Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev is to address the Strasbourg assembly next month and 18 Soviet delegates are to attend Council meetings starting later this year.

"Mr. Lukyanov said that the Soviet Union wished to proceed step-by-step" in its relationship with the Council, said Mr. Bjorck, adding that the Soviet Union was ready to rapidly sign some of the 142 Council of Europe conventions.

"We think that even if we cannot predict the future, the democratization of these countries has gone too far to be reversed," said Mr. Bjorck, adding, "Everything is up for debate but human rights."

He said that he hoped Mr. Gorbachev "would elaborate on his concept for a common European home" in Strasbourg next month.

Welcomes Gorbachev Strasbourg Visit

LD3006052089 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 29 Jun 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Reporter A. Sturua] After the press conference, Anders Bjorck, in an interview for the Vremya program and in reply to a question about the main aims of the visit, said:

[Begin recording] [Bjorck in English with superimposed Russian translation] Above all, we wanted to reach an understanding on the future of cooperation between the USSR Supreme Soviet and our organization [Council of Europe parliamentary assembly]. It is important to note that we not only reached agreement on this but also outlined specific areas for future cooperation.

[Sturua] Very shortly President Gorbachev will be in Strasbourg and will address your council. What do you expect from this?

[Bjorck] He will be in Strasbourg next week. It is the first time that a European socialist head of state has addressed us. I hope that he will give us a more detailed explanation of his understanding of a common European home and will say how he would like to see it. Mainly, I hope that the visit will provide a beginning of the building of this home. For our part, we are ready to cooperate and pin great hopes on this coming visit by Comrade Gorbachev. [end recording]

Council of Europe President Views E. Europe Ties

PM2306144489 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 25, 18 Jun 89 p 2

[Report on interview with Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly President Anders Bjorck by Dmitriy Yakushkin in Paris: "Window to Europe"; date of interview not given]

[Text] Paris—Hungary, Poland, the USSR and Yugoslavia were the first socialist countries to get so-called special guest status at the Council of Europe as decided by that council's Bureau of the Parliamentary Assembly. This status allows these countries to attend and speak to the council's assembly sessions and numerous commissions.

Anders Bjorck, president of the parliamentary assembly, deputy to Sweden's Riksdag, expressed, in an interview to an MN correspondent, his hope that he'd see Soviet parliamentarians at the autumn sesson of the assembly in Strasbourg.

"Whoever had predicted something like this 2 or 3 years ago would've been called mad," says A. Bjorck. "We started discussing the question of offering the special status to East European countries last year. Many of our members were shocked by this. This was absolutely new to them, and I had to personally accelerate the decision-making procedure."

MN: Have you tried to establish contacts with East European countries before?

A.B.: Yes, but their reaction was always the same—"No, no, and once more no!" Even our letters simply came back to us unanswered! The Council of Europe at the time was not recognized by Eastern Europe—we were called the child of the cold war.

MN: Mikhail Gorbachev expects to meet with members of the Council of Europe in July. What do you expect from his visit?

A.B.: It is always dangerous to use such a high-falutin' word, but I'd call his forthcoming visit historical. For the first time the Soviet leader will speak at a parliamentary assembly of this type. Through our parliamentarians—and there are 350 of them from 23 countries of Europe—he'll address millions of Europeans. As for the content of his speech, I'd like to hear about the USSR's approach to some of the conventions adopted by the Council of Europe on human rights and the possibility of the USSR cooperating with us in culture and environmental protection. We'd like to know Mikhail Gorbachev's point of view on the prospects for cooperation between the Council of Europe and the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Council of Europe Official Views Gorbachev Visit

LD3006080789 Moscow TASS in English 0653 GMT 30 Jun 89

[Text] Paris June 30 TASS—By TASS correspondent Nikita Yeremakov: "East-West relations have changed significantly since 1985 and this process is far from complete, it has just begun", Catherine Lalumiere, secretary-general of the Council of Europe, told TASS.

Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev will tour the headquarters of this organisation, grouping 23 West European countries, in Strasbourg during his official visit to France.

The development of East-West relations is aimed at overcoming Europe's division, Lalumiere went on. This division covered ideology, politics and the economy. In ideological terms, serious changes are occurring in the Soviet Union now, although it is clear tht far from all of the ideological heritage will be revised since there are a lot of goods things in it. At the political level, East-West relations are being gradually intensified but in the commercial and economic field they are still far from reaching their potential.

For two years now the Council of Europe has been pondering ways to improve relations with the eastern part of our continent, primarily with the Soviet Union, Lalumiere stressed. Work in this direction was as vigorous as ever and we are fully determined to cooperate with the Soviet Union in a variety of areas within the bounds of our competence.

In this regard, we are looking forward with hope to Gorbachev's arrival in Strasbourg and his speech, Lalumiere said. She personally was interested above all in the president's ideas concerning the building of a common European home. The Council of Europe, too, has considerations on this score, therefore, it is important for it to learn the Soviet point of view and then to discuss the available proposals and further steps. The visit of Gorbachev, whose approach to these problems is constructive and positive, will help identify specific areas of cooperation and map out ways to attain these goals.

Lalumiere dwelt on the "specially invited" status which the Council of Europe intends to grant to the Soviet Union and some other European socialist countries. It will enable representatives of Soviet legislative bodies to participate in the work of the European Parliament and in some of its commissions without the right to vote. This can become the first stage of the Soviet Union's rapprochement with the Council of Europe.

The joining by the Soviet Union of the Council of Europe's conventions could be another area of cooperation, in her view. Many of them—from nature conservation and production standards to the pharmaceutical industry and preventing natural and technological catastrophes and overcoming their consequences—can be signed by the Soviet side immediately. There are no political conditions and hurdles to this. Other documents, for instance those concerning culture and human rights, envisage respect for definite values, a state ruled by law and definite legal and procedural mechanisms for the protection of the individual.

But the situation in this field in the Soviet Union is also rapidly changing, therefore, the Council of Europe does not regard this area of cooperation as closed. The recent elections of people's deputies of the USSR and their first congress, which was marked by an atmosphere of surprising honesty, have convinced the Council of Europe of the correctness of the course of cooperation with the Soviet Union.

Lalumiere believes that the discussion of the common European home is not only of purely intellectual interest. Definite political actions should follow.

Spokesman Previews Gorbachev Visit to France

LD3006170489 Moscow TASS in English 1530 GMT 30 Jun 89

[Text] Moscow June 30 TASS—"The main purpose of the forthcoming Soviet-French summit is to confirm the traditional, perpetual and substantial development of the dialogue between the USSR and France as an important element of the entire complex of the Soviet Union's relations with Europe", Vsevolod Sukhov, deputy head of the First European Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry, told a briefing here today. He addressed reporters prior to the visit to France by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee and president of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Dwelling on the topics of the forthcoming conversations, the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman gave priority to the problems of Europe, European security, of the construction of a common European home. Questions of the Vienna talks on disarmament in Europe and the entire complex of the problems of European and international security will undoubtedly come up for discussion.

During the visit much attention will be given to the entire complex of bilateral relations and cooperation, Sukhov said. The coordination of more than a dozen agreements is being completed now. Approximately half of the number of the agreements to be signed will cover economic cooperation. They include the agreement on mutual encouragement and mutual protection of capital investments. There will be several agreements about the development of cultural cooperation.

Sukhov called the attention of the journalists to the agreement on contacts between the armed forces of the USSR and of France in 1990-1991.

There are plans for Gorbachev's meeting with representatives of the French public in Sorbonne during the visit, the diplomat said. On concluding the stay in Paris, Gorbachev will visit Strasbourg on July 6 and will address the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe. The Soviet leader will thus have the first contact with one of the most representative West European political organisations. The Soviet side hopes that this will set the beginning of a dialogue and the development of contacts with that organisation and will help ensure that these contacts and cooperation advance in a right direction and at a high enough pace.

Asked about the possibility of the signing of a document similar to the joint statement signed during Gorbachev's visit to the FRG, the Foreign Ministry spokesman said that the signing of any joint documents of such a general nature is not yet envisaged.

French Foreign Minister Previews Gorbachev Visit

Sees Visit as 'New Stimulus'

PM2806162189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Jun 89 First Edition p 1

[TASS report: "Important Event"]

[Text] Paris, 27 Jun—M.S. Gorbachev's upcoming official visit to France and his talks with President Francois Mitterrand will be an exceedingly important event in relations between our countries, French Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Roland Dumas said in an interview for the French magazine FRANCE-USSR.

It is significant that the visit is taking place not long before the summit meeting of the seven major Western countries and the celebration of the bicentennial of the great French Revolution, and in a crucial period in the evolution of East-West relations. The talks will sum up the results of implementation of the action program agreed to last November during the French president's trip to the USSR and will be a new stimulus to our bilateral relations in all spheres.

Soviet-French relations have always had enormous significance—in view of their long tradition, the USSR's prestige in Europe and in the world in general, and also the special role France has assumed on the international stage, while remaining independent in the security sphere and, at the same time, being a member of the North Atlantic Alliance, R. Dumas stressed. The USSR and France are situated at two extremes of Europe and are, at the same time, the only continental nuclear powers and permanent members of the UN Security Council. This gives them a special responsibility. All this graphically demonstrates what paramount partners our two countries are for one another. The strengthening of their cooperation in all spheres, which will be confirmed during the upcoming meeting between the heads of state of the USSR and France, will impart new momentum to the building of a safer and more just world.

Discusses French-Soviet Ties

LD0107194489

["Planeta: International Program" on Gorbachev's upcoming visit to France, including interview with French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas by Moscow TV correspondent Potapov; date, place of interview not given—live or recorded; Dumas speaks in French with superimposed Russian translation by Potapov]

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1415 GMT on 1 July broadcasts a 40-minute program entitled "Planeta: International Program," which is devoted entirely to Gorbachev's upcoming visit to France. The program includes a travelogue of Paris in summer and various information about industrial links between France and the USSR.

The program also includes an interview with French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas by correspondent Potapov. Potapov says: "After almost 4 years, the Soviet leader will again be visiting France. I discussed the significance of this visit with French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas." The interview then proceeds as follows:

[Dumas] This is a most important event for France and for the world. The visit will take place a few days before the meeting in Paris of the heads of state and government of the seven most developed countries of the West, and after the NATO adoption of the Brussels Declaration, the proposals for disarmament in Europe, and other world events of current importance. It is therefore very important that the president of the Republic, in accordance with a previous agreement, will meet Mr Gorbachev and discuss all these issues. We consider that the moment for a new Soviet-French summit has been very well chosen.

[Potapov] What is your assessment of the present state of Soviet-French relations, and how do you think the summit meeting in Paris could help the development of our relations?

[Dumas] I would say that historically, relations between the Soviet Union and France have been good. That is a statement of fact. But in my opinion, they have not yet attained the appropriate level in all spheres. We have developed political contacts. In particular, I have met with Soviet Minister Mr Shevardnadze, if memory serves me right, seven times since October of last year. So meetings between ministers are frequent, and between top-ranking diplomats, too. Things are going well in the political sphere. We expect Mr Gorbachev's visit to provide a new impetus to our relations, both at the summit level and in the sphere of economic and cultural exchanges. We will be signing a number of agreements that should open the way to a new stage in the development of our contacts.

Official Discusses UK Diplomatic Expulsions

18070664 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 24, 17-23 Jun 89 p 7

[Interview with N. Uspenskiy, chief of the Second European Department, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by D. Makarov: "The 'Non Grata' Methods of English Diplomacy"; date, place of interview not given; first two paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] **The general warming of the international climate was shadowed recently by a certain unpleasant incident: the expulsion of 11 Soviet citizens from Great Britain. This was followed by retaliatory measures on the part of the USSR Government.**

Our correspondent D. Makarov requested the comments of N. Uspenskiy, chief of the Second European Department of the USSR MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs].

[Uspenskiy] Unfortunately, events developed the same way they frequently have in the past: On 19 May J. Fretwell, political director of the British Foreign Office, summoned Soviet Ambassador to London L. Zamyatin, issued a statement, and handed over a list of names of 11 Soviet officials, demanding that they leave the country within 2 weeks. To this list were added the names of three Soviet citizens who had already left Great Britain having been declared persona non grata. In the statement by the British Foreign Office, the 14 people listed had been accused of "impermissible intelligence activity."

Our ambassador challenged the accusations as completely unfounded and not supported by facts. He declared a protest to the British side, emphasizing that all of our officials have strictly observed all international norms.

[Makarov] How did the Soviet Government react?

[Uspenskiy] The next day R. Braithwaite, British ambassador to Moscow, was invited to the USSR Foreign Ministry where First Deputy Secretary A. Kovalev announced the measures taken by the USSR Government. According to these measures, it was proposed that 11 British citizens leave the USSR within 2 weeks. Three British citizens who had left the country were also declared persona non grata. Additionally, it was stated that from now on we will set a quota for the personnel of British institutions in Moscow. The thing is that some time ago the English first set limits on the numbers of our officials in London. At present the quota is 205 people. In accordance with the decision of the Soviet Government, a comparable system will henceforth be established for British representatives in Moscow.

[Makarov] Why, in your view, did the British Government choose precisely this moment for its unfriendly action?

[Uspenskiy] I and my colleagues in the department are convinced that the action of the British authorities is of a purely political nature. The thing is that in spite of the fact that significant progress has been made in Soviet-British dialogue, at the same time our views on issues of nuclear disarmament diverge seriously. There are influential forces in England that do not like the USSR's radical position on the issue of tactical nuclear weaponry. Under the influence of peaceful Soviet proposals, the image of the enemy they have created over many decades in order to justify their goals has begun to melt and disintegrate. And since the Soviet positions on issues such as human rights and disarmament are now practically invulnerable, one of the few areas where it is still possible to try to charge up passions is spymania, which is exactly what was set in motion.

[Makarov] But was it not possible to avoid the publicity of mutual expulsions of Soviet and British citizens? As far as I know, the British authorities asserted that they had supposedly proposed to the USSR that this matter be circumvented quietly in order to avoid any negative effect on Soviet-British relations.

[Uspenskiy] Indeed, when the political director of the British Foreign Office made the representation to the Soviet ambassador, he said the British side did not wish to make the matter public in order to minimize the damage to Soviet-British relations. In the response made by the USSR on the following day, we agreed to the British proposals. We announced that we would adhere to the principle of confidentiality as long as the British side did so.

But this agreement held for only 12 hours. By Sunday the British ambassador in Moscow had gathered journalists and told them everything. Naturally, after that the chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry's Information Administration, G. Gerasimov, made an announcement disclosing our position.

[Makarov] It seems to me that the expulsions of Soviet citizens from Great Britain and the introduction of quotas have taken place before as well.

[Uspenskiy] Indeed, the British Government has taken such actions in the past as well. More than once. Thus, for example, in September 1971 105 people were expelled from England after being accused of "impermissible activity"; the quota limiting the number of personnel at the USSR Embassy was introduced in 1968 on the pretext of the events in Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Government has only now, 20 years later, introduced a quota on the number of British citizens in the USSR as a retaliatory measure.

[Makarov] Some feel that the retaliatory expulsion of British diplomats and journalists and the introduction of quotas on the visits of British citizens to the USSR do more harm to our country than to Great Britain since we are interested in trade, economic, and other relations with one of the leading countries of the West.

[Uspenskiy] In this case, I recall the words M.S. Gorbachev spoke in 1985 which, in my view, are still topical: The USSR is as interested in relations with England as England is interested in relations with the USSR.

We acted with reciprocity in the case of the expulsions. If the British side considers it possible to increase and, even better, to completely eliminate quotas, which we have frequently requested, then we are prepared to eliminate the quota on the number of British citizens in the USSR.

[Makarov] Can you give an example of the lack of Soviet specialists complicating the work of our institutions in Great Britain?

[Uspenskiy] Only through gargantuan efforts are we ensuring Aeroflot flights to this country; their number is increasing since the stream of tourists has grown. And in other fields, the volume of relations is now such that it requires reinforcement through intellectual resources, both in Moscow and in London. Therefore, the establishment of quotas is an echo of the cold war which hangs like a millstone around the neck of our relations.

[Makarov] How do you assess the quota from the point of view of international law?

[Uspenskiy] Just 1 year ago Great Britain, along with other European countries, the United States, and Canada, signed the Vienna accords which speak of the expansion of contacts among peoples, of citizens' rights to travel from one country to another. Of course, limiting the number of personnel at Soviet representations abroad complicates our people's work related to the obligations of the European process—for example, the issuance of visas.

[Makarov] Can you see any way out of the situation that has been created?

[Uspenskiy] To my mind, the way out is for both sides to show realism and restraint and attempt to preserve everything valuable that has been accumulated in our relations over recent years, and to hold a calm and open dialogue on all issues, including complex and touchy ones. Experience shows that both sides know how to do that.

Political & Social

Gorbachev's TV Address on Interethnic Relations

PM0107161589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Jul 89 Morning Edition p 1

["Speech on Central Television by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet"—IZVESTIYA headline]

[Text] Dear comrades!

At today's meeting I would like to talk with you about the question of interethnic relations, a question which, so I believe—and I am sure of this—is of concern to every Soviet person today.

People's tranquility and well-being, the fate of restructuring, and, if you like, the fate and integrity of our state depend to a considerable degree on its correct resolution.

We, all of us really, cannot fail to be concerned at the fact that intolerance, friction, and even conflicts on interethnic grounds—conflicts which dislodge people from the normal routine of life and which in a number of cases have resulted in human tragedies—have recently arisen now in one place, now in another.

Can one really remain indifferent to and unconcerned about the fate of the refugees who have appeared among us and the misfortunes of people forced to leave their homes and abandon property and work?

The refugees include old people, women, and children whose destiny has been cracked for their whole life. They suffer not only physical hardships. Far graver are the moral upheavals that can leave their mark on people's way of thinking, on their behavior and character.

Violence, which becomes an inevitable consequence of enmity among peoples, has always given rise to evil and immorality.

This is not to mention the fact that all this has a ruinous effect on the economy of the regions and the whole country and entails serious material losses.

When the situation became exacerbated in Nagorno-Karabakh last year and enterprises came to a halt in Stepanakert—incidentally, a small city on our scale—that affected the work rhythm of hundreds of enterprises and the budgets of many families and working people and harmed them.

We are speaking of individual hotbeds of interethnic clashes. But if we are not aware of the whole tremendous danger of such phenomena and if they spread, then worse times could await us.

People of all nationalities must know this situation, must be aware of it. Irresponsible slogans, political incitement, a gamble on the artificial counterposing and clashing of interests and on the squeezing out of certain nations by others, and appeals and actions of this sort could lead to a universal disaster.

The present generation and our descendants will curse both those who pushed us onto this path and those who did not warn in time and halt the madness.

As chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, I consider it my duty to warn of the growing danger of an exacerbation of interethnic relations and the associated consequences for society, for every family, and for every person.

Everyone must obey the laws of the country in which he lives. Only this can guarantee the citizen's rights regardless of his nationality. And the state will uphold these rights with all the means at its disposal.

No one must tolerate nationalist manifestations in any form—be they local nationalism or chauvinism. They are degrading for any nation and are insulting and indecent from the viewpoint of human dignity.

We must not tolerate those who would like to use the friction that has arisen in interethnic relations for speculative or even criminal purposes. If intolerance is really needed somewhere, it is, above all, with regard to those who deliberately fan interethnic strife.

I have already said and I wish to repeat that this is playing with fire. Whoever has embarked on this path assumes very grave responsibility before his own people and society as a whole.

We are obliged to halt such a development of the situation. And we must not waver, taking the most resolute measures, in accordance with the laws' demands and the people's vital interests, against those who provoke interethnic clashes and call for borders to be redrawn and for national minorities to be expelled.

Their can be no connivance here either with those who have embarked on a criminal path or with those who contribute to this.

But when speaking of the need for urgent actions, we must not reduce all work just to emergency measures, to putting out fires. Comrades, we must look deeply into everything, implement a package of measures to improve interethnic relations, and eliminate the causes that lie at the bottom of the complications that have arisen.

Looking the truth in the eyes, we must admit that, in addition to tremendous achievements in the development of all our peoples, many problems have accumulated that demand both close attention and urgent actions.

The causes of the difficulties that have arisen are complex.

Hardly anyone would be able to deny the tremendous changes that have occurred in the economy and the culture of all our country's peoples. But they have also created their own problems, which were not noticed for a long time and were driven deep inside.

Ethnic problems and problems caused by stagnation in the economy and by lack of attention to people's social needs became interwoven in a tight knot of contradictions.

The once current principle of merging all nations led in practice to the result that the objective trend and, in general, the healthy trend toward rapprochement and internationalization was counterposed to the growth of ethnic self-awareness.

Today we are reaping the fruits of the lawlessness that was permitted in previous decades—the expulsion of entire peoples from their lands, obliviousness to the ethnic interests of small nations. All that happened, and it could not pass without trace.

The result of such distortions was indifference toward ethnic interests, the failure to resolve many socioeconomic problems of the republics and autonomies, deformations in the development of the language and culture of the country's peoples, the exacerbation of the demographic situation, and many other negative consequences—which, in the final analysis, created tension in interethnic relations.

We are all faced with the very complex task of bringing these relations into a normal, healthy channel. This is vitally necessary.

We must make the correct choice and clearly determine the approaches from which these questions will be resolved.

What is seen as the key to resolving the problems that have accumulated?

First. We must be guided by the fundamental socialist criterion mentioned back at the 19th party conference: Each person, whatever his nation, must feel himself to be an equal citizen in any part of the country and must have the opportunity to enjoy all the rights guaranteed by the USSR Constitution.

The equality of nations and peoples is inextricably connected with the equality of people regardless of their nationality. That is human civilization's supreme principle of humanism.

Dramatic new events are already taking place and may arise wherever there is no understanding of this principle. So far the conflicts have affected regions where people of certain nationalities constitute a minority and small communities.

But what if interethnic strife spreads and embraces regions where millions of people of other nationalities live alongside people of the indigenous nationality?

Surely it is clear how tragic the consequences of this senseless strife may be. And what kind of an example will we be setting for others as we call on all mankind to establish a nonviolent world.

Second. We can expect a change for the better only if each nation and each people feel, I would say, confident in their own home and their own land.

Therefore, all the necessary preconditions must be ensured for economic and social progress, the free development of language and culture, and the preservation and rational utilization of the environment in which the lives of their forebears has proceeded throughout the centuries.

That is clear, just as it is also clear that the prosperity of the indigenous nationality cannot be attained at the cost of infringing the rights and freedoms of, still less squeezing out, people of other nationalities who have linked their lives and the future of their children and grandchildren with that land.

We have lived and will continue to live in a multinational community. That is true with regard to all union and autonomous republics, all autonomous oblasts and okrugs, and all krays and oblasts of the country.

That is the specific nature of our multinational union. And it must be taken into account.

Third. After the CPSU Central Committee April (1985) Plenum the party and people reached a conclusion on the need to implement a radical political and economic reform. Now life has brought us to the realization that it is equally necessary to carry out profound transformations in the Soviet federation as well.

It is quite clear that thorough study of all the questions associated with this will be required. Here, too, we must act together. It is our common concern. We are all interested in ensuring that the best decisions are adopted.

This work has begun and is proceeding intensively. Soon questions of the party's nationalities policy will be discussed at a CPSU Central Committee plenum. The USSR Congress of People's Deputies and the country's Supreme Soviet will thoroughly deal with them.

What should be said now is this. When thinking about restructuring the federation and harmonizing interethnic relations, we cannot fail to take into account the realities that have taken shape over entire centuries, especially during the years of Soviet power.

Within the federation our peoples have come a long way in their economic, social, and cultural development and impressive results have been achieved, as I have said. Today both each individual republic and our entire federation can demonstrate outstanding achievements of modern civilization.

The social interests of all the republics are firmly interwoven within the framework of the union, and a unified national economic complex based on a countrywide division of labor and production sharing has been established.

The richer and brighter the blossoming of each nation is, the stronger our Soviet unity is.

Even taking into account the fact that miscalculations, many miscalculations, have been made in this matter and there are clear absurdities in it that require rectification, it remains a fact that all republics and regions are most closely interconnected with one another.

To break these connections would be a great wrench. In the quest for something better we must not take the road of destroying what has been created and abandoning what the federation has already yielded, which can be augmented within its framework.

Therefore, calls for economic autarky and spiritual isolation must be deemed profoundly alien to the vital interests of any people and of all society. Their implementation would throw us all a long way back—a long way back—and would bring tremendous material and moral losses to each nation and each person.

Yet what we are primarily endeavoring to do in embarking on perestroyka is to radically improve our life. And there are real possibilities of this.

I am convinced that the answers to all the questions that perturb us should be sought not in the destruction—not in the destruction—of unity, but along the road of resolutely renewing the federation in order to give it a second wind, as it were, and to fully implement in practice the principles on which Lenin based the union of Soviet republics.

All these questions are not a matter for the distant future. They must be resolved during the present stage of the political reform.

Fourth. In speaking of interethnic relations and the sheer complexity of this question in a multinational country, I would like to stress the thought of the responsibility of the Communists, Komsomol [Leninist Communist Youth League] members, and entire public of our republics.

A great deal depends on our intelligentsia, on scientists and cultural figures in all republics. Their influence on nationalities processes is tremendous, and the peoples heed what they say. We expect this influence to be sensible and beneficial.

Everything concerning nationalities problems passes through the consciousness and heart of man. Therefore, every citizen of our society must have his say in calling for the soothing of interethnic passions.

Extreme responsibility and honesty on these questions and, most important of all, actions and specific deeds are now required of literally everyone.

No one who cares about peace and people's prosperity can be a spectator from the sidelines. Positions on these questions must be clear and firm.

While resolutely opposing any manifestations of nationalism, it is important to be sensitive and responsive to all legitimate national demands and aspirations.

The Soviet peoples have a single destiny. The questions that confront us, even the most complex questions, can be and already are being resolved on the basis of democratic discussion, tolerance, and consideration toward one another. We simply have no alternative. We must not only clearly understand that, but also act accordingly.

Dear Comrades! I am appealing to people of all our country's nationalities, to you all. I am appealing to your minds and hearts.

I am appealing to you to display the gratest responsibility toward the present and the future and to do everything to solve the accumulated problems in interethnic relations on the basis of friendship and cooperation and to lead the Soviet federation out onto the broad road of development in our common interests.

Former Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko Dead at 79

Gorbachev Announces 2 Jul Death

OW0307074289 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0600 GMT 3 Jul 89

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Before we start with the agenda, dear comrades, I would like to tell you that yesterday Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko passed away. I ask you to honor his memory by standing. [Video shows deputies rising for a minute of silence]

It is unnecessary for me to speak about Andrey Andreyevich. No doubt this will be done at the appropriate time. All of you know this man. His whole life has been tied to our history, achievements, problems, [word indistinct]. This man was in the thick of things for decades.

I think that even though Andrey Andreyevich has been on a pension during recent times—he recently left the Central Committee at his own request—nevertheless, we should, on behalf of the Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the government, inform the people and do all that is necessary for our people to bid him farewell. Do you agree with me? [The deputies answer in the affirmative] [passage omitted]

Funeral Scheduled; Commission Named

LD0307173789 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1710 GMT 3 Jul 89

["Notification of the Death of Andrey Gromyko"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, July 3 (TASS)—The Central Committee of the CPSU, Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and the Soviet Government announced today with profound grief that the prominent figure of the Communist Party and Soviet State Andrey Gromyko, died on 2 July in his 80th year after a serious and prolonged illness.

The Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers have formed a government commission headed by Vitaliy Vorotnikov to organize the funeral of Andrey Gromyko.

People will be able to pay their last respects to the dead in the central House of the Soviet Army. The funeral will take place on Wednesday [5 July] at the Novodevichye Cemetery.

TASS Reviews Gromyko's Career

LD0307081989 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0750 GMT 3 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow 3 Jul (TASS)—As has already been reported Andrey Gromyko passed away on Sunday at the age of 79. One of the greatest Soviet diplomats and statesmen of the older generation, for half a century he had occupied prominent, influential, and subsequently even key posts in the USSR.

Back in 1939 Andrey Gromyko became a counsellor at the USSR's embassy in the United States, but it was in 1943 that his name gained wide currency, when he was appointed the USSR's ambassador to the United States of America. It was in this capacity that he headed the Soviet delegation to the 1944 conference at Dumbarton Oaks, where the decision was made to create the United Nations Organization, and in 1945 he headed the USSR delegation to the San Francisco conference where the UN Charter was adopted. For many years Andrey Gromyko was the only statesman left alive whose signature was featured under the charter of this universal world organization.

Andrey Gromyko took part in the work of historic international meetings such as the Crimean and Potsdam conferences of the heads of the three great powers of the anti-Hitlerite coalition—the USSR, United States, and Great Britain. He also worked as the USSR's ambassador in Great Britain, and for many years held the post of deputy and first deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR.

For about 30 (?years) Gromyko headed the Soviet diplomatic department, setting a unique record of holding this major state post. In recent years (1985-1988) he occupied the supreme post in the Soviet state, that of chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. For more than 3 decades he was repeatedly elected a member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, the supreme collegial leading organ of the ruling party in the USSR.

In the person of Andrey Gromyko the Soviet country has lost one of its prominent leaders, a man from a peasant family who was able, thanks to his abilities and personal qualities, to rise to high posts in the party and state.

CPSU Politburo Meets 29 Jun, Reviews Party Work

LD3006183189 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1620 GMT 30 Jun 89

[Text] Moscow, 30 Jun (TASS)—The CPSU Central Committee Politburo at a session yesterday examined the question of the work of party organizations in the conditions created by the deepening of restructuring and the progress of political reform.

It was noted that on the basis of the guidelines of the 27th CPSU Congress and 19th all-union conference, the processes of democratization and glasnost are further being developed in the work of the party organizations and more is being expected of party members. In 1988, 438,900 people joined the Communist Party, half of them workers. The Communists' are being swelled by active participants in restructuring who are convinced of the rightness of the CPSU's new course. The health of the party's ranks has been positively affected by the fact that they are increasingly being purged of mercenary-minded, morally unscrupulous elements—of those who blacken the name of Communist. A decision on this issue will be published in the press. The Politburo examined progress in implementing the decisions made previously on policy in the sphere of money circulation in the country. It analyzed in detail the causes that have brought about negative phenomena on the consumer market, something that has direct influence upon the political situation in the country and the mood of the people. During discussion of this question, concern was expressed over the slow positive changes in this sphere and dissatisfaction that many ministries, departments, and republican and local soviet and economic bodies have been dragging their feet in taking specific measures, displaying formalism, and waiting for instructions from above. The attention of Communists working in the USSR Council of Ministers, the central economic departments, and the councils of ministers of the union republics was drawn to the need for carefully devised and effective measures for the economic regulation of the income of enterprises and of the population, the activation of anti-inflationary levers, and the vigorous development of voluntary forms of mobilization of the monetary resources of enterprises and of the population.

The Politburo approved the results of the conversation between M.S. Gorbachev and T. Zhivkov, general secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee and chairman of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria [PRB], which affirmed the mutual comradely interest of both parties in the success of the reforms being implemented in the USSR and the PRB. The similarity of many pressing problems relating to the development and renewal of socialism—in addition to the natural difference in the approaches to resolving them, taking into account the specific conditions of each country—creates objective prerequisites for deepening Soviet-Bulgarian cooperation. The mutual readiness to develop links between both parties, further improve the mechanism for pooling experience, and jointly draw up a new model for cooperation was stressed. Relevant instructions were given on the accords that have been reached.

The results of the meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and E. Honecker, general secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED] Central Committee and chairman of the GDR Council of State, were discussed and approved. It was noted that the comradely exchange held at the meeting, during which information and views on topical matters relating to restructuring in the Soviet Union and the implementation of the SED's course toward combining continuity and renewal were expressed, has great significance for further improving cooperation between the two parties and further strengthening the traditional friendship between the peoples of the Soviet Union and the GDR. The deep mutual interest in the real success of the transformations being implemented in the two countries was stressed. The CPSU and the SED reaffirmed their attachment to the new politicl thinking and expressed their readiness, together with allied socialist countries, to consistently pursue a course toward improving the situation, expanding equitable cooperation in Europe, and continuing the measures that have been started in the disarmament sphere.

The session examined the results of the talks between M.S. Gorbachev, and A.A. Hashemi-Rafsanjani, speaker of parliament and acting commander in chief of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran, who was in the Soviet Union on an official friendly visit. It was noted that the accords reached during the visit give a new impetus to the further advancement of Soviet-Iranian relations along the path of good-neighhborliness and cooperation and to the achievement of greater mutual understanding and trust between the USSR and Iran. The declaration on the principles of relations and friendly cooperation between the USSR and the Islamic Republic of Iran and the long-term program of trade and economic and scientific and technological cooperation for the period up to the year 2000, which define the spheres of active cooperation between the two countries and which were signed in Moscow by M.S. Gorbachev and A.A. Hashemi-Rafsanjani, are of principal importance. The mutual striving of the Soviet Union and Iran to build their relations on a new basis that meets the interests of the peoples of both countries, as well as peace and stability in the region and in the whole world, was ascertained with satisfaction.

V.I. Vorotnikov's information on the results of the official visit of a Soviet delegation to Brazil was reviewed. It was noted with satisfaction that the constructive Soviet-Brazilian dialogue and the coinciding of the approaches of the two countries toward prospects for the development of the world process are having a positive effect upon bilateral relations and are helping multilateral efforts aimed at improving the international situation. During the visit the interest in principle of the Soviet Union in the further development of relations with Latin American countries, which in recent years has been acquiring a more and more versatile character, was confirmed.

30 Jun CPSU Central Committee Conference Held

LD3006215489 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 30 Jun 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] A conference at the CPSU Central Committee today [30 June] examined the fulfillment of the decisions of the party and government aimed at developing bases for storing and processing agricultural produce and machine building in the food sector, and setting up a modern food industry.

Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev opened the conference with introductory remarks. The report was delivered by Comrade Ligachev. A broad exchange of views took place on the matters discussed. Comrade Gorbachev spoke in conclusion.

The conference was attended by Comrades Zaykov, Ryzhkov, Maslyukov, Razumovskiy, Solovyev, Baklanov, and by deputy chairmen of the USSR Council of Ministers.

A report on the conference will be published in the press.

Those taking part in the conference visited an exhibition fair that has opened at the USSR Exhibition of Economic Achievements of equipment for food sectors of the industry and small-scale mechanized equipment in the country's agro-industry of Moscow and Moscow Oblast.

3 Jul Supreme Soviet Proceedings Reported

Gorbachev Announces Gromyko Death

LD0307081389 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0630 GMT 3 Jul 89

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet session continued its work in the Kremlin today under the chairmanship of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev.

At a joint sitting of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities, Comrade Gorbachev announced that Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko had died yesterday. The deputies paid tribute to his memory by standing.

The chairman went on to give the information that the Supreme Soviet is faced with discussing the candidacies of 50 members of the government. Because of this he called for attention to be given during the debates to the most important problems, and for deputies to be more clear cut and precise.

Primakov, chairman of the Soviet of the Union, made an announcement about the voting procedure, and the order of work of the sitting of the Supreme soviet and its committees and commissions. A decision on this issue was adopted by a majority of votes.

The candidature of Pavel Ivanovich Mostovoy for the post of deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and chairman of the USSR State Committee for Material and Technical Supply was the first to be presented for discussion.

In addition, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev put a request to the deputies that the candidacies of the USSR minister of defense, and also that of the country's minister of finance be examined out of turn in connection with the forthcoming overseas visit.

The session is continuing its work.

Candidacy Discussions Resume

LD0307074289 Moscow TASS in English 0721 GMT 3 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 3 TASS—By TASS parliamentary correspondent:

The USSR Supreme Soviet gathered in the Kremlin on Monday after the weekend interval to continue the discussion of ministerial candidates.

The meeting, chaired by Mikhail Gorbachev, is expected to complete the discussion of candidates for three remaining vacant posts of deputy chairmen of the USSR Council of Ministers today.

The three candidates are Pavel Mostovoy, proposed for chairman of the State Committee for Material and Technical Supply, Lev Ryabev, nominated to head the Bureau for the Fuel-and-Energy Complex, and Ivan Silayev, the incumbent head of the Council of Ministers' Machine Building Bureau, who has again been proposed for the post.

The parliament is yet to hold a second vote on the candidacy of Vladimir Kamentsev who was proposed for deputy premier and head of the State Foreign Economic Commission.

Kamentsev failed to win the 272 votes he needed from the 542-member parliament for approval at last Friday's meeting which was attended by only about 400 deputies.

Eight deputy chairmen of the USSR Council of Ministers and the foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, were approved by parliament last week.

Mostovoy Confirmed Deputy Chairman

LD0307094389 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0800 GMT 3 Jul 89

[Vladimir Korablev report from the 3 July Kremlin Supreme Soviet joint session]

[Excerpts] The joint session of the Soviet of the Union and Soviet of Nationalities was opened today by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. He announced that by 1000, 429 deputies had registered to take part in the work of the session. Some deputies are absent for valid reasons. For instance, the Lithuanian delegation consists of six deputies out of 15, since the rest are taking part in the work of the Supreme Soviet session of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev then asked the deputies to honor the memory of Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, who passed away yesterday.

Yevgeniy Maksimovich Primakov, chairman of the Soviet of the Union, informed the deputies of the Supreme Soviet's adoption, prior to ratification by the Congress of People's Deputies, the second congress, of a provisional decision envisaging that the sessions of the chambers be regarded as plenipotentiary if they are attended by two-thirds of the deputies, and that adopted decisions be regarded as valid in the event of the majority of deputies with the right of deciding vote for them.

The deputies went on to resume discussion of candidatures to the composition of the USSR government. [passage omitted on deputies, interviewed prior to today's session, speaking in favor of Gorbachev's 1 July address]

First to be discussed at the session was the candidature of Pavel Ivanovich Mostovoy, recommended for the confirmation to the post of deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and chairman of USSR Gossnab. [State Committee for Material and Technical Supply] He is 58 years old. By education he is a mechanical engineer. At present he is chairman of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic State Committee for Material and

Technical Supply. Pavel Ivanovich Mostovoy presented to deputies an extended program of restructuring of the work of Gossnab. He said many sectors of our industry would from next year be transferred to wholesale trade, and this would make it possible to reduce the shortage of output. He spoke of the need for the campaign to save natural resources. In this connection, Comrade Mostovoy drew attention to the need for wide use of secondary raw materials. The main thing in determining our successes in solving socioeconomic problems in the near future are well-balanced plans for 1990 and the 12th 5-year plan period, Pavel Ivanovich Mostovoy said, concluding his speech.

By a majority of votes he was confirmed in the post of deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the USSR Gossnab.

In view of production necessity, as Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev noted, deputies started to debate the candidatures of Comrade Yazov, recommended to the post of USSR minister of defense, and Comrade Pavlov, recommended to the post of USSR minister of finance.

I will tell you in more detail about this in an hour's time, but now a break has been announced at the session. I now end my reportage from the Kremlin on the USSR Supreme Soviet session.

Yazov's Candidacy Debated

LD0307094689 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0830 GMT 3 Jul 89

[Report from the Supreme Soviet session by correspondent Aleksandr Ruvinskiy]

[Excerpts] The session resumed work at 1000 this morning. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev opened the session. He announced that Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko died yesterday. The deputies paid their respects to the memory of Comrade Gromyko.

At a joint session of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities, a discussion of the candidates for Soviet Government posts was continued. Before the start of the discussion, the deputies adopted the decision, until the procedure for the Congress of People's Deputies and Supreme Soviet session is confirmed, to approve candidacies in the future by a simple majority of votes among those present at the session sitting. The sittings are to be considered competent if no less than two thirds of the members of the Supreme Soviet are present; and the sittings of committees and permanent commissions are to be considered competent if no less than half of their complement are present. [passage omitted]

Then consideration of the candidate for the post of minister of defense began. Comrade Yazov was recommended for this. For an hour he answered numerous diverse questions from deputies; these were posed both in written form and directly from the body of the hall. Here is what he said in reply to one of the most common questions:

[Begin Yazov recording] Many people are now raising the question of freeing the students on active military service. At the present moment 176,000 students called up in 1987 and 1988 are on active military service. Roughly half of the questions from deputies to the minister of defense wonder whether it is not possible to let the students called up in 1987 and 1988 go early. I would reply that those 176,000 students are a very highly trained part of the Armed Forces. They have undergone training in training subunits and are section commanders, tank commanders, infantry fighting vehicles and gun commanders. In other words, 176,000 of the junior officer corps would be discharged, and that would undoubtedly have an effect on the battle readiness of the Armed Forces.

Any decision can be made, but I would ask you to bear this in mind: At the present moment there is no possibility of discharging these comrades, and they must do the length of service that is laid down by the law. [end recording]

[Rovinskiy] By a majority of votes the deputies passed a decision to close question time and to set about debating the candidacy. This debate began right after the break a few minutes ago.

Report on Yazov Candidacy Debate

LD0307114789 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0900 GMT 3 Jul 89

[Correspondent Lyudmila Semina report from USSR Supreme Soviet session in the Kremlin]

[Excerpts] The USSR Supreme Soviet session today continues to discuss the candidates for posts in the new government. But at the beginning of today's session the deputies reviewed questions concerning regulations and the summing up of the voting results. It was decided that an issue shall be decided by the majority of those present provided two-thirds of the deputies of both chambers take part in the session. Pavel Ivanovich Mostovoy was the first today to be confirmed in the post of deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. [passage omitted] Then, Dmitriy Timofeyevich Yazov was submitted for confirmation in the post of USSR minister of defense. He has been in this post since 1987. [passage omitted] The discussion of Comrade Yazov's candidacy, and his replies to questions have exceeded the regulations that have been set out. The session was chaired by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, and he said that we need full clarity in all questions. Here are Comrade Yazov's answers to some questions and his understanding of the work of his department. Military doctrine is determined by the country's supreme political leadership, while the Ministry of Defense decides specific measures for its implementation. Well, probably everyone is interested in the strength of the armed forces: it is

3.7 million men. This will be the figure after the reduction by 500,000 servicemen. In comparison, the United states has 3.05 million servicemen. Yearly expenditure on the Army, calculated per head of the country's population, is R270 in this country, and $1.3 thousand in the United States.

In answer to a question about creating a professional army, Comrade Yazov said that we cannot shoulder this at present. But we do have semi-professional troops, for example military air pilots, officers and warrant officers on submarines.

The next problem is this: 176,000 people are now engaged in military service. In connection with the fact that these are the most qualified junior command personnel, it is not possible to recall everyone from the Army.

Answering a question about democratization in the Army, Comrade Yazov said that the process is taking place, but one-man management is still the main thing in the Army. The deputies also raised the vexed question of negative phenomena in the Army, above all about the bullying [devodovshchina] of junior conscripts by their seniors. Comrade Yazov said that he is also concerned with this problem. But nevertheless he thinks that there is more talk about it than facts. When he stated that there is 1 case per 27 companies the hall started to hum with indignation. I understand the deputies very well. I think that even because of one case like this, the alarm should be raised. It is necessary to remember that our children serve in the Army.

There were also questions concerning the limitation of nuclear weapons tests, and about when Vladivostok will become an open city. In his reply to this question, that the city has already been opened, I think Comrade Yazov permitted himself a sentence which comes from the time of stagnation: None of them will break their backs if they—meaning foreign delegations—make a call and notify in advance that they wish to pay a visit. Yes, everyone needs to change their thinking, even those in such high posts. And it is precisely this that was discussed during the debate on this candidacy. It is now continuing after a break. Those taking part in it were both military and civilian people. Each of them cited facts which could alarm the public. But the main thing, in the view of the deputies, is that the claimant to the post of defense minister failed to outline a program for the reorganization and democratization of the Army and juridicial protection of military servicemen.

I have just heard the following: The entire restructuring of the Army so far has been replaced by demagogic delarations. The discussion on Comrade Yazov's candidacy is continuing. With this I end my reportage from the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Yazov Reappointed Defense Minister

LD0307101889 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1011 GMT 3 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow, 3 Jul (TASS)—TASS parliamentary correspondent reports from the Kremlin:

The 66 year-old Dmitriy Yazov was reappointed USSR minister of defense today.

The majority of members of the USSR Supreme Soviet voted for the reappointment of Army General Yazov to this post which he has occupied since 1987.

Criticism of Yazov Reported

LD0307120389 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1100 GMT 3 Jul 89

[Report by commentator Aleksandr Ruvinskiy]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] A sharp debate developed [at the joint session of the Session of the Supreme Soviet today] around Comrade Yazov's candidacy for the post of defense minister. The deputies talked about the lack of social security for servicemen, the poor living conditions for officers, and the structure of the Armed Forces. Remarks were made about the personality of the candidate for the post of defense minister. Criticism was leveled at the position of the Armed Forces toward local soviets. The low level of military discipline and paper-shuffling in the Army were mentioned. The deputies criticized Comrade Yazov's stance toward students who are on military service for a fixed period at the present time. There were proposals to the effect that they be given the opportunity to continue their education even if the term of this service has not expired.

Gorbachev spoke at the session and supported the candidacy of Comrade Yazov for the post of defense minister. However, he agreed with some of the remarks that had been made. As a result of the voting—77 votes against and 66 abstentions—Comrade Yazov has been endorsed as USSR defense minister.

There is now a break. The session will resume at 1600. It is also intended that the candidacy for the post of USSR minister of finance will also be examined today.

Pavlov Confirmed Finance Minister

LD0307141489 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 3 Jul 89

[Vladimir Korablev report from USSR Supreme Soviet joint session]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] After the break, at 1600, the joint session of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities continued its examination of candidates for the composition of the USSR Government. Members of the Supreme Soviet started debating the candidature of Valentin Sergeyevich Pavlov for the post of USSR minister of finance. By speciality he is an economist, a doctor of economic sciences. In 1956 he graduated from the Moscow Finance Institute. He has a fairly extensive experience of work in the field of finances. His career has ranged from ordinary inspector of Kalininskiy rayon finance department of the City of Moscow to chairman of the USSR State Committee on Prices.

In his speech, Valentin Sergeyevich spoke of our country's complex financial situation, and about the fact that the finance and credit system needs serious restructuring. Restructuring in the field of finance, Comrade Pavlov stressed, consists in raising the yield on each ruble invested. Now, Comrade Pavlov noted, attention must be concentrated on questions of the regime of economies and one must seek the necessary resources for raising the peoples' living standard. Then Valentin Sergeyevich Pavlov answered many questions from deputies. They concerned monetary reform, increasing purchase prices, a bill on taxation, on levying state duties on inheritance, on taxation of unmarried people and people with small families.

Deputy Tikhonov read an address from the participants in the recent congress of members of production and services cooperatives, saying that the recent decree of 23 February 1989 on taxation contradicts the law on cooperatives.

Only now has the voting ended. By a majority of votes Comrade Pavlov has been confirmed in the post of USSR minister of finance.

Ryabev Confirmed Deputy Chairman

LD0307161889 Moscow TASS in English 1550 GMT 3 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow, July 3 TASS—By TASS Parliamentary Correspondent reporting from the Kremlin:

The USSR Supreme Soviet, at the joint session of its two chambers today, continued the debate on the composition of a new goverment.

In addition to Dmitriy Yazov, who was confirmed as defence minister today, several more candidates have passed the parliamentary "exams".

Pavel Mostovoy, nominated to be deputy prime minister and chairman of the USSR State Committee for Material and Technical Supplies, set out a programme of overhauling the system of supplies to meet the needs of the country's economy.

He pointed out that in 1992 the country will fully embrace the system of wholesale trade with regard to means of production.

The process has already started: in 1987, wholesale trade covered only four per cent of the entire volume of supplies, while in 1989, the figure grew to 40 per cent. The parliament has confirmed his nomination by the majority of votes.

At the afternoon sitting, chaired by First Vice-President of the Supreme Soviet Anatoliy Lukyanov, the deputies considered the candidacy of Valentin Pavlov, a 52 year-old Doctor of Economics, as Finance Minister.

After setting out his views on the reduction of state spending, the candidate responded to a question about his attitude to the idea of conducting a money reform. He believes that it is not expedient now since such measures should be undertaken only when the national economy begins an upward movement. Otherwise, the reform will only damage it.

After Pavlov's appointment, the Supreme Soviet confirmed by the absolute majority of votes the candidacy of Lev Ryabev to the post of Deputy Prime Minister and chairman of the Bureau of the USSR Council of Ministers for the fuel and energy complex.

The 56-year-old candidate had earlier held the position of Minister of Medium Machine-Building of the USSR.

He is convinced that as the international situation becomes warmer, the press will publish more stories on military activity.

The candidate described the procedure of burying nuclear waste. He said that waste products are either transported to remote uninhabited places, where they will be kept for a long time, or to processing enterprises.

Speaking about the construction of an atomic power plant in the Crimea, he said that a competent commission was studying that region's seismisity. If it is found to be more than seven points (the magnitude the station is designed to withstand), the nuclear facility will not be built.

Ryabev also announced that a commission of the International Atomic Energy Agency will arrive in the Soviet Union next November to consider the safety of reactors used at the Chernobyl power plant.

He stressed that the modified reactor of the year 1989 differed considerably from the 1986 model and would not blow up even if the conditions that led to the Chernobyl disaster are repeated.

Confirmation Procedures Changed

LD0307160289 Moscow TASS in English 1641 GMT 3 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 3 TASS—A TASS parliamentary correspondent reports from the Kremlin:

Today's meeting of both chambers of Soviet Parliament was concluded by the wish of success to president of the USSR Supreme Soviet Mikhail Gorbachev who flies on Tuesday [4 July] to France for a visit.

Throughout the day the deputies continued the discussions of the composition of the Soviet government. The discussion began last week. Dmitriy Yazov, 66, USSR defence minister from 1987 will continue on this post.

Valentin Mostovoi, 58, chairman of the Ukraine's State Committee for Material and Technical Supplies, became a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers. He will now head the USSR State Committee for Material and Technical Supplies.

Lev Ryabev, 56, former USSR minister of medium machine-building, also became a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers. He will head the Bureau of the USSR Council of Ministers for the Fuel and Energy Complex.

The parliament today adopted a decree which will apparently have a positive effect on the further discussion of the cabinet's composition and on the solution of other personnel questions. Decisions on appointments will from now on be adopted by the majority of votes of those present, not of the total number of deputies of the chambers.

The previous practice oriented at the old Soviet parliament which was convened for two or three days proved unsuitable for the permanently working Supreme Soviet. A number of deputies are members of parliaments of the republics, some deputies combine the activity in the Supreme Soviet with other duties and so cannot attend the meetings of the chambers every day. Because of this, as the practice of the past week showed, it is far from always that the majority of votes from the total composition of the chambers could be received. For that reason some decisions, specifically the appointment of Vladimir Kamentsev a deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, could not be endorsed. The situation will become simpler now.

The discussion of the Cabinet's composition will be continued by the chambers tomorrow morning.

Yazov Rejects Speculation on Military Coup

LD0307151989 Moscow World Service in English 1500 GMT 3 Jul 89

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Dmitriy Yazov, in an interview with Radio Moscow, has rejected foreign and local speculation about the possibility of a military coup in the Soviet Union. He said there was no question of a coup and that such allegations were being peddled with the aim of causing collision between some leaders and politicians. The minister assured Radio Moscow listeners that the Army's business was exclusively the country's defense.

Correspondents Report on Governmental Debates

PM0207165189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Jul 89 Morning Edition pp 1-2

[Report by special correspondents G. Alimov, E. Gonzalyez, V. Romanyuk, A. Stepovoy, V. Tolstov, and V. Shchepotkin: "Trial by Democracy"]

[Text] In the morning of 30 June the USSR Supreme Soviet continued forming the government. V.Kh. Doguzhiyev's candidacy for the post of deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers was the first to be examined. Even though he is to tackle in the future something quite new to us—the creation of a comprehensive state system to ensure the population's safety—not so many questions were put to V.Kh. Doguzhiyev.

So M.S. Gorbachev, who was in the chair, was soon able to put the question to the vote. Only four deputies abstained, and no one raised his hand against V.Kh. Doguzhiyev's candidacy.

Let us recall that candidates for the Cabinet of ministers are, by common agreement, considered in alphabetical order. But here M.S. Gorbachev asked for a digression: Circumstances demand that we have a plenipotentiary foreign minister and a plenipotentiary administrator of affairs of the USSR Council of Ministers.

E.A. Shevardnadze expressed readiness to give a review of the ministry's work in the space of 15-20 minutes, but the deputies preferred to hear at another time a thorough report on the subject of international relations. And not in order to assess the candidate—his activity gives rise to no doubt—but in order themselves to be au fait with the problems.

The USSR Supreme Soviet unanimously appointed E.A. Shevardnadze foreign minister.

"A unique instance in all our work," M.S. Gorbachev remarked in this connection.

Quite a few points were put to M.S. Shkabardnya, recommended for the post of administrator of affairs of the USSR Council of Ministers. They ranged from the technical equipment for sittings of the Supreme Soviet itself to the structural work scheme of ministries and departments and ties and cooperation among them.

During the vote one hand was raised against M.S. Shkabardnya, and two deputies abstained.

It seemed that the appointments would continue in this generally peaceable vein. At any rate, it could hardly be supposed that there would be a clash of opinions during the discussion of the candidate for the post of deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers for foreign economic questions.

V.M. Kamentsev, proposed for this post, portrayed the situation in a quite detailed and self-critical manner. The chief problem is the structure of exports and imports, which does not suit us. The main achievement is the democratization of foreign economic activity and the opportunity for any producers to participate in world trade. V.M. Kamentsev went on to expound his views on price formation and the convertibility of the ruble and answered many but (owing to the lack of time) not all questions.

However, the very first deputy to go to the microphones to discuss the candidacy said that he would vote "against." It must be noted here that there is an understanding among the deputies: to speak only if they have complaints, criticisms, or suggestions; there is no point in extolling a candidate. Moreover, V.A. Gubarev, a deputy from Krasnodar Kray, said that he was not against V.M. Kamentsev personally, but against the policy of selling off our irreplaceable riches—oil, gas, timber.

Deputy G.I. Filshin from Irkutsk spoke out still more sharply, and not just against foreign economic policy, but also against the candidate for the post of deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. He substantiated his opinion point-by-point with the methodicalness of a scientist. Another deputy—L.I. Sukhov, a driver from Kharkov—also joined the opponents of the proposed candidacy.

However, five deputies supported V.M. Kamentsev, albeit with reservations, promising to vote for him. N.I. Ryzhkov, who had proposed V.M. Kamentsev for this post, explained his position. Incidentally, he rejected Deputy Filshin's arguments, also point-by-point and justifiably. "Kamentsev can be criticized, just like every member of the government," N.I. Ryzhkov said. "But you must remember that with his participation over 2 and ½ years we have shaken monopolism in foreign economic activity and created potential for trade in everything. Is that not an achievement?"

When it came to the vote, the absence of more than 100 deputies was a factor. Precisely 246 hands were raised for V.M. Kamentsev. Considerably fewer voted against or abstained, but he did not get half the votes of those on the deputies' register. The resolution of the question was deferred.

In the break we had a brief interview with Professor K.D. Prunskene, member of the Supreme Soviet Committee for Economic Reform.

[Correspondent] Kamentsev, candidate for the post of deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, has just said that the problem of the ruble's convertibility can be resolved stage-by-stage and over a long time. What is your opinion?

[Prunskene] I agree that the country is not ready today to have a convertible currency. First, it is necessary to ensure quite a strong position for Soviet goods on the foreign market and take a worthy place in the world system of the division of labor. Therefore, Kamentsev is right when he says that the introduction of the convertible ruble would harm the economy now. But I am not at all satisfied with the fact that the republics have not secured adequate independence in the program of foreign economic activity expounded by him. This is why I voted against his candidacy. [Prunskene ends]

The discussion of the candidacy of N.P. Laverov for the post of deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the Committee for Science and Technology began after the break. For 45 minutes he answered numerous questions put in writing by members of the Supreme Soviet. These questions concerned, in particular, problems of the development of small-scale power generation on small rivers, the training of specialists in higher educational institutions, the education of the most gifted children, patents...

By a majority of votes Academician N.P. Laverov was appointed to the post of deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

Several other questions were examined at the end of the sitting. By a majority of votes the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted a decision to grant the USSR general prosecutor the right to extend the term for keeping in custody a group of suspects accused of committing particularly dangerous crimes. There was information on the consequences of the well known events from a group of deputies who had visited Fergana.

...The previous day, 29 June, as already reported in IZVESTIYA, A.P. Biryukova and V.K. Gusev had undergone parliamentary trials for the posts of deputy chairmen of the USSR Council of Ministers. Neither aspirant is a novice in his or her field. Vladimir Kuzmich Gusev became a deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers 3 years ago, in June 1986. But Aleksandra Pavlovna Biryukova did so quite recently in 1988, when restructuring was already breaking many usual stereotypes. However, what changes have occurred in the political life of society in such a short time! The appointment procedure itself is very vivid evidence of this.

You can understand in a human way the psychological discomfort which many of us probably feel when it is necessary to undergo a personal trial by democracy. You will agree that these are far from being the same thing—a cabinet appointment within a narrow circle of examiners and an overtly committed examination by several hundred people who have brought into the USSR Supreme Soviet auditorium the anxieties and cares of the broad people's masses. This is a test of competence, of profound knowledge of problems, and of the ability to suggest ways out of the very difficult situations in which the country has found itself. All the more so if, like A.P.

Biryukova, you are in charge of such a multifaceted area of the government's work as the social sphere—one which, moreover, affects the interests of each of us. This is why many questions were put to her.

Deputies, and thus voters too, learned interesting information about the prospects for the provision of pensions by listening to some of A.P. Biryukova's replies. Thus, for example, asked whether it would be possible, when establishing pensions for women in Central Asia and Kazakhstan, to take account of the fact that they have to raise five or more children, the candidate for the high government post reported that this is taken partly into account now and will be provided for in the new Law on Pensions.

Deputies' strict exactingness both in committee and commission sittings and at the Supreme Soviet session itself is gradually becoming the norm and increasingly commonplace. But, at the same time, unfettered actions on the part of deputies are also becoming an increasingly frequent phenomenon, boring stiffness is vanishing, increasingly frequent use is being made of jokes and humor, and sometimes the courtesy that lends humanity even to something serious appears. A.P. Biryukova had already answered a good 10 questions, but notes still continued coming in—but not only to her, to the presidium also. And M.S. Gorbachev seized on a free minute to read out one of them. "When so many male Supreme Soviet deputies put many questions to the only woman in the government, my Caucasian heart cannot stand it. I propose ending the answers to questions and that all members of the Supreme Soviet vote for Aleksandra Pavlovna..."

There was applause and laughter. After another reply to a question and then a number of speeches, voting began. The result is already known: The USSR Supreme Soviet appointed A.P. Biryukova deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Bureau for Social Development.

Right after her appointment she gave a brief interview to IZVESTIYA.

[Correspondent] You have never before been through such a procedure. What are your impressions?

[Biryukova] I have already started getting used to this. During the work of the committees and commissions I went through a similar, and perhaps even tougher procedure. I was listened to in eight committees and commissions. I must point out that in the Committee for Public Health Comrade Chazov and I spent a total of 7 hours standing on the rostrum, setting forth our programs, and answering questions—from 0900 through 1600. And in the Commission for Consumer Goods and Trade the cross-examination lasted 3 and ½ hours. This was roughly how things stood in the other committees and commissions.

[Correspondent] How do you intend to organize your work with the USSR Supreme Soviet?

[Biryukova] It is hard to say at present. But, in any case, we will have to work very vigorously with the committees and commissions. I myself will probably not be able to participate constantly in their sittings every day. That is impossible. When examining fundamental questions of the social complex, I cannot conceive of myself seeking solutions without consulting with deputies. I will participate in hearings and explain and, where necessary, defend the government's position before the Supreme Soviet.

[Correspondent] What, in your view, is the value of the procedure for approving members of the government?

[Biryukova] This is a complex but good school. I can only say that the huge number of questions—I had time to answer only some of them—is very rich material for thought, for drawing up my immediate work program and long-term programs. [Biryukova ends]

After the break A.I. Lukyanov took M.S. Gorbachev's place as chairman. He announced that V.K. Gusev was recommended for the post of deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the Bureau for the Chemical and Timber Complex.

The aspirant delivered a short exposition of his program and answered numerous questions. V.K. Gusev's fairly self-critical speech might have seemed conducive to a calm discussion of problems of the chemical and timber complex. However, when the notes dried up and speeches began in the debate, it very soon became apparent that the deputies were not so peaceably minded. On the contrary, there followed very cutting assessments, whose purport may be summed up like this: The activity of the chemical and timber complex is creating a crisis in a number of sectors of the national economy. In no other country in the world are there such losses of timber, particularly during drifting. At the same time as the degree of wear and tear to fixed capital has reached critical proportions, progressive technologies are not being introduced.

Two people's deputies from Bashkiria spoke—Yu.K. Sharipov, general director of Ufa's S.M. Kirov Production Association, and M.G. Rakhimov, director of the 22d CPSU Congress Ufa Oil Refinery. Yu.K. Sharipov reported that 44 million tonnes of oil are processed and hundreds of thousands of tonnes of chemical products produced in the Ufa-Blagoveshchensk section—which is 18 km. There is a superfluity of petrochemical and chemical production facilities in Sterlitamak, Salavat, Meleuz... The autonomous republic, which constitutes 0.7 percent of the territory and 1.4 percent of the population of the USSR, today provides 60 percent of the union production of herbicides and processes 30 percent of the oil. And there has been no improvement during the 3 years that V.K. Gusev has headed the chemical and timber complex.

M.G. Rakhimov's speech was couched in a more conciliatory tone: It is, of course, necessary to build, but to build ecologically clean projects, not forgetting, of course, people's social needs.

People's Deputy V.D. Yudin still further exacerbated the situation. He declared totally undiplomatically that the USSR Council of Ministers Bureau for the Chemical and Timber Complex does not have a clear-cut, constructive program. On the one hand, the leader of the complex appears to be campaigning for a reduction in the felling of forests, while on the other he is taking credit for high indicators precisely for timber felling.

The atmosphere was clearly becoming heated. And here N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, took the floor. I agree, he pointed out, that we are talking of one of our country's most complicated and contradictory national economic complexes. It has evolved historically in such a way that we really have lagged very far behind in the chemical industry from the viewpoint of world consumption. Very many problems have accumulated in this sector. They have been doing so for decades. Today, N.I. Ryzhkov said, it is a question not of V.K. Gusev but of the chemical industry and the development of the state's chemical production facilities. Let us take a comprehensive approach to examining these problems, because the problems will remain whoever we put at the head of the complex. V.K. Gusev will go, but the problems will stay. It is necessary to form a program for our country's chemicalization, determine the levels that must be reached, and decide what must be done for this!

Very many complaints were put to V.K. Gusev today, N.I. Ryzhkov went on to say. But I will tell you, for example, how Bashkiria has behaved on the question of introducing new production facilities in the city of Blagoveshchensk. How many times Comrade Shakirov complained to the CPSU Central Committee general secretary about me as chairman of the Council of Ministers, "pushing" for these projects! For years the leadership of the autonomous republic "pushed" for the project, complained, and wrote official letters to the effect that N.I. Ryzhkov would not adopt a decision. But I said: Wait, don't be in a hurry. We are negotiating with foreign firms on the purchase of the latest technologies. We are pursuing a definite line. No, came the reply, let's build what there is. So is V.K. Gusev to blame for that now?

As regards V.K. Gusev's candidacy, I abide by my opinion. It is up to you to decide. But I believe that he is an honest, qualified man, a very good man who knows his job. Please support his candidacy.

The speech by the head of government, so it seemed not only to us, substantially changed the mood in the auditorium. It was hard to remain neutral on listening to the emotional, sincere speech of someone appealing for support to the legislators, being convinced of his own choice. However, this is one more sign of the times: Now you must more and more often reckon with competent power.

Voting began. By an overwhelming majority of votes V.K. Gusev was appointed deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the Bureau for the Chemical and Timber Complex.

After his appointment, still flushed with emotion and feeling, V.K. Gusev granted IZVESTIYA a brief interview:

"It was an extremely complex and crucial test. The situation in the chemical and timber complex is extremely complicated. It is perfectly clear that our chemical industry cannot develop now without making amendments. I think we still assess a very great deal in the old way. A departmental view hinders life and work. Therefore, the process of the democratic examination of problems in the Supreme Soviet and in its committees and commissions will make us take a completely new look both at the development of the chemical industry and at the population's attitude toward it."

After the sitting we turned to N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

"What has been going on in the Supreme Soviet for 2 weeks now is a great school for everyone," Nikolay Ivanovich said, "both for the person who aspires to or is recommended for some state post and for those who discuss him. I believe that this is a mutual school. This is, in point of fact, a new beginning in the formation of the government. There has never been such a thing in 70 years. I am convinced that this will go down in the history of our state."

[Correspondent] Please say which Supreme Soviet the government finds it easier to work with: The present one or the former, obedient one?

[Ryzhkov] I am firmly convinced that the government will find it easier to work with a Supreme Soviet such as the present one. It will set about resolving very important questions. Just yesterday a comrade spoke, saying: The Council of Ministers issues a lot of resolutions... I favor issuing fewer, but let someone issue more laws. The more laws there are, the fewer resolutions there will be. Therefore, I am convinced that it is easier to work with such a Supreme Soviet. Not from the viewpoint of relations, for there will be much discussion and many arguments. But from the viewpoint of formulating a common position—how to lead our state on in the spheres both of the economy and of social development. I believe that with such a Supreme Soviet we will proceed more quickly than we did with the old one.

From a purely human viewpoint, what is my attitude to the whole procedure?... I have already expressed my view. I take a positive attitude to this procedure in principle. But when for weeks on end you hear criticism addressed to the government and the chairman of the Council of Ministers, I would not say there is any great joy in this. But the Supreme Soviet, too, will pass through this school, and it will realize that it, too, needs a strong government. If the Supreme Soviet has a weak government, I believe it will be a disaster. Then all the statutes and everything that the Supreme Soviet outlines will be left hanging in the air.

When my colleagues—the deputies whom I have recommended—stand on the rostrum, I, of course, feel for every one of them. I feel in a purely human way. And I am very pleased when they answer competently, when they show their erudition and the scale of their thinking. Then I am pleased with them.

[Correspondent] When does the prime minister of the Soviet Union end his workday now?

[Ryzhkov] At 2300. [Ryzhkov ends]

The USSR Supreme Soviet sitting ended at precisely 1400. The work of the committees and commissions resumed after a 2-hour break.

30 Jun Supreme Soviet Proceedings Reported

Radio Reports on Proceedings

LD3006103189 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0900 GMT 30 Jun 89

[Text] At the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. In the Kremlin a correspondents' post of All-Union Radio is operating. Now we have our correspondent Vladimir Korablev on the line.

[Korablev] During the last 2 hours of today's joint session of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities, the deputies confirmed Vitaliy Khusseynovich Doguzhiyev as deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Amrosiyevich Shevardnadze; and Mikhail Sergeyevich Shkabardnya, who is in charge of the affairs of the USSR Council of Ministers. Then the deputies began discussing the nomination of Vladimir Mikhaylovich Kamentsev, who is being recommended for the post of deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers State Foreign Economic Commission. Vladimir Mikhyalovich Kamentsev set forth the future program for the activity of the Foreign Economic Commission and answered the questions put to him. A fairly heated discussion then developed at the session on his nomination. The deputies spoke about the unsatisfactory work of the commission headed by him. Thus, for example, Deputy Bubelev Kray expressed alarm about the sale of oil, gas, and timber, of which our country has an acute need. Deputy Sukhov from Kharkov also spoke about this. Deputy Severov stressed that there is a need to use foreign currency to urgently buy medicines. Moreover, he stressed that in so doing, 500 million rubles should be allocated for this purpose.

The deputies also voiced their anxiety at the structure of the foreign economic commission and for a more clearly defined organization of export and import operations.

Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov spoke afterward. He noted that the foreign economic commission faces solving very important questions linked with the development of international trade, credits, and purchases of grain and other foodstuffs, which unfortunately we have so far been forced to buy abroad.

He also said that the large credits which many people are now proposing should be taken from the capitalist countries could create serious difficulties in the future, when we have to pay back the debts.

Comrade Gorbachev spoke at the conclusion of the discussion on Comrade Kamentsev's nomination. He noted that the discussion was very useful and that it will help in solving a number of problems in our foreign economic policy.

However, Comrade Kamentsev's nomination has not been endorsed, because he did not get a majority of votes from the members of the Supreme Soviet. A repeat vote will have to be carried out.

The discussion on the nomination of Nikolay Pavlovich Laverov to the post of deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Minister and chairman of the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology is now in progress. He is an academician. Comrade Laverov is now answering numerous deputies' question. At issue is scientific and technical progress. Questions of the Aral, the Caspian, and many other questions are being raised.

On this point I am finishing my reportage from the Kremlin session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Approved Appointments Listed

LD3006122789 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1139 GMT 30 Jun 89

[Text] Moscow, 30 Jun—TASS parliamentary correspondent reports from the Kremlin:

The Soviet parliament, which since Wednesday has been discussing the personnel of the USSR Council of Ministers, has today effected several other appointments.

Eduard Shevardnadze was again confirmed as USSR minister of foreign affairs. So far this is the only member of the government for whom the members of the parliament have voted unanimously.

The post of deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers has been taken by 54-year-old Vitaliy Doguzhiyev, former minister of general machine building. He will head a new governmental body—the State Commission on Extraordinary Situations.

Fifty nine-year-old Nikolay Laverov, a prominent Soviet scientist and vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, will head, with the rank of deputy premier, the State Committee on Science and Technology.

The parliament also endorsed 59-year-old Mikhail Shkabardnya as manager of affairs of the USSR Council of Ministers.

Sixty one-year-old Vladimir Kamentsev did not get the necessary number of votes to be confirmed in the post of deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and leader of the State Foreign Economic Commission. Repeat ballotting will be carried out on his candidature.

Then, at the request of the USSR General Procurator, the parliament gave permission, in order to complete investigations, to extend by 4 months the period of holding in custody persons who have committed severe crimes—on 13 counts altogether. Soviet legislation does not permit persons to be held in custody during an investigation for more than 9 months. The request of the procurator general was given preliminary consideration and was supported by the parliamentary committee on questions of legislation, lawfulness, and law and order.

The next joint (?meeting) will take place in the morning of 3 July. Several committees and standing commissions will hold their sessions this afternoon.

Kamentsev, Ryzhkov Remarks Aired

LD3006214189 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 30 Jun 89

[Commentator Olga Vasilenko report on USSR Supreme Soviet session in Moscow on 30 June, with recorded remarks by deputy Vladimir Mikyahlovich Kamentsev and USSR Council of Ministers chairman Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted]

[Vasilenko] The approval of some candidates today happened so easily and quickly that I, personally, was amazed, as it is so unusual at present. But then began the discussion of the candidacy of Vladimir Mikhaylovich Kamentsev. As deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers he will, if elected, deal with questions of the government's foreign economic activity. It would seem that he gave a clear analysis of the state of affairs in that sphere. Let us listen:

[Kamentsev] The USSR's share of world foreign trade amounts to only slightly over 4 percent. This, of course, is not at all in accord with our country's requirements and capabilities. You know that the structure of trade exchange is rather one-sided. Sixty percent of our exports comprises raw materials and oil products, and only 40 percent is manufactured goods. And with the sharp fall in the price of fuel, all of this has caused a fall in the share of external economic activity in the gross national income from 11 percent to 8 percent. And this was caused to a considerable extent by the fact that in practice the primary producers of goods were far removed from external activity and were totally indifferent to the export of their output.

This required things to be put right. And the government, the party Central Committee and the government, undertook a series, a stage-by-stage series, of decisions to radically improve foreign economic activity. The main trend of all of these decisions was to bring the direct producer of goods closer to foreign economic activity. Today the right has been given to all, without exception, to carry out export and import business, to all, without exception, to enter the foreign economic market. Norms have been established for foreign currency allocations.

And here I can report that in 1987-88 transfers have been made to enterprises' funds of R1.6 billion in freely convertible currency, R1 billion in clearing currency, and R4.5 billion or even more in transferrable rubles. Permission has been given to spend foreign currency without having to get agreement from anyone at all. There has been considerable simplification of customs procedures, of the procedure for posting people abroad. Basic documents have been adopted on implementing direct links, the creation of joint enterprises that are now being created directly by the enterprises themselves, and on the right to develop the most varied forms of joint business activity, including financial, scientific, and personnel. A fundamental decision has been taken on training cadres, including sending our people abroad, that is now being actively implemented, and on inviting teachers here from abroad. That is, we have given autonomy.

However, the desired progress has not yet appeared. The country's foreign currency position is difficult. Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov gave a detailed report about this to the Congress of Peoples Deputies. Our debt is twice as much as our income from exports; and our imports are implemented exclusively by increasing foreign credits. This is influenced by the price of oil. It has fallen from R160 to R60 per tonne in the past 4 years. But this is not the whole cause. The point is that everything that I am talking about—autonomy, and the rights—has removed the brakes from the cart. But this will not make it go any quicker. The cart must be fitted with an engine, an economic engine.

[Vasilenko] So, to return, there seems to be a clear stance and a knowledge of the problem. But alongside support, the deputies expressed a lack of confidence in this candidacy. Why was nothing changing our foreign policy activity? Why are we selling so much raw material and things that we need so much ourselves? All of these speeches were so convincing that Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov was obliged to go to the rostrum, as it was he who proposed Comrade Kamentsev's candidacy.

[Ryzhkov] Forgive me, comrades, but I am obliged to do this because it was I who put forward the candidature of Comrade Kamentsev, and, therefore, I am obliged, yet again, to voice my thoughts. Mikhail Sergeyevich, may I have a few minutes?

[Gorbachev] Of course.

[Ryzhkov] In addition to my allotted time, I wanted to say the following, comrades. I understand why the discussion of Comrade Kamentsev's candidacy has given rise to such fervent interest, very sharp criticism and, apparently, dissatisfaction concerning many questions. My attitude toward this issue, toward this problem, is one of great understanding. Speaking frankly, I am very concerned—just as much as the deputies are—by the situation that is taking shape in our country's external economic activities. I think that, after a few months' work, you will have the opportunity to go more deeply into the whole situation that has developed in our state's external economic ties. It's not so simple. I must work with all the complexes, as it were, since that is my duty. But I must say that I am always most concerned and worried by our state's external economic position.

There's no laundry detergent today, but obviously we'll get by. There's no soap today. That's bad, but obviously we'll survive for a month or two. But if we get our external economic strategy wrong, we may punish not only ourselves, but also our children and our grandchildren. So I have always handled that matter in a very cautious and well-considered way. There are always two contradictions in this matter. There is the economic strategy for the future, about which comrades here have quite rightly said: Why are we selling timber? Why are we selling oil and gas?—and so on. I share that view. We should neither rob ourselves nor our children. We should not rob our grandchildren either. And at the same time, alongside this there is an aspect that says: How should we live nowadays?

And these two contradictions are always in collision. Perhaps it might even be correct nowadays to reduce trade turnover in our country and to reduce the forward sales abroad of these raw materials. But in that case, let's tackle another question: How are we to solve the problems of today? Some 44 million tonnes of grain—well, Comrade Kamentsev spoke about 48 million, because we are getting a little from the socialist countries—44 million tonnes of grain are purchased for freely convertible currency. In order to feed the people we need 50 million. Can we turn down such a purchase today? It would be a pleasure for me to be the first one who would turn it down. I would be the first to turn it down.

But what should we then do in our country? The situation would be even worse. We are in no position to have either meat or milk.

Just take vegetable oil. Today we are purchasing one in every 5 kg of it. As for animal fat, we are buying every fourth kilogram. And if today we do not go for these purchases, which have us by our throat, we shall have to introduce a ration card system for many foodstuff products. Therefore, I do not understand, but I am not speaking about meat. I am speaking of other food products.

I do understand. Well, comrades, two interests constantly collide in our country: the interests of the future, which worries us, and the second one is that life nudges us to solve particular problems, as they say.

Hence, the second issue, concerning credits: I would like once again to express my point of view. I spoke of this in my concluding remarks during the congress, but I also want you to know the position. You see, criticism is rife from all sides. On the one hand it is said: Why is it that the foreign debt is growing? It is growing because, unfortunately, we are living beyond our means; we are living on borrowed money. This is one aspect. Another group of people is saying: Why are you so afraid all the time? Why don't you take large credits? Why don't you use these credits to purchase whatever is necessary to create, now, a good social atmosphere in our country? And so on. The situation in the country is currently such that no one pays his debts to anyone else altogether.

Comrades, this can be said about some other country but not about our country by any means: Our country cannot incur debts and fail to pay them off. We are a great state, a big power: How can we countenance such things at present? If we take money, we must give it back. It is the prestige of the state; it is our country's political prestige. We cannot afford to play some sort of game here. That is why we have been proceeding very cautiously during these years. Yes, life urged us on and we did take credits. Recently we took a credit—our press mentioned this—of R2 billion in order to buy technological equipment for the food industry and for the light industry while our projects are beginning to get going. We take these credits; but to do it on a grand scale only to find ourselves in a most difficult situation in our country in a few years is, in my view, a very dangerous phenomenon.

We have no need—I am harping back again—we have no need to rob our grandchildren. Let it be us who live a hard life. It is indeed we who are experiencing, as it were, this process at present, a complex process of our country's development. So why should we create conditions for future generations to pay for our sins? I believe that we should approach these problems in a considered manner.

With regard to Comrade Kamentsev, you may reprehend him, you can criticize him like any member of the government in recent years. I think that anyone who works will be criticized without fail. But I have worked closely with Comrade Kamentsev in recent years.

Comrades, very fine and sober voices have been heard here. The first thing we must do is to create a system. We are not in a position, comrades, to administer from here, to tell people what to do, and so on. We need a system. Listen, is it not to the credit of the foreign economic complex, which Comrade Kamentsev headed, that over 2.5 years we have essentially—I may be using sharp words—shaken loose the monopolism that existed in foreign economic relations and foreign trade?

After all, Lenin's provision had been replaced. Where he spoke of a monopoly of foreign trade this had been replaced by a monopoly of the Ministry of Foreign Trade. That is the point. Indeed, over these 2 and ½ years we have created a system. Surely it is no easy thing to really make the transition, when all the trade of our country was passing through one bottleneck—and that is indeed how it was—and when we have now created a system and are finally creating the possibilities, as they say, for everyone to trade. Yes, there are restrictive functions, and they exist in every state. There is also licensing in every state. It is for this reason that the state exists. However, we eventually created these prerequisites.

Therefore, I think, comrades, that Comrade Kamentsev has worked very energetically in this respect. When he arrived, of course, he did not at first—while he was getting the feel of things—understand, but today he is one of those who is really pursuing the democratization of foreign economic relations. Whatever we say about him, he is, as they say, truly pursuing this line.

As for strategy, it does exist and has been approved. I think that after all the sittings we shall obviously have to carefully review it and present it to the Supreme Soviet. Let us have a talk about this strategy.

Finally, comrades, there has been talk here about power. A comrade said during his address that the authorities—that is, the executive organs—have taken power, and so on. I am asking you to take some of the power from us. [applause and laughter]

[Vasilenko] Surprising as it may be, Comrade Kamentsev today was not appointed to the post of deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers. Two hundred and forty-six votes in favor did not make up half of the whole composition of the Supreme Soviet, so the appointment was postponed as not everyone attended the session. And so Nikolay Pavlovich Laverov was appointed to the post of deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology.

In the second half of the day the committees of the Supreme Soviet and the commissions of the chambers are due to work independently.

Kamentsev Responds to Questions

LD3007224989 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 30 Jun 89

[Speech by Vladimir Kamentsev at 30 June Supreme Soviet session in the Kremlin, from a recorded relay of the 30 June Supreme Soviet proceedings; Kamentsev reads questions submitted to him by Supreme Soviet deputies and follows with his answers]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] Do you now feel that you were responsible for the reduction in the inflow of currency into the country's budget? Imports were much reduced and the share of Soviet exports is just 4 percent. People's deputy Zhdanov—please excuse me for not reading out the names, it's all correct here. Of course, unquestionably, working in this area I do feel my own responsibility, first and foremost responsibility not for the fact that we did not sell many machines or that we did not sell a lot of paper and cellulose, but for the fact that to do that today is not advantageous, and for the fact that over these 2 and ½ years we have indeed done, in my view, virtually everything that could be done to give freedom of access to the external market. But so far we've done nothing to make people—once they've been given this freedom—want to use it. In other words we haven't yet brought in those economic levers.

I stress that this is of course linked directly with the overall economic reform in the country, but I say once again, of course, 2 years isn't such a long period of time, but without question I am to blame in this respect because the party and the government entrusted this sector to me and if it's not yet working then it's my fault.

What is your attitude to the fact that workers will receive part of their pay in hard currency? Comrades, honestly I don't know whether you'll like this or not but I am against this. I consider that there should be one kind of pay in our country. What we have to strive for is not the introduction of some even more privileged currency in parallel—I don't know, it's not been raised, but we had the Berezka—you can throw stones at me, whatever you like, but I was an active initiator of the idea of closing down the Berezka and I'll tell you honestly why I was, because there was a huge number of letters, a huge number, and they're still coming in, though, true, they sometimes publish only the letters from those who want the checks and they don't publish those from people who don't want the checks—well, there are 280 million people in the country: 250,000 people from our country work abroad, 250,000, and a privileged currency has been created with which these people, who furthermore live better rather than worse than many of the other people in the country, are able to get additional privileges on top of that. That is not right. There has been discussion of the question of whether or not this represents an inflow of currency into the country. I can report to you quite officially that in 1987, say, exclusively foreign currency goods were sold in Berezka: We exchanged R138 million for checks; and we spent R126 million on imported goods for sale in that shop, with an economic effectiveness of 1.4 against figures of 1.7 and 1.9 in other shops. Once again, therefore, I say that our road must evidently be aimed at getting the ruble backed up with goods, at doing so gradually but more quickly, so that every Soviet person, whether he works as a steel worker or as a trade representative or wherever else, can go into a shop and buy what he wants. We musn't make some new kind of currency, I've got dollars, you've got rubles. That's not right. From the social point of view that's not right.

Why do we sell all the things our people need? Comrades I'd answer you like this: I don't think we've anything today that our people don't need. No. But comrades, there are things that our people need very much indeed, but we cannot make them ourselves. Take the example of medicines. Do we need them? We do. That means the currency is needed. Yes. And we sell what can be sold on the foreign market. Not everything—I have to say that we could sell more. Or take the example of grain. This is a serious question that has been raised here, comrades, because this year we will buy 48 million tonnes of grain, 48 million tonnes, and that is with due consideration of everything. I want to report to you, comrade agrarians, and to all of you I address myself, perhaps: We produce—and here I am taking the state procurements, here I've been given the figure of 86 million tonnes, but I give a different figure, comrades, it's never been 86, its been 77, and we buy in 48.5 millions tonnes taking into account the advance purchases, and that is 52 percent of the whole state procurement. And of course that is what we should be turning our attention to, comrades: We are buying, during this 5-year plan period, during the first 3 years of the 5-year plan period we have already purchased R55 billion worth of foodstuffs and consumer goods, hence just 6.5 billion on grain. And for 1989 the figure is 22 billion that has been envisaged for this, 5 billion in freely convertible currency. It is here, therefore, that we have to look for our reserves, so to speak. [passage omitted]

A deputy from the Komi Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and deputies from other places are worried by your work in the Ministry of Fisheries when thefts involving millions were committed—the Sushkov case. Two issues are getting somewhat confused here. Sushkov was the ministry I started to run after I had left the Ministry of Fisheries, that was the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations. The Ministry of Fisheries was a different matter. This was the case of the Okean firm where some apparently useful work was being done, the setting up of brand-name shops—that ministry was one of the first to set up these brand-name shops, a network of shops throughout the whole country. So what happened? The swindler—for him the main task was always not to steal, though he also had to steal, but the main thing was how to market, and when that network of Okean shops had been set up, that obstacle, how to do the marketing, well those who did the catching did the selling. This led to enormous abuse, enormous abuse. You know that a large group of people were convicted and one of them even, a deputy minister, was shot for this, so to speak. It was a very serious case and I want to say I was then working as a deputy minister. True, I was not one of the people running the handling issue, I was in no way involved with that case, and I think the fact that it was after that that I was appointed minister should be an explanation for you of how I behaved at that time.

As far as the Sushkov case is concerned, I would like to say that when Sushkov was condemned I was still working at the Ministry of Fisheries, but when I was appointed to this post the first thing that I and Comrade Katushev, the newly appointed minister of foreign economic relations, did was to begin a radical review of the cadre policy of that ministry. I want to say, knowing once again that the radio and television are here, that in a whole number of ministries, in a whole number of ministries a large number of people, so to speak, were, well, the offspring, the children of whoever you like, in other words a kind of cliquishness made its appearance, wherever you go daddy's over there and his little boy is here. [passage omitted]

Glasnost Committee Discusses Program

LD3006180789 Moscow TASS in English 1652 GMT 30 Jun 89

[Text] Moscow June 30 TASS—By TASS parliamentary correspondent reporting from the Kremlin:

The parliamentary committee on issues of glasnost, rights and applications is called upon to become a centre determining painful points of society. It should not be turned into a complaints bureau. This view is shared by the deputies who work in this committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet, who gathered in this afternoon to work out a programme of action.

Speakers at the sitting stressed that work with applications to the parliament from Soviet citizens will be concentrated chiefly on singling out main problems in individual regions of the country and determining ways for their solution.

The committee will hear reports by both top government executives and local managers and send their representatives to republics, territories and regions of the country.

It will pay much attention to work jointly with other parliamentary committees and commissions of the chambers on drafting national laws on glasnost, press, rallies and demonstrators. The committee will conduct its work in close cooperation with the mass media.

"Besides, we intend to set up a forecasting group that will study possible consequences of one or another law and results of its discussion," committee chairman Vladimir Foteyev told TASS.

"Soviet sociologists will take an active part in this effort. This will help avoid negative phenomena like the dismal example of superficially devised provisions of the anti-alcoholism law."

Assessing the government confirmation hearings, continuing at the session of the Soviet parliament, Foteyev pointed to the acute and impartial character of debates that compelled many cabinet members to take on more responsibility in their activity.

In his view, this will secure that the "easy life" of cabinet members is now a thing of the past. At the same time, the committee chairman pointed to the lack of experience of parliamentary work on the part of many deputies whose statements are often excessively emotional which results in unjustified delays.

Ryzhkov Interviewed on Kamentsev Nomination

LD3006194689 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 30 Jun 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast; interview with Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov by unidentified correspondent at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses 30 June—recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] Nikolay Ivanovich, the "Vremya" program. Can I ask you one short question? [video shows correspondent speaking to Ryzhkov]

[Ryzhkov] Yes.

[Correspondent] Just now in the voting, the candidacy of Comrade Kamentsev, whom you are putting forward, was not passed. Does this mean....

[Ryzhkov, interrupting] First of all, I would not say that it was not passed. It is simply that today not all the members of the Supreme Soviet were here, and for that reason it was proposed that a second vote be held, when the full complement of the Supreme Soviet gathers. That is how I understood it.

[Correspondent] Will you defend him as before?

[Ryzhkov] I defended him today and will continue to defend him, because I am convinced that I am right, but it is a matter of how the deputies of the Supreme Soviet act. I do not intend to withdraw the candidacy of Comrade Kamentsev (?from the discussion).

[Correspondent] Nevertheless there were very many people against him here in the hall. How can this be explained?

[Ryzhkov] One can only explain it in terms of the problem, not the problem of Comrade Kamentsev, but the problem of foreign economic links. We are all dissatisfied with the fact that we do not have the correct structure of exports or the correct structure of imports. We are dissatisfied with the fact that this has been going on not just for 1 year, but for a very long time. So, that is public opinion, and to be frank I am not satisfied with such a structure either. This exacerbation has occurred and evidently it is not a matter of individuals.

[Correspondent] Someone will have to tackle it all the same.

[Ryzhkov] Of course. If it is not Kamentsev, it will be someone else. These matters will still have to be tackled. You have to take into account that the problem cannot be resolved so easily; it has a very great element of inertia. We say we have to sell more machines abroad. Yes, we have to, but do you think they are waiting for us over there?

We have to ensure that the machines we make are good, and second, we have to win our markets. That takes time. So I consider that the discussion today was of the problem of our country's foreign economic ties in the first place, and only after that was it about Comrade Kamentsev as the person who has worked in this job for 2-1/2 years, as people are pointing out.

[Correspondent] Thank you for the interview.

Ryzhkov Interview on Supreme Soviet Cited

LD3006165689 Moscow TASS in English 1623 GMT 30 Jun 89

[Text] Moscow June 30 TASS—"What has been going on in the Supreme Soviet for a forthright [as received] already is a great school for all of us," head of the Soviet Government Nikolay Ryzhkov said in an interview with the newspaper IZVESTIYA. He was describing his impressions of the work done during the current session of the new Soviet parliament, the Supreme Soviet. "It has taught lessons both to the appointees and to those who took part in the debates. It set a new beginning to the practice of government forming, something we haven't had these seventy years. I am sure it will go down in the history of the state."

The reporters wondered which Supreme Soviet was for the government easier to work with—the new one or the previous, obedient one.

"I am firmly convinced that it will be better for the government to work with the new parliament which will shoulder the decisions of the most important questions. A comrade spoke yesterday, saying the Council of Ministers was putting out too many resolutions. I am with him on this, but then let somebody make more laws. The more laws, the fewer resolutions. That was what made me think the new Supreme Soviet will be easier to work with. Not that there will be few discussions or even clashes. Just the other way round—to work out, hammer out a joint position for leading our country further both in the economy and in the social development will be easier with this new Supreme Soviet, we shall proceed faster than with the old one.

"What is my attitude to the procedure from the point of view of general humanity? I have answered that already. I view it positively, in principle. But when you hear criticism of the government of the chairman of the Council of Ministers week in, week out. I shouldn't say it is a great joy. Of course, the Supreme Soviet will have to learn its lessons too, they will come to understand that they need a strong government. If the Supreme Soviet has a weak government it will spell disaster. In that case all that they will legislate will remain suspended in mid-air.

"When my colleagues whom I recommended as deputies face the audience, I naturally feel for everyone of them. Just take it to heart. And I feel very pleased when they reply to the point, display erudition and the scale of their thinking. I am greatly pleased with them."

Nikolay Ryzhkov told reporters that now the working day of the Soviet prime minister never ends before 11 p.m.

Ryzhkov Cited on Supreme Soviet Debates

LD0107142689 Moscow World Service in English
1110 GMT 1 Jul 89

[Excerpts] This past week, after a short recess, the USSR Supreme Soviet resumed its work here in Moscow. An analysis from our commentator, Vitaliy Gurov, and this is what he writes:

And so the day-to-day work of the parliament has begun. When I say day-to-day I don't mean that everything taking place in the Supreme Soviet hall is habitual for us. Of course it's not. Both experts of the Supreme Soviet apparatus and the journalists covering the session, as well as the MP's themselves never before saw anything like it. To quote the Ukrainian author and MP Boris Oleynik, the index of democracy at the session is very high.

The teamwork has started in the Supreme Soviet. I'd like to note that the Members of Parliament are to solve a great many issues and here's a list of them: first of all they have to form a government, then there will be an exchange of views on the plan of work related to action on the decisions of the Congress of People's Deputies, and then, which is most important, the MP's will get down to lawmaking work proper. [passage omitted]

Now how does the Prime Minister, Nikolay Ryzhkov, regard the current state of affairs?

[Begin Ryzhkov recording in Russian with superimposed English translation] A vigorous exchange of opinions is under way in the USSR Supreme Soviet on many important issues. Actually problems are being discussed that have accumulated in the life of our society. Now today all these problems are surfacing. For this reason the MP's tell the candidates to the cabinet everything that is uppermost in their minds and the candidates speak about their stand in tackling those issues. And this is being done quite well, I would say, said Prime Minister Ryzhkov. [end recording]

Well, everyone is entitled to his or her own opinion. The session of USSR Supreme Soviet will continue on Monday.

Deputies View Military Industrial Conversion

LD0107181889 Moscow World Service in English
0310 GMT 1 Jul 89

[Report on interview with Supreme Soviet deputies Mikhail Zalikhanov and Vladimir Yudin by unidentified correspondent; date, place not given—recorded; deputies speak in Russian with superimposed English translation]

[Excerpts] The joint session of the two houses of the Supreme Soviet has continued considering the nominations for the new government. One deputy premier endorsed by the parliament, Igor Belousov, will deal with problems of the military-industrial complex. Outlining his program, the official paid special attention to the conversion of military industries into civilian production. He said it was necessary to take full advantage of the unique situation concerning the new Soviet defense doctrine when there is a sharp reduction in the output of military vehicles and armaments. Our reporter has been discussing the issue with two members of the Supreme Soviet, Mikhail Zalikhanov and Vladimir Yudin. [passage omitted] First, what is the attitude to conversion of Mikhail Zalikhanov?

[Begin Zalikhanov recording] My attitude is highly positive. The reduction in armaments has become possible thanks to the new political thinking. I welcome the fact that the funds released in this conversion will be spent to improve the life of the people and to develop agriculture. By the way, such spending of the released funds will help to strengthen the nation's defenses, though this sounds as a paradox. If our people live well and have firm faith in their socialist system, they will be protecting it readily. [end recording]

The other MP, Vladimir Yudin, takes a broader view of the conversion issue:

[Begin Yudin recording] The conversion of management, as well as the conversion of production, are now under way. Many candidates to posts of ministers worked earlier in the military-industrial complex and this complex was not so much subjected to administrative pressure as civilian industries were. For this reason, engineers and economists maintained a measure of independence. Thus the men who passed the school of defense industry are very much needed, said Vladimir Yudin. It was noticed at the hearings in the Supreme Soviet commissions and committees before this session how free at ease the candidates from the defense industry felt. For example, they sharply criticized the prime minister's proposals and offered their own, but representatives of the traditional civilian branches with all their merits could be felt dependent on the authoritarian system of management. [end recording]

The problems of the military-industrial complex were discussed in the Supreme Soviet in such detail for the first time. This complex was actually outside the vision of our parliament before. Can the MP's take it under strict control? A question to Vladimir Yudin:

[Begin Yudin recording] Everything necessary has been done for the purpose. The Committee on Defense and State Security has been set up under the Supreme Soviet. It has sufficient powers. And so everything now depends on the members of the Supreme Soviet, on their actions. [end recording]

Boris Yeltsin Interviewed on Hungarian Television

LD3006201389 Budapest Television Service in Hungarian 1935 GMT 28 Jun 89

[Interview with Boris Yeltsin, USSR Supreme Soviet member, by unidentified correspondent on the "Panorama" program; date and place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] Boris Yeltsin, one of the most popular Soviet politicians, is 58 years old. He was a lonely fighter for a long time, the daredevil of perestroyka. But recently, 6 million Moscow people voted him into the Supreme Soviet. He also dared oppose Gorbachev, but he is not going to be beheaded for this. This always grumpy, outspoken, characteristically Russian figure—his parents are peasants—has burst into Soviet political life almost without any preparation.

Boris Nikolayevich, your speeches and demands are definite. Your speeches urge progress. But my feeling is that your demands are in contrast with the interests of the leading apparatus. However, without the apparatus, it would be difficult to realize all that you want. This is a paradox.

[Yeltsin] Yes, of course. But first of all, let us have a look at this apparatus, at what it is like. Since it can be operative, or bureaucratic, it can be oversized or it can consist precisely of the right numbers. I attack the bureaucratic apparatus, which is far too large and which is aggressively conservative, and not just the apparatus in general.

[Correspondent] This is clear. You said that a program to lead the country out of the crisis is indispensible.

[Yeltsin] Yes, there is a need for a special program.

[Reporter] Yes. You have listed a lot of demands of very many kinds. Also you listed what can be done, what ought to be done. Would you repeat them now?

[Yeltsin] Well, I have urged extraordinary economic measures. Our financial situation has to be improved. The exchange rate for the ruble should be raised and inflation must be halted, because one ruble is worth only about 30-odd kopeks today [time frame of comparison not specified]. And this leads to inflation, to price rises, to crisis.

[Correspondent] Is there poverty in the Soviet Union as well?

[Yeltsin] Forty-eight million people live under the poverty line, which means that we are on the edge of a precipice.

[Correspondent] How long do you think it would take to improve the situation? I think the Soviet people are beginning to lose patience.

[Yeltsin] You are right. I think their patience won't last longer than 1 or 2 more years. That's the maximum. And then the people will take their destiny into their own hands. The revolution from above will turn into a grass-roots, spontaneous revolution.

[Correspondent] What can you as an MP and member of the Supreme Soviet do?

[Yeltsin] Well, I may have mentioned to you, and certainly to other journalists, that I disapprove of the tactics applied by perestroyka. My stand differs from the official one. I think that if we survey our natural resources, intellectual and other values, and so on, we see that perestroyka should not have been introduced in so many areas. It is like an attack in a battle; if the attacking troops are located several miles from one another, they cannot achieve a breakthrough. This is true of perestroyka as well. First of all, we should carry out political reform. This should be the starting point. Then the scope of perestroyka should be narrowed. We should withdraw form certain areas.

We have to postpone the space program and cut defense expenditure. We should reduce industrial investment costs by 30 percent. We have a great deal of other possibilities upon which to concentrate our material means—raising living standards, including food supply, expanding the variety of goods, service, and housing. So perestroyka should be made to work on the essentials. If we had done this from the beginning, we could have raised the living standards of the people over the past 4 years.

[Correspondent] At the congress, you and several other MP's mentioned that respect for the party was diminishing.

[Yeltsin] That's right.

[Correspondent] What is the reason for this? Perhaps a lack of awaited results?

[Yeltsin] There are several reasons. The most important is that in the course of 4 years, of the targets proclaimed at the beginning of perestroyka, only those that are parts of the establishment advanced—openness, glasnost, and democratization. And they really did. People are no longer indifferent. Society is becoming political. This is obvious. But as far as the material basis for perestroyka is concerned, there is no progress for the time being. This is one reason. The other reason I see is the overwhelming number of bureaucrats in the party. The democratization of the party is lagging behind that of society. So a reform of the party, perestroyka within the party, has not yet come. We have redecorated the facade to a certain degree, but this is all. This is naturally a very serious problem.

[Correspondent] Can we still state that the Soviet Union, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, is still a solid alliance of people?

[Yeltsin] The differences have indeed become more intense and, again, the reason is that serious mistakes have been committed. First and foremost, the party and the government had made a mistake underestimating the significance of the relations of the nationalities. They stated that such a problem does not exist in our country, that this has been settled once and for all and it does not have to be dealt with at all anymore. They did not analyze the processes taking place in the republics. And as for the situation of the small nations, they ignored that completely. Nobody has examined what is happening in relations between our nations. They only considered it important to establish a strong central power, and they have indeed developed this enormous power consisting of a great number. My view is that it is not a large and strong central leading body that we need, but a wise and talented one. This is the most important thing. And the republics must be given much greater independence. If, for example, they want to devote a million rubles to the building of kindergartens and schools, the relevant officials have to travel to Moscow to get the money. This, of course, hurts their national pride, and limits their independence. Well, you know, this sort of thing gradually deteriorates the relation of the central power and the republics.

[Correspondent] My impression is that the deputies of the Baltic republics have prepared themselves very well for the congress. They have formulated exactly what they want and outlined their opinion and plans very openly.

[Yeltsin] Yes, I have met them, and we have talked. Indeed, they have a very exact and elaborate action program. They see clearly what they need in the future. And, although in small percentage, there are people among them who want separation from the Soviet Union. However, this can be explained by the fact that so far the republics have been ignored and their sovereignity neglected. If, however, we give them economic independence, introduce the system of self-accounting, ensure real sovereignity for them, and so on, then of course their view would change and there would be fewer in the camp of those wanting to secede. It is true, there are several people who say that precicely because of this, this endeavor would become stronger and stronger and eventually everybody would want to secede. But this is not so. This process will turn around if the republics are given independent decision rights to solve their own problems. I agree with them. Strong republics are necessary, but I would change this enormous central apparatus, even its name. In my view, a small, wise, and talented central leadeship is needed.

[Correspondent] Two very awkward problems were raised at the congress. I could also say they were rather scandalous matters. One was the events in Tbilisi and the other was crime and the activities of the Uzbek and Moscow mafias. What is your opinion on these matters?

[Yeltsin] First of all, Tbilisi. The weekend before the congress, I went there on my own accord and spent 48 hours—Saturday and Sunday—working in Georgia. I spoke with several hundreds of people, i.a., with wounded people who were being treated in the hospital, with members of the Ministry of Health's medical group, with the social committee functioning there, and with a group of deputies. I spoke with very many people. I viewed the films. Here in Moscow, we saw only one of them, and it was not one of the most successful ones. There I saw more realistic, better films, from which it was more possible to judge what really happened, albeit they were nighttime pictures. True, the action of the authorities was actually lawful, but very mistaken. It can only be evaluated as an action against our own people.

[Correspondent] And the other topic?

[Yeltsin] Well, the other topic is the mafia and crime. When I worked in the Moscow party committee, I met the investigative group led by Gdlyanov, partly in the matter of the Moscow mafia, partly in connection with the Tashkent affair. We spoke more than once, and they showed me the investigative material. In my view the case should not have been taken from them. The fact that now an organized attack has been launched against them leads me to conclude that it was an intentional, premeditated measure. However, I cannot say this with absolute certainty.

[Correspondent] Are Moscow politicians also in touch with the mafia?

[Yeltsin] Look, it is difficult for me to talk about this. We have no concrete information. But Gdlyanov thinks they are.

[Correspondent] It seems to me that you were less popular as first secretary of the Moscow party committee than you are now. What is the reason for this?

[Yeltsin] Look....

[Correspondent, interrupting] Forgive me, please allow me to finish. In your view, is it easier to politick in the opposition?

[Yeltsin] The reason for the change probably is first that the speech I delivered at the July, that is, the October 1987 Central Committee plenum was kept secret for 2 years. [sentence as heard] A kind of halo was put around my name. That doubtlessly had an impact on the people. Then, while defending my stand and my principles, I was, so to say, floored by a knock-out. People generally defend those who are hit. This is a natural reaction. Of course, I can only attribute my popularity to this in part. To be sure, this is also enhanced by the fact I constantly do my work among people. Leaders ought to travel by mass transport sometimes, or perhaps not even sometimes. By the way, I always travel in that manner.

[Correspondent] Did you come on foot this time?

[Yeltsin] Yes, they took away my official car. I go on foot or by trolley. Yes, I have no privileges. In the course of 3 years, I have gradually renounced everything. I lay no claim to any privilege; I live like the other people of Moscow. True, I do not even have a salary now, so I live more poorly than they.

[Correspondent] How will things continue? As a deputy, how much salary will you get?

[Yeltsin] Well....

[Correspondent] So you do not know. If you are not averse to this, I would like to say that you very strongly criticize the personality cult. I am thinking that you have said that the Politburo is Gorbachev's attendant.

[Yeltsin] This phenomenon exists.

[Correspondent] Well, you are very popular. Might not a personality cult take shape around Yeltsin, as well? Forgive me for the question.

[Yeltsin] I am ready to reply to any question. You do not have to make apologies. The situation is that the personality cult has also entailed a cult of power; only in such a case can it become a personality cult. Do you understand? If the people merely support someone, this does not constitute a personality cult of the relevant person. Rather, it means that the relevant person simply enjoys the trust of the people. I would not brand that as a cult.

However, we really need a mechanism which would prevent the development of a personality cult, that power is concentrated in the hands of one. To be sure, this kind of mechanism is very necessary. I am not competing for laurels, or position. I have already stated that I have renounced candidacy for president. This struggle is taking place not for power, but for justice, for the respect and prestige of our country which is building socialism. I agree with Yevtushenko; we really are still building socialism. There does not yet exist either a developed or a (?half-ready) socialism in our country, if we think only of the five classic basic principles. We are building socialism; at the same time, one of the most important conditions for this is social justice. I am a fighter for this social justice.

[Correspondent] I brought a satirical Hungarian weekly. There is an interesting caricature in it. I believe that it also characterilzes your congress. Here are the conservatives and these....

[Yeltsin, interrupting] Reformers..

[Correspondent] Yes, the reformers. The conservatives have roots.

[Yeltsin] In that case the roots must be cut out.

[Correspondent] At one of the mass rallies, I saw a sign with the following inscription: (?Bari) Boris. It is a good game with your name. In Hungarian it is something like: Fight, fighter, Boris; or: Win, winner. This is encouragement addressed to you, that you should continue to fight. If you are not averse to it, please allow me to wish you the same thing as the inscription. Naturally, with the appropriate respect, because we are not on informal terms [tegezoedes]. (?Bari) Boris. So, fight, Boris.

[Yeltsin] Thank you, I will do so.

Biryukova Profiled as Candidate Deputy Chairman

18001281 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 23 Jun 89 p 2

[Article by L. Vasina: "One Hears in the Permanent Commissions..."]

[Text] Allow me to introduce her: Aleksandra Pavlovna Biryukova, a candidate for the post of deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the bureau of the Council of Ministers for social development. On 20 June, after 3 hours of debates, the commissions and committees of the Supreme Soviet recommended A. Biryukova for these posts.

Aleksandra Pavlovna Biryukova, having received a diploma from the Moscow Textile Institute, became a master at the famous Trekhgorka. She said farewell to the factory years later with the rank of head engineer. For a long time she was one of the leaders of our trade union.

She was elected secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and candidate member of the Politburo. Recently she has been the deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the bureau for social development.

She is 60 but Biryukova does not consider age an impediment as long as her health holds up. Aleksandra Pavlovna's family is not large—just she and her husband and therefore, in her words, she can give everything to state business.

Biryukova's work day lasts 12-14 hours. In the opinion of N. Ryzhkov, she is distinguished by a rare ability to work and conscientiousness. "And your deputy's shortcomings?" the prime minister was asked. She is too emotional, she easily gets caught by new ideas, sometimes without a preliminary in-depth analysis. This is N. Ryzhkov's view.

Her program: A. Biryukova thinks that the social sphere is of key significance for restructuring: People are expecting appreciable changes and the government must not fail to meet their expectations. She noted that there have already been certain changes in the social policy. These are primarily social changes in investments to the benefit of the social sphere. Moreover, she thinks that there has already been a certain gain of branches of group B over group A. There has been an appreciable redistribution of the national in favor of consumption. But these changes are clearly inadequate.

In A. Biryukova's opinion, the government should determine the priorities in the social sphere itself. And she thinks the first of them should be the normalization of the consumer market. These are the goals. The tension should be relieved as early as 1990. Under the 13th 5-Year Plan the effective demand should be satisfied. And by 1995 we should reach the scientifically substantiated normatives in the consumption of the basic goods.

Aleksandra Pavlovna says that to do this it is necessary in the near future to provide all the necessary resources for the production of consumer goods. We must immediately arrange for the inter-republic exchange of goods in keeping with the principles of the socialist market. We must develop economic incentives that will motivate the collectives to produce goods for the people. Joint enterprises must be organized, including on a basis that does not involve foreign currency. This and other steps will help, according to A. Biryukova, to advance consistently toward the earmarked goals.

DEBATES:

Aleksandra Pavlovna, until the time when the economic incentive system is developed we shall not saturate the market with goods.

I agree with you. We are searching for these incentives. Moreover, a group of specialists has prepared a memo devoted to this problem and it has been discussed by the Politburo. We hope to continue the research that has been started.

How do you feel about the fact that women are still being employed on night shifts?

Negative, of course. But the situation will change some day. We must take women off the night shifts gradually but consistently.

How do you assess the high normatives for deductions from profit at light industry enterprises? Do you agree that they must be changed?

We must figure out specifically how this happened. At least three factors have come into play here. First: We have assimilated many high-quality items. There has been unjustified growth in prices, which was caused by the enterprises' zeal for profits. We have tried and are trying to halt this negative tendency. To this end the appropriate decree was adopted by the Council of Ministers.

During the course of the meeting A. Biryukova answered other questions from the deputies.

Difficulties in Approving New Ministers Noted

18001290 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 24 Jun 89 p 2

[Article by T. Yakhlakova: "Democracy—A Complicated Science"]

[Text] Our parliament is beginning its work with difficulty. The badly adjusted mechanism breaks down at first. This week, as we know, in the committees and permanent commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet there has been discussion of candidacies for the posts of leaders of ministries and departments.

The schedule allots 2 hours for every meeting. During this time the deputies must consider two candidacies, as a rule. Is there any need to say that this is not enough? On Thursday in a joint meeting of the commission for questions of the development of culture, language, ethnic and interethnic traditions, and protection of our historical heritage and the commission for the ethnic policy and interethnic relations, the discussion of one candidacy—that of USSR Minister of Culture V. Zakharov, who was recommended to retain this post—took 3 hours. And the question of the chairman of the USSR Goskino [State Committee for Cinematography] was on the agenda. Meetings of other commissions and committees are dragging out in a similar way. As a result, awkward ("nonparliamentary," as the chairman I. Bisher said) situations arise: Those who are supposed to be nominating members of the future cabinet of ministers sometimes do not manage to get from one meeting in time for the beginning of the next and the candidates have to nominate themselves.

One would like to hope that such foulups can be explained only by the lack of experience. But many deputies have seen in them an attempt to impose the administrative will apparatus work methods on the parliament. The schedule of meetings and the list of candidates, as it later became clear, were not coordinated with all members of the commission (or even the majority of them). Therefore, for example, the minister of culture will not be discussed in the committee for science, public education, culture, and education. But members of the committee reasonably decided that this question pertains directly to them and on Thursday they came to the meeting of the commissions. As, incidentally, did certain deputies from the Committee for Youth Affairs. But it turned out that both had gone to this trouble for no reason: Their voices meant nothing here.

Incidentally, the 3-hour discussion of the candidacy of the USSR minister of culture brought one more surprise. It "suddenly" became clear that the composition of the commission had not been approved by the USSR Supreme Soviet. And the question of whether or not the decisions were legally enforceable arose immediately. They argued long and heatedly until the following variant was suggested: If the Supreme Soviet approves the composition of the commissions without any changes or with insignificant changes, their decisions can be considered legal, and if the commission is not approved they will start all over again. The question was put up for a vote under these conditions: Did the commissions recommend V. Zakharov for the post of USSR minister of culture? But many deputies refused to participate in the voting, thinking that they should not cast their vote if it can be interpreted however the commissions wish. Partly because of this V. Zakharov did not receive the necessary number of votes. The question of appointing the minister of culture was put off until Monday at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. For this reason they brought up for consideration the candidacy of A. Kamshalov, who was recommended for the post of chairman of the USSR Goskino.

All this makes us think once again about how rashly the Congress of People's Deputies acted in underestimating the importance of procedural issues and declining to discuss them.

Members of the Planning and Budget Commission who were considering the candidacy of V. Gribov, recommended for the position of chairman of the board of the USSR Gosbank [State Bank], also refrained from a recommendation.

But by a majority of votes the deputies expressed their confidence in the USSR minister of public health, Ye. Chazov, although the 4-hour discussion was just as heated as health problems are crucial in our country. And almost without any complications, by a decision of several committees of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Academician L. Abalkin was recommended for the position of deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. For the first time in the country's history a high government post will be awarded to a scientist.

During the past week the deputies also gave their approval and support to Yu. Maslyukov, recommended for the post of first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the USSR Gosplan [State Planning Commission], and A. Biryukova, who was nominated for the post of deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and chairman of the bureau of the Council of Ministers for social development.

But the final word in the formation of the new government will be said, of course, by the USSR Supreme Soviet, which will begin to work on Monday, 26 June.

Supreme Soviet Review of Appointees Examined

PM3006150089 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Jun 89 Second Edition p 1

[A. Murtazayev, A. Pokrovskiy, R. Fedorov article: "Ministers and the Times: Thoughts on the Discussion of Candidate Members of the Government"]

[Text] The general review of government forces that is taking place at the USSR Supreme Soviet has highlighted what we had guessed at even before. The practice of forming the country's government in secret was inevitably bound to elevate to high posts people whose business and human qualities and level of competence might suit the "upper echelons," but did not meet requirements from "below." Thus the ground was prepared for the development of "superficial" officials whose heads, like sunflowers, turned only to follow the chief luminary.

In those days we became acquainted with ministers one at a time, on reading the relevant decree, with no commentaries at all. Or else, once every few years we reviewed the newspaper iconostasis of members of the new government. In neither case was it possible to grasp how a minister being replaced differed from the newly appointed minister, or what were the peculiarities of the Cabinet as a whole. And yet they undoubtedly had their peculiarities.

Well, the times mark all of us with a special mark. They not only generate their own heroes. They generate their own ministers, too. The last of the representatives of the "iron people's commissars" who opposed economic laws with enthusiasm (and with bloodshed) is still living out his days on a pension. The dealers in inflated figures and departmental ostentation and the lovers of generous gifts are still painfully present in our memory.

Restructuring opened up a radically new approach to cadre policy in the top management component. Yes, the public discussion of personalities appointed to leading state posts is unusual and unfamiliar, but at the same time it is in accordance with the spirit of the times, as expressed by our parliament.

"We have all seen," N.I. Ryzhkov, an authoritative participant in these changes, testifies, "how hard it is to stand on this platform for 2 or 3 hours answering numerous well-thought-out and very difficult questions from deputies. I would not call it a pleasant procedure, but I am quite convinced that it is necssary, and that all government members should pass through this 'purgatory.'"

Let us say at once that not everyone did pass through it. And that applies first and foremost to those who presented themselves to the deputies with obsolete ideas on the place and role of a statesman in our changing society. L. Rozenova, candidate for the post of chairman of the State Committee for Prices, appeared before the deputies with old ideas about the tricky problems of pricing and price control, having experience of 20 years' work in her sphere. Alas, the old baggage proved to be a hindrance.

So what is the generalized portrait of a minister for our times that is emerging in the course of discussions at the USSR Supreme Soviet? Presumably no one would be bold enough to answer that question exhaustively. So let us look closely at just a few episodes in the course of the Supreme Soviet discussion. Academician L. Abalkin joined the ranks of deputy chairmen of the USSR Council of Ministers "by storm," so to speak; he is a figure of a kind that was not formerly customary for government members. This is perhaps the first time that a major scientist, rather than an official who has won a degree without ever leaving his office, has become a government member.

An exception?

But here is another example. Two USSR Supreme Soviet committees—for Agrarian Questions and Food and for Questions of Ecology and the Rational Use of Natural Resources—expressed unanimous support for Academician A. Isayev, who was introduced for the post of chairman of the USSR State Committee for Forestry. After the vote and the chairman's summary—"unanimous!"—a murmur of satisfaction rippled around the hall.

The academician's appearance before the deputies was permeated with civic enthusiasm, and the program set forth won people over with its scientific validity. It was probably this combination that made the people's deputies vote unanimously "for." The fate of the forests that are the concern of Academician A. Isayev, a scientist with a worldwide reputation who has left his familiar post as director of an academic institute for their sake, is the fate of the country. Under this banner he set forth his program.

But, theorize as you may, here a great deal depends on personalities, on a leading official's perception of his task, and on his responsibility not simply for his sector of work, for the sector, but to the country and people.

At the same sitting the deputies discussed the candidacy of N. Kotlyar, minister of the fish industry. His career, his track record, and finally the report delivered by the minister on the state of the sector and the program he put forward for its development testified convincingly enough to his knowledge of his job.

The deputies listened to all this with satisfaction. But...

How did it come about that the industry exhausted stocks in the Barents Sea first of cod, and then of capelin—basically the fish on which the cod used to feed? The sea is experiencing an ecological tragedy, and it is on the ministry's conscience. What is N. Kotlyar's view of this?

Along almost the whole of the Far Eastern coast and in Sakhalin and Kamchatka the salmon spawning rivers—the cradle of these delicious fish—are dying, through the fault of mining industry sectors. N. Kotlyar is a Far Eastern man. This situation should be well known to him. Why does he tolerate it without sounding the alarm? Why are we not developing mariculture to enable us to increase the "harvest" of the sea and gather that harvest not in distant regions, but off our own shores?

Another "why" also came up. Of 11 million tonnes of fish caught, only 1 million—less than 10 percent—comes from our internal water areas. Our fish ministry has now dropped all concern for river fish, "abandoning" the internal water sources to the agro-industrial complex. But this does not only mean collective farm [kolkhoz] and state farm [sovkhoz] ponds. It means Baykal and Ladoga, the big rivers of the European north and Siberia, thousands of small lakes. The ministry is turning its back on them.

At one time the ministry was equally indifferent to the destruction of the fish resources of the Azov Sea and to how the Aral Sea is drying out, and to this day it fails to sound the alarm about the threat that hangs over its foreign currency bank—the sturgeon shoals of the Volga and Caspian.

The people's deputies reminded the minister of all this. Ecological problems and the attitude to them are a measure of civic responsibility today. You would think that the fishery ministry should be the first to study these concerns. But... to this day the sector's orientation toward catch figures prevails. It is apparently because of sector interests that the ministry does not want to hand over to the USSR State Committee for Nature Conservation its own monitoring service—fish conservation. It is so much more convenient when you control it yourself! No one wants to argue with his own ministry...

Deputies asked the minister about fish conservation too. And agian, they did not receive an exhaustive or precise answer. In general they assessed him as a specialist and a good sector man, and came out in favor, by a majority of votes, of the Supreme Soviet confirming him in this post.

But the considerable quantity of "black balls" thrown in by the minority should be studied too. It appears to indicate that today different demands than yesterday's are made on a minister. It is not enough only to know your sector, develop it, and defend its interests. A minister is a member of the government, and in this capacity it is incumbent on him to think about the country as a whole. For the time being, the strong "sector man" can also pass. But only for the time being. And perhaps tomorrow, at the next convocation of the Congress of People's Deputies, they will hear a resolute "no." Because they who receive a unanimous "yes" are concerned not only for their own jobs, but for the country as a whole, for the whole people.

Have we raised people like this? You will agree that for all the abundance of ministries and committees, for our country, with a population of many millions, there are not really so very many "portfolios." You would expect there to be no shortage of contenders! But no. It was with difficulty and some strain that people were found who could be entrusted with an important job.

Introducing G. Yagodin for the post of chairman of the State Committee for Public Education, A. Biryukova, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, said:

"In our view, there is no alternative candidacy."

The people's deputies basically agreed with her; they had no alternative. The members of two USSR Supreme Soviet committees—for Science, Public Education, Culture, and Upbringing and for Youth Affairs—discussed G. Yagodin's candidacy heatedly, but could propose no alternative. And not only because they did not have the constitutional right to do so...

A small detail: A discussion set for 1400 hours was postponed to 1600. Dozens of deputies sat waiting for... the minister. The minister, not a candidate for the post. And he came in confidently and conducted himself firmly and calmly, as if at a meeting with workers in public education. But that is what it was. The Committee for Science and Education is made up for the most part of rectors of higher educational establishments and schoolteachers. In short, to give or not to give a recommendation—that question did not occur to them. And perhaps it is noteworthy that out of 16 votes "against" the candidate, 13 were from the Youth Affairs Committee, that is, basically, the consumer.

The complaints made by the young people amounted to this: Yagodin, as chairman of the State Committee, promised to do everything to stop the use of school and student manpower to rescue negligent agriculturalists. This was not achieved last fall. The teachers and children were promised freedom. But the schools are still groaning under the diktat of the department, and the children under the diktat of the teachers.

The "pros" came down on the other side of the scales: He held a congress of public education workers, the attitude to innovative teachers has changed, and an All-Union Council for Public Education has been set up.

At the deputies' request, the vote was carried out by name. Perhaps in this case it was superfluous? The chairman loudly read out the deputy's name, and the deputy answered "for" or "against." And nearby sat the candidate, to whom there was no alternative.

Only for the time being, one would hope. Not everything new can be achieved at once. We think the experience accumulated by the people's deputies has prepared the ground on which not departmental specialists, but real statesmen will spring up.

Reports on Kazakh, Novyy Uzen Situation Continue

Background, Details Viewed

18300708 Moscow TRUD in Russian 24 Jun 89 p 3

[Article by V. Gafiatulin and O. Kvyatkovskiy: "What Happened in Novyy Uzen"]

[Text] By now it is known precisely that the situation in the city in the middle of the Mangyshlak Desert became hot a while ago. On 16 June the hot coals of dissatisfaction became apparent during a melee by hooligan elements on a dance floor. The hotbed of conflict was expanding, and still new people were drawn into it. By the evening of 19 June the situation in the city had become extremely complicated. An urgently convened meeting of the Supreme Soviet Presidium of the Kazakh SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] resolved to impose a curfew in Novyy Uzen.

Having visited the site, leaders of party, soviet, and law enforcement organs of the republic who became members of the government commission talked about the social causes of the events straightforwardly and honestly at a press conference. While developing the oil peninsula through the use of ultramodern equipment, the union ministries and offices have ignored the needs of the local population and "maintained" extra hard living conditions in this large city next to an oil deposit. Everything in the city is an insoluble problem dating a long way back: housing, water, supplies... For example, sugar ration cards were issued... only to those employed. What about the rest of them? Some of those arriving from outside the city managed to receive apartments quickly, whereas some old-timers have been waiting for their turn almost since the founding of the city.

The city authorities cannot give the exact number of unemployed young people—either 1,200 or 2,000 persons. Meanwhile, much of the equipment at enterprises is being used on one shift.

The situation was also complicated by the fact that the city authorities, who were receiving numerous reports and complaints by the working people concerning the dislocations occurring in Novyy Uzen, have done nothing specific to improve the situation. Worse yet, while the situation was "getting ripe," and subsequently during the disturbances already underway, the city committee of the party Ye.K. Kumiskaliyev and the city executive committee A.V. Kurichev displayed surprising unconcern and powerlessness. The management of the "Mangyshlakneft" [Mangyshlak Oil Production] Association in the person of its general director, N.U. Bekbosinov, also happened to be on the sidelines.

Measures are currently being taken aimed at providing help for the city in supplying food and consumer goods to the populace, organizing an efficient operation of municipal services, developing the entire social sphere, as well as establishing and maintaining due public order.

A decision has been made to close down some of the cooperatives in the sphere of trade and public catering. Competent organs have been assigned the task of thoroughly checking out the facts of violations of passport regulations in the city, issuance of residence permits on unlawful grounds, allocation of housing out of turn, and job placement of the young people. Ways for solving other acute problems are being worked out. Those guilty of the occurring shortcomings will be held strictly responsible.

On the evening of 19 June the tension began to abate. However, a complete normalization of the situation is still far away. Extremist demands are still being made: to surrender for punishment the militia chief accused of murdering one of the thugs; to relocate away from the city all persons of Caucasus origin within 7 days; to free all those apprehended for hooliganism during massive disturbances. Threats to sabotage the power and water supply systems are heard. The security forces have strong guard detachments at all vitally important installations, including food warehouses and the baking plant.

Unfortunately, the sparks of the conflict flew into nearby workers' settlements: Clashes between groups of residents of different nationalities, unauthorized meetings, and demonstrations have occurred.

As a result of the tragic events, four people have died—two Kazakhs, one Lezgin, and one Turkmen. The number of wounded is being established more precisely. During the disturbances more than 50 functionaries of the law enforcement organs have been hurt.

Curfew Helps 'Squash' Rumors

LD0207130389 Moscow TASS in English 1254 GMT 2 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 2 TASS—The situation in Novyy Uzen, a city in western Kazakhstan where riots erupted recently, is gradually coming back to normal, the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA writes today.

"A business-like atmosphere is returning to the city," the paper was told by Lieutenant Colonel of Militia Viktor Shklyar, deputy head of the Political Department of the Kazakh Interior Ministry. "Organs of militia and interior troops do their best to protect the life of every man in the multinational city of Novyy Uzen and other towns and villages of Gurev region from any contingencies."

For this purpose the curfew is still in force. As many as 271 firearms were seized on detainees in the period of its operation. Actions by the government commission and political workers of the Kazakh Interior Ministry helped establish contacts with the population and ensure regular information of residents on developments and squash rumors and fabrications.

Kazakhs, Caucasians Work for Calm

LD0107141789 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 1 Jul 89

[Report from Mangyshlak region, Gurevskaya Oblast, Kazakhstan by correspondent Sergey Omelchenko]

[Text] After the events in Novyy Uzen, a tense confrontation between certain groups of Kazakhs and Caucasians is continuing here. People had yearned for a real, consistent nationalities policy and having acquired the possibility of implementing one to some degree, they have taken the extreme sidetrack toward nationalism. Social problems and matters of social justice are also complex. Here, unfortunately, almost no one is working directly with the people as they should, neither the party aktiv nor the soviet aktiv. A strange position is coming about here as a result of this and in all probability as a result of what newly arrived agitators have prompted: If the thief, the speculator, or the bribe-taker is one of us, a Kazakh, then it's nothing, it is tolerable; but if he is a Caucasian, then immediately all the Caucasians, all those who arrived from the western bank of the Caspian, are branded. As a result of this there are outrages against the constitution, there are unjust demands to expel people.

Some Caucasians have been sacked and have set out to look for places that are a little calmer and more peaceful. But those of the Caucasians who have stayed and want to work normally here in what is, after all, already their homeland, which has been cultivated and mastered by them together with all the other peoples of our country, they are only asking for one thing—a calm, thoughtful dialogue, in order to resolve the urgent problems together with the whole world, with Caucasians, Kazakhs, Russians, and Ukrainians.

A working group has been formed in the headquarters of Shevchenko city party committee [gorkom] of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, which is to carry out the propaganda, agitational, and information functions, that is, in essence, the functions of the gorkom and the city executive committee. The Caucasians are trying to create an international association, of which Kazakhs would also be members, a kind of committee or discussion club. The Kazakhs have already formed a public organization called Parasat—in Russian this means reason—which is concerned with improving living conditions, with the development of the language and the culture of the Kazakhs. A decision by the constituent assembly of the Parasat organization, says the following in particular: We shall repel extremist elements, criminals, speculators, bribe-takers of any nationality, those who are promoting a split in the friendship between peoples. These are completely just and reasonable words, and it would be good if they were to remain not only a decision of the constituent assembly but sincerely implemented by the activists of the new Kazakh organization.

Details of Unrest in Uzbekistan Described

PM0307105189 Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 11 Jun 89 p 4

[Reprint of article from FERGANSKAYA PRAVDA 9 June: "The Truth About Kuvasay"; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Readers have asked the PRAVDA VOSTOKA editorial office to explain the reasons for the conflict that flared up in Fergana Oblast. They justify their appeal to the newspaper by reference to the various rumors and conjectures that have been circulated within the republic. That is why we are reprinting an item from FERGANSKAYA PRAVDA on this question.

The whole world is well aware that the conflict which flared up in Fergana Oblast had tragic consequences. There are dead and injured. Buildings and establishments have been damaged and apartment blocks burned down. Widows, orphans, fathers, mothers, sisters, and brothers can be heard lamenting in city suburbs and in villages. Thousands of people have left their homes, fearing pogroms and reprisals. What brought about this exceptionally tragic event?

It is hard to answer this question unequivocally. But one version suggests it was the events in Kuvasay in the last 10-day period of May this year. A common brawl that broke out between groups of indigenous nationals and Meskhetian Turks was deliberately distorted and artfully exploited by corrupt elements to bring their sordid political schemes to fruition. The artificial kindling of interethnic dissension, along with the specially-organized mass riots accompanied by pogroms, arson, killing, violence, and acts of vandalism first enveloped the settlement of Komsomolskiy in the city of Margilan, the Lenin Collective Farm in Ferganskiy Rayon, and then simultaneously the city of Fergana and adjoining rural rayons, where the excesses carried out by the frenzied excited masses continued over the days that followed. These actions assumed a grander scale 7 June. The number of people involved increased and the city of Kokand and outlying rayons were subjected to pogroms and devastation.

The apparently precise collaboration between disparate bandit groups operating in various districts and the pogrom against the homes belonging to Uzbeks and people of other nationalities, which began 7 June, the killings of law-enforcement officials, and the besieging and burning of militia, party committee, and local soviet executive committee buildings—these events prompt the thought that we are not dealing with isolated hooligan elements. They are being used by some forces as a blind instrument in a well-planned, large-scale political action which was elaborated long ago and which is being skillfully implemented with the main objective of destabilizing the situation not only within the oblast but also within the republic and the country.

There it is—the full unvarnished truth. This truth will maybe cool the hotheads and still the hand of the instigators, killers, and pillagers. So, what actually happened in Kuvasay?

The incident began in Kuvasay in the last 10-day period of May when a small domestic dispute occurred between young Uzbek nationals and Meskhetian Turks. The conflict situation recurred 23 May. Uzbek nationals patronizing a restaurant where the majority of the staff and clientele were Meskhetian Turks were subjected to insults. In retaliation young people of the indigenous nationality began to gather in groups to avenge the insult. Then they set off for the area with a high concentration of Meskhetian Turks. At 1930 some 200 people on each side had assembled in Budennyy Street. Despite the presence of militia staffers feelings were running high on both sides and from both sides excited and inflammatory shouts rang out. Then stones began to fly. Six people were injured and taken to the hospital as a result of the fight. The injured included the following: two members of the militia; two Meskhetian Turks; and two Uzbeks. Another seven people involved in the mass brawl were given medical aid that day.

This skirmish was successfully curtailed toward midnight through the efforts of city and oblast party and soviet organs and militia details. However, the next day—24 May—approximately 300 Meskhetian Turks gathered on V.I. Lenin Square toward 1100 and began demanding that their nationality issue be resolved and that those to blame for the mass brawl be punished. Groups of Uzbek nationals, mainly young people, also began to come to the same square and formed a group of 500 people.

Militia details and people with influence in both communities [sredy] were brought into play to prevent a further confrontation between these groups. Party and soviet officials engaged vigorously in explanatory activity. This bore fruit and by 1330 the mob had dispersed.

However, toward 1900 groups of young Uzbek nationals began to build up on the square once again.

Tashtan Aslanov, an authoritative figure among Meskhetian Turks, spoke to the gathering. He publicly apologized to those present for his compatriots' ill-advised actions. Then speeches were made by representatives of party and soviet organs, calling for observance of calm and order and for the prevention of ill-advised illegal actions that could entail unpredictable consequences.

Despite these appeals, the crowd, which by that time included people under the influence of alcohol and narcotics, began to march along Zheleznodorozhnaya Street toward the area with a high concentration of Meskhetian Turks. There was no reaction to militia officials' appeals for them to stop and disperse. A brawl broke out once again on the approach roads to the Meskhetian Turkish area [makhalla] between the mob and 150 Meskhetian Turkish residents. Stones, iron bars, knives, and battle noise simulators were used.

Militia staffers' actions succeeded in rapidly curtailing the brawl. The mob was forced out of the Turkish quarter and dispersed by 0200.

That night 58 people, of whom 32 were hospitalized, were injured during the brawl. One victim—Tajik national Ikram Abdurakhmanov, born 1960, a native of Valik village, Kuvasay City—died in the hospital.

That is the truth about events in Kuvasay.

The artificial kindling of tension, the use of all manner of unscrupulous methods and means of intoxicating people, including framed special laboratory photographs of the "horrors" in Kuvasay, ultimately did their dirty work. Both peoples are unsullied and totally innocent. Neither peoples wanted trouble in Kuvasay, Fergana, Tashlak, Margilan, or Kokand. Both peoples must find the strength to stop their senseless sons and prevent the tragedy escalating further. Both peoples will also be able to live in friendship as they did for 45 years in succession prior to this.

Situation Returning to 'Normal'

LD0107210689 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 1 Jul 89

[Text] A fundamentally new concept has been formulated for speeding up the socioeconomic development of Uzbekistan for the period up to 1995. Our correspondent reports from Fergana:

[Correspondent I. Abdukhalikov, identified by screen caption] The situation here is getting back to normal following the tragic events of June. Transportation and industrial enterprises are working and shops and bazaars are open. Farmers already are completing the harvest of winter cereal crops, albeit a little late. Even the most superficial analysis shows that the greatest excesses occurred in places where there is high unemployment, a difficult ecological situation, and a serious socioeconomic situation among the population. [video shows streets with traffic, combine harvester, gun-toting soldiers in a street]

Kuvinskiy Rayon, where we filmed this footage, is situated just a few dozen kilometers from Fergana. There are no Interior Ministry troops here, and there is no curfew. In the event of unrest, civil defense units have been organized. The problem of employment for the population exists here, too, but people are not giving in to provocative appeals. The fact that in Kuva serious attention is being paid to matters related to the level of employment among the population serves as the strongest possible argument. [video shows town scenes filmed from moving vehicle, militiaman briefing men wearing red arm bands]

[Unidentified man] Today, about 200,000 people are unable to find work. Many representatives from union ministries and departments have visited us. They are working together with us under the program adopted by the Politburo and the country's government for the rapid socioeconomic development of the republic for the 13th 5-Year Plan. This program provides for creating in the Fergana Valley a great number—more than 150—of industrial enterprises, primarily in highly labor-intensive sectors like electronics, instrument-making, and radio and means of communications, as well as light industry, particularly textiles, sewing and footwear, as well as the food industry, in connection with processing produce from the agro-industrial complex.

'Tension' Between Georgians, Azerbaijanis Reported

LD0107200689 Moscow TASS in English 1930 GMT 1 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 1 TASS—The situation in the Marneuli Bolnisi Dmanisi districts in Soviet Georgia has been tense for several days now, the newspaper IZVESTIYA wrote Saturday.

It said that the tension was brought about by aggravation of relations between Georgians and Azerbaijanis, who had settled in the districts long ago.

The situation is being controlled by the republic's Interior Ministry bodies. More than 3,000 militia and Interior Ministry troops have been sent there from Tbilisi, Georgia's capital, and from other districts to patrol roads and maintain order in towns and villages.

The Georgian Interior Ministry's press group reported that 51 fire-arms, 350 steel arms, 12 bottles filled with a flammable liquid, and 60 smoke hand grenades have been seized in the Marneuli and Bolnisi Districts in the past few days.

Informal associations, which wish an early end to the conflict, are also providing information.

Georgia's Interior Minister Shota Gorgodze told IZVESTIYA that, in his view, an undesirable development of events will be prevented and people will be appeased.

In any case, he said, it is only the efficient efforts by law-enforcement bodies and extensive explanatory work by communist party and local government bodies that make it possible to maintain stability of the situation.

Urals Train Crash Investigation Report Published

LD0107121689 Moscow World Service in English 1100 GMT 1 Jul 89

[Text] The Soviet Procurator's Office has published the results of the investigations into the circumstances of the devastating explosion of two trains in the area of the Ural Mountains.

Caused by a malfunction in a powerful gas pipeline, the explosion claimed hundreds of lives. Many people were seriously injured.

It has transpired that 9 months before the explosion the local procurator's office started legal proceedings in connection with the faults in the construction of that section of the pipeline. Had the leaders of the construction work taken the necessary measures to eliminate the defects as they promised the tragedy would have been avoided.

The Soviet press has published a letter written by the staff of the pipeline management. The letter calls for severely punishing those responsible for the tragedy, regardless of their posts.

Estonia's Ryutel Addresses Conference on 1939 Treaty

LD3006135389 Moscow TASS in English 1233 GMT 30 Jun 89

[Text] Tallinn June 30 Estonian News Agency (ETA)—TASS—An international conference on the legal evaluation of the Soviet-German treaties of August 23 and September 28, 1939, opened in Tallinn today.

The treaty of August 23, 1939, which went down in history as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and a secret protocol to it, the existence of which is disputed, as well as the Treaty on Friendship and Borders of September 28, 1939, were among the topics discussed by the recent Congress of People's Deputies, which formed a special commission in this connection.

The conclusions of the conference, attended by scientists from Moscow, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Ukraine, Poland, West Germany and Finland, will be submitted to the commission.

Addressing the conference participants, Estonian President Arnold Ryutel stressed that the international conference in Tallinn should contribute to the scientific understanding of this historical and legal problem, which is extremely important for European peoples.

Militia Prevents Interethnic Clash in Lithuania

LD0207181189 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1530 GMT 2 Jul 89

[Summary] In (Siauliai) Rayon in Lithuania, the eve of a popular festival was marred when several young men of Lithuanian nationality, warmed by strong drink, armed themselves with sticks and iron bars and set out to "bash the Russians." Militiamen blocked their way. The group shouted threats and insults, and attacked a militia vehicle. After vain appeals to reason, the militia were forced to use rubber truncheons. The incident is being investigated and the ringleaders will be brought to book.

Lithuanian Deputy Discusses Congress Walkout

PM2906151089 Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 10 Jun 89 p 3

[Interview with Kazimera Prunskene by V. Mikhaylov, under the general heading "People's Deputies Speak," on Lithuanian deputies' walkout from Congress of USSR People's Deputies session: "We Had No Alternative"; date, place of interview not given]

[Text] [Mikhaylov] What made you get up and leave?

[Prunskene] It was the natural thing to do.

You probably heard Romas Gudaytis' speech, which we had prepared the day before. The basic reasons are set out there in a fairly detailed way. I would like to add some thoughts of my own.

First of all, both life itself and the debates during the congress showed that there is a clear constitutional crisis because of contradictions in the USSR Constitution and contradictions between the USSR Constitution and the union republic constitutions. On the one hand sovereignty is declared, and on the other it is denied. And if there is no normal constitution, then how can we talk about constitutional oversight or a corresponding oversight committee? What constitution will be observed?

On the other hand, one of the functions of this committee must be to reveal inconsistencies between the fundamental laws of the republics and those of the Union. After all, we recently adopted an amendment according to which Article 70 of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Constitution states that only republican laws apply in the republic, while union laws apply only if they are ratified by our Supreme Soviet. This is in conflict with the proposed functions of the Constitutional Oversight Committee.

To put it plainly, merely by participating in the voting, we would have been passing sentence on our Constitution and betraying the sovereignty of Lithuania. For, having declared Lithuania's sovereignty, the deputies should act according to its principles.

Subsequently, we had a great many discussions with representatives from other republics, and when we again expounded our position, they understood that in fact the problem does not just concern Lithuania, but all the other republics too. We already have a legal basis for acting the way we did. Having once again analyzed our action, we find it correct. For we had to express our protest against the view that we are just 50 deputies and nothing more. In my opinion, a great many people did not understand or fully realize that we are not just 50 deputies, but that we are representing a sovereign republic here, and the will of our voters.

[Mikhaylov] The logical reasons for your action are, I hope, comprehensible to many readers. But were there also psychological reasons for your walkout?

[Prunskene] When we finally realized that our position was not being taken into account, and that the question was simply whether to set up a Constitutional Oversight Committee now or leave it until the fall, and that it was not the opinion of some arithmetical number of deputies that was being disregarded, but of a delegation from a sovereign republic—yes, of course this affected us very deeply psychologically.

When we realized that they were about to start the procedure to form this committee, there was nothing left for us to do except leave the hall. Because we had already tried simply abstaining, but this made no impression either on the deputies or the chairman and was simply ignored. Therefore, we showed our disagreement more clearly, our disagreement not just with participating in this procedure, but with even being present at it.

I think that this did have some influence, after all, and the resolution of this question was halted.

Unfortunately, the planned meeting with Gorbachev in the evening did not take place because debates on the problems in Uzbekistan ran late. I must say that our problems are too moderate and too European in character compared with what was being discussed in the evening. One of the Uzbeks even said: "Look at the Balts. They can gather 200,000 people for a rally and discuss their problems, and it's all right. But we, when we gather, we immediately pull out our knives. Otherwise we can't have a discussion." At the moment there is bloodshed, fires, and terrible clashes between armed people there. And in the evening, Uzbek problems somehow overshadowed the Lithuanian deputies' protests.

[Mikhaylov] It seems to me that our parliament has run out of time. To use the chess analogy, it must be noted that there is a most complicated situation on the board with unpredictable results. But the indicator on our clock, alas, has already come down...

[Prunskene] The congress revealed a multitude of problems that it was physically incapable of examining in one sitting. The indicator has come down, but this does not mean that we have lost. While we are untying the tangles of one set of problems, more problems are accumulating. We were talking about Tbilisi and the Baltic region, and now a hotbed of political tension has arisen in Uzbekistan.

With every passing day it becomes increasingly clear and obvious how different the peoples who live in the Soviet Union are. At the congress it was said repeatedly that someone somewhere is trying to pull the blanket over to their side of the bed. But in practice it is impossible for everyone to fit under one blanket! And when people try to make us all the same, to make us eat from one pot, live in one house, and cover ourselves with one blanket, as if we were one family, it is so unnatural... We can be good neighbors, everyone living in his own house with his own blanket, we can trade freely and be engaged in in cultural exchange, but we cannot be identical people, as this is simply unthinkable with our different levels of culture, civilization, morals, and different outlooks.

That is why when someone calls: "Be identical! Live as the center decrees!" we must firmly stick to our position. Ryzhkov's report, for example, sets forth once again the concept of a distributive economy, and one detects attempts to transfer resources from one place to another and patch the holes, instead of forming a mechanism that would really move the economy onto a new level.

[Mikhaylov] Did you vote against Ryzhkov?

[Prunskene] Our delegation was split: Part voted against, part abstained. Since I had frankly expounded my position from the congress platform, it seemed to me that it would be better to express a neutral stand in voting and abstain. I expressed my "against" in words. I did not want to offend anyone by doing this. But I had to speak angrily about the lack of understanding in discussions with the center.

The center should know this and take it into consideration.

Restructuring, Nationalist Problems Viewed

LD2806134689 Vilnius KOMJAUNIMO TIESA in Lithuanian 24 Mar 89 p 3

[Article by Docent Juozas Lakis: "Restructuring, Nationalism, Internationalism"]

[Excerpts] Many of the questions, currently under discussion, are linked, somehow, with national values and historical development of the nation, whose values they are. Restructuring—first of all, denotes rebirth of nations. This development has been matured by certain recent Soviet nation characteristics and an inner restructuring logic.

Restructuring—is a general movement. There cannot be a different version of it, whether it would stem from the top, or be partial or limited. It would not be restructuring.

National priorities, in this unquestionably international process, are undoubtedly not as evident as those of a mass character, but are basically inseparable from them. The feeling of a national and cultural community and cultural, social, and other mechanisms, that have evolved throughout the centuries, are highly important and productive as indicators of any type of mass action. Those republics where this mechanism has started to function are providing the most visible examples of practical restructuring and mass initiative. All this makes discussion of present and future nationalism highly urgent, in determining its significance in the development of Lithuania's political situation.

1. Concerning That Which Was Not Considered History

What type of historical experience, in the realm of national relations, has been accumulated most recently? Although precision is impossible, we shall strive to provide a general description of the pre-war national situation. The two decades of independence, in the period occurring between the wars, provided a unique significance for national consciousness which surpassed by far the political orientations and social attitudes of those years. Following several centuries of Polonization, Russification amd Germanization, and after divisions and redivisions that made the flame of nationalism appear, to a majority of thinkers, to be diminishing, there arose a wave of rebirth. Gaining impetus from contradiction, change, but on the whole, favorable conditions for rebirth, it matured Lithuania's self-dependence.

This was not a sweet-tasting fruit. National dignity was injured and a complex of potential aggression and other dangers stemming from a constant threat to the Lithuanian Republic's sovereignty and territorial integrity was formed. Apparently, that was what first gave rise to the vision of a unified nation. [passage omitted]

Unmerciful processes of becoming richer of poorer hindered national unity. They created single milionnaires and tens of thousands of the poor. They gave birth to social injustice, the experience of which was diminishing the idea of unity, the latter being connected more and more with the well-to-do idea. In truth, during those decades, social distances between separate groups did not reach the critical stage, and did not undermine patriotism and the efforts to strengthen Lithuanian independence.

The cultural existence of the period has not as yet received our respect. It was provided wings by rebirth and it supported its intensity with whatever means it had at its disposal. It lifted spirituality above all calamities and dangers. Literature, art, science, and education did not have a solid material base from which to draw; however, this was compensated for by selflessness and enthusiasm. [passage omitted]

Thus, Lithuanian nationalism was pragmatic, constructive and open to the prevailing conditions. It did not harbor (or at least, it did not harbor much) animosity toward other nations or states, even in the face, as we all know, of a multitude of provoking circumstances. It was marked by tolerance toward people of other nationalities residing in Lithuania.

Bourgeois parties of various tendencies and also the politicians exploited the united nation idea as a political slogan.

They appealed to the people in the nation's behalf, thus strengthening their ideological influence and squelching feelings of class unity. In essence this amounted to speculation with nationalist feelings, clearly, in pursuit of political supremacy goals: in other words—bourgeois nationalism. The rhetoric of nationalism was met with certain favor among the people, since it evoked national common interest, formed over centuries, along with a common destiny and historical recollection of disasters. It used to rebound, however, because of poverty, shortages, social iniquities, and political restrictions.

2. Nationality "In the Realm of Internationalism"

The most recent history of Lithuania began during the strongest power period of Stalinism. Official declarations stated, the palace of internationalism had already been completed. Official speeches were based on the premise of a united Soviet people and the further coming together of nations. Appropriate projections of this policy's decisions were, in literature and art (socialist content—national forms), social studies (common socialist conformity with the law—national characteristics) and in educational development (internationalistic, patriotic, and atheistic education). It is not difficult to observe that whatever had something to do with nationalism was regarded as something nonessential, almost nonsignificant, but something which needed to be taken into account, for the time being. It came into being as if there were no room left for nationalism, especially its folkloric area, traditions and customs.... The village, with its thousand years of spirituality and the decenct foundations, of its way of life, were relegated to the zone of inattention and ignorance. Progress began to be measured in terms of urbanization, industrialization and the "mastery over nature." Interest in rituals and the ethnic group way of life was simply regarded as bourgeois trivia, or even more threateningly—a nationalist position.

The ideological system, being created in the Republic, was brought closer to the common union model, in the shortest time possible. Without any regard for the existing ideological and moral situation. There was no other way, however:

Stalinism would not have been true to itself, had it made allowances for some type of variety, even if it had been dictated by objective circumstances. Many social groups were unable to adapt themselves to quickly changing circumstances, and to mature their psychological, moral and ideological beliefs. Republic ideological institutions announced the vitory of socialist ideology and a campaign to expurgate religious belief and nationalism (a campaign which lasted about four decades).

It would be erroneus to think, however, that nationalism was totally denied. To the contrary, it was, in a certain sense, even necessary for the politicians at the top. Stalinism, as is known, was based on similarity and strict subordination. It would not have been tolerable without embellishments. One of these was comprised of the declaration of nationality—"national characteristics," "national shapes," etc. Thus, the "international palace" could exhibit "nationality" and popular displays, that had been suitably touched up, in accordance with the ideological political directives of those years. Let's page through some of the books and press issues of that time; Let's look at movie newsreels and paintings. How unnatural and banner-like had been the stereotype of a Russian, or a Lithuanian girl; how ennobled was youthful behavior and how civic-minded and political were the thinking and behavior of the"working man" made out to be. This imitation of popularization was to feed literature, art, movies and amateur activities. It did. Not all of it—fortunately. Not all of those engaged in cultural work fell prey to it. The most prominent exponents of spirituality managed to break through the artificial layer of popularity and reach its real depths.

In other words, nationality could not express itself in public life as a spontaneous, untwisted value system, but had to be an illustration of socialism, in the shape of "form," "specifics," and "characteristics."

Following Stalin's dethroning, the view of socialism did not change, just as the country's political and ideological system was hardly changed. Directives continued, urging development of socialist internationalism, without accomodating vestiges of "bourgeois nationalism and with a renewal and artificial dissemination of backward reactionary habits and customs, under the guise of 'national traditions,' with minimal attempts to present falsely interpreted local 'interests' with common Soviet people's, of the struggle for interests of communism." This quote was taken from an official 1960 document. [passage omitted] Let us turn our attention to areas where the nurturing and enrichment of national existence should be discussed. We encounter curses directed against bourgeois nationalism, reactionary customs, and local interests. This is found not only in the selected quote, but throughout the entire document, as well as in the majority of scientific studies of that time. It was a rare individual who, upon receiving such directives, could resolve to actively participate in defending city and republic interests, especially if these happened to be against the center's line. Continuous exortations were being repeated to join the struggles against nationalism and parochialism. Although these did not bear a definite address, for the most part, they supported the Stalinist tension and atmosphere of suspicion. They chained creative thought and, initiative giving rise to fear, one might become an object of devastating criticism.

By the same token, Soviet people's unity and friendship among nations etc. were referred to in increasingly lofty terms. This was true: Wide economic and spiritual ties existed between the republics that were of vital importance and that fostered good feelings of internationalism. The trouble was buried deeper: Pompous exhibition of friendship among nations served to increasingly stifle international association and cooperation problems that could not fail to exist. They became sharper, since they were being solved thoughtlessly by central departments. Soon these found a reflection in publicistic writing and education, which portrayed individuals as without a fatherland or a birthplace, although having strong feelings of love for our vast country ("My address—is not a house, nor a street...The Soviet Union"). [preceding sentence rendered in transliterated Russian].

An analysis of the actual situation at that time attests that there existed no ill will "from above" against nationalism. Its complex of ignorance stemmed from a series of circumstances, the influence of limits on political thinking not to be excluded from among them. [passage omitted]

The official view of nationalism as a second class entity, beside internationalism, formed already forgotten theories concerning the universal character of the world revolution. Those who had taken the first steps toward socialism felt as if they were inside a locomotive of history, imagining that everyone else had to follow them. [passage omitted] The mole of history continued its work, however, imperceptibly and stubbornly. Leaning on one another, the Soviet republics rebuilt their war-ravaged economies, were slowly shaking off the Stalinist frost, were gaining self-confidence, as well as confidence in their own creative capabilities. By the 1980's, which were considered by many as unfavorable, it was not difficult to notice signs of national consciousnesss, not only in the Baltic areas, but also within Russian centers, the Transcaucasus, and other regions. Official attitudes toward nationalism were also slowly changing: The importance of national culture, Soviet republic meaning, and self-expression began to be accentuated in political documents.

Although not much had changed in everyday life, these constituted obvious changes. It is somewhat questionable that criticism urging restoration of a historical castle would have been possible in the 1980s.

3. Present Nature of the Spiritual and Political Situation

The current stage of rebirth has matured among all segments of the population. I would think no social group could be found that does not yearn for republic self-dependence, spirituality, decency, and ecological well being, and who would not consciously desire to utilize its resources. The rebirth of historical as well as political views in Lithuania (as in Latvia, Georgia, Russia, etc) is closely intertwined with the restructuring taking place within the entire Soviet Union. The destinies of restructuring and rebirth are inseparable. [passage omitted] The interaction between the two processes has not revealed itself, as yet, in all of its aspects. For this reason, I think, we will need to return to this premise, more than once in the future, and coordinate our new initiatives and with that appraise our new situation, as it exists.

The most important discussions that have taken place to date were dictated by the spirit of the times. Economic independence and national sovereignty, ecology and problems of moral and cultural fulfillment mark the path for fulfillment and rebirth. The strong tension, present in public discussions, the far-reaching and enriched opinions, and the wide range of options for a solution are understandable and excusable. The situation is considerably complicated, however, by passions and, frequently, by overwhelmingly categorical assertions and intolerance toward those who beg to differ. There exists, at times, an unfounded national ambition as if Lithuania were the only place experiencing authentic changes and hundreds of thousands of threads were not to be found connecting it with that which is taking place here and elsewhere.

The revelations and reliving of the dismal and bitter truth, concerning the events of 1939-40-41, of occupation and postwar tragedy, have fanned the emotions. During the discussion stage of the situation, impetus was given to such psychological tension that at various public moments it gave rise to instances in which rationality and pragmatic thinking were totally drowned out. Fortunately, and to the credit of participants at these various meetings, the critical point was not exceeded. It almost didn't happen. Without the spiritual uplifting, of course, there would not have come about this impetuous surge forward that changed all of our thinking and behavior and old stereotypes of public life, and brought back priorities on national sovereignty. By comparing the press publications, which came out at the beginning of the year, to those published at the year's end, and by looking at official and unofficial functions and finally our own citizen's stands, it is possible to conclude that during other times such changes would have taken decades. Without experiencing this spiritual uplifting there would be no massive support for Sajudis amd other independent organizations and radical initiatives.

A certain national dissociation in raising longstanding nationality questions constitutes the biggest problem in the initial step. Discussions have arisen between Lithuanians and other national groups who also regard Lithuania as their fatherland. We do seem to agree that this is not good. However, the number of declarations, imbued with insults and double meanings, has not at all diminished following the first wave of massive demonstrations. It is high time to take a clear assessment of public actions and initiative, not only on a nationality, but also on an international scale. They must not oppose one another. Under the existing situation, restructuring and rebirth, which have been acting like partners, may turn into locomotives pitted against each other.

Rebirth and restructuring are for—everyone. They exist for both Lithuanians and Russians, for students and pensioners, and for radicals as well as conservatives. No one can lay claim to an already restructured name of honor and no one may destroy someone elses's dignity with demeaning condemnations, in the sometimes painful, public, and each individual's ideal and moral renewal process. Even specialists don't always complete a job in the same manner. Here, in addition to varied training, the circumstances in which people live and work differ—things have such varied interpretation and significance. Renewal would lose a great deal if mouths were to be silenced on its behalf, if people were excluded from public life on some pretext, or if a rational heritage from the past, including those postwar decades, were to be renounced. If necessary, discuss it as a matter of fact, but avoid small political intrigues. Such ought to be the path to a wider democracy.

The changes in our life have taken on a dynamic tone. Let us not stop repeating to ourselves and to others a wise saying not to step on each other's heels [toes]. Currently, we like to align ourselves with recognized world examples, sometimes by even "dusting off" their shadows from them, in our unique manner, and bypassing their social and historical context. In the case of a union, it's—Swiss; if it happens to be a democracy, it's—American; etc. Too often we forget that nations have nurtured and developed their democracies over decades and through many stages. We yearn to attain that level all at once, or at least in the near future. People say Churchill said of Khrushchev: "He wants to jump across the chasm in two leaps." Could it be that some of us wish to span the chasm with two leaps? One does not need a remarkable memory to recall how attempts to jump into a world of Japanese miracles, mature socialism, or even into communism have ended.

We have the unique chance to align restructuring and rebirth with the uplifting into a more mature level of national self-determination. Let us, therefore, develop this possibility persistently and thoroughly.

4. Lithuanians and Other National Groups Within Lithuania

The national makeup of the republic is distinguished by its healthy proportions and fosters favorable opportunities for the cultural and moral solidification of people of all nationalities who live in Lithuania. We have been spared sudden and massive influxes of people of other nationalities; in this respect, we are immeasurably more fortunate, in a sense, than our neighbors. [passage omitted] So, why did there arise, in international relations, (not only in our republic, by the way) a certain type of coldness? Frequently, hooligan-like expressions of nationalistic origin are called to attention. The phenomenon is much more encompassing, however, and its subjects are not in every case uncultured individuals. Herein, also, can be found old problems that are now becoming clearer. Any increase in public tension has always had an impact on internationality relations: The nearly subsided affronts and disagreements again find suspicions and spite. This happens even now.

Each actual step taken to strengthen the Lithuanian nation's nationality raises a lot of questions for the people of other nationalities. First of all, are they being outdistanced and will they be left by the wayside? There were similar reactions to the solidifying of the role of Lithuanian language and the revival of national attributes. This may happen in other instances, also.

Western researchers have a tendency to refer to growing involvement in nationality affairs as nationalism. When, following the initial Lithuanian Sajudis meeting, Voice of America co-worker R. Sakadolskis was asked to comment on that station's Russian language announcement about "Lithuanian nationalists," he replied that he saw nothing derogatory in that word. [passage omitted]

Yes, terminology interpretations do differ in this area. I would think, however, that in this instance we are not talking about form but about the essential differences in appraising the most recent events taking place within the union republics. Our experts do not tend to view national consciousness processes as nationalism, if they do not present a danger to other nationalities. In this they have shown themselves to be more patient and more tolerant than their Western colleagues.

Public statements by party, Sajudis, and other authoritative representatives of organizations are very valuable in dispelling the coolness in internationality relations. The situation cannot be altered, however, by mere exhortations.

I think the rationale and status of countrymen should be discussed, and perhaps legalized. Other national groups have lived in Lithuania, alongside Lithuanians, for centuries. They have the right to regard Lithuania as their natural fatherland. For this reason it would be correct to regard every individual permanently living in Lithuania as a countryman. The ethnic minorities, consisting of Poles, Belorussians, Russians, Jews, and Karaims, are integrated in Lithuania in every respect. They have good reason to expect the goodwill of the main national segment of the population.

Academician D. Likhachev, who firmly supports ethnic minorities, observed that chauvinism "is generally characteristic of weak nations—a weak culture, and of nations' weak cultural heritage." (..DRUZHBA NARODOV No 6, 1988. See 224). Lithuanian culture contains many bright qualities of multi-nationality. The cultures of Lithuanians and Lithuanian Russians, Jews, Poles, and Germans make up an integrated society. This by no means amounts to a Lithuanian fusion with Russia, Poland, etc. cultural splinter groups.

This may also be stated about Lithuanian and all other countrymen's self-awareness, patriotism, and in a certain sense continuity of historical memory.

I would think the following would be a possible way of handling practical citizenship, cultural existence, and internal internationality relations questions. All individuals who have permanently settled in Lithuania would be integrated here by stages and become countrymen. This is such an objective tendency that it would be unthinkable "to resist it." Questions of migration, of course, need regulation, primarily because of social and economic considerations. To regard this matter with extreme attitudes would be unrealistic and harmful.

The need to expand our interaction with other nations is gaining impetus, in the 21st Century perspective. Are we thorough in our fostering of characteristics required for this, so that along with national unity and patriotism we may be capable of sensitivity to world problems and be receptive to the experience and culture of others, in order not to shut ourselves up in our own midst and becoming weak in the eyes of others?

Science Research Independence Urged in Lithuania

LD2706132289 Vilnius TIESA in Lithuanian 6 Apr 89 p 1

[Article by Leonas Kadziulis, chief of the Agriculture Section and corresponding member of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic Academy of Sciences, under the rubric "Agriculture: Analysis and Prognosis": "Science—Not A Department Servant"]

[Text] Agricultural science research institutes that had, until 1956, been a part of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Academy of Sciences system, have been under department jurisdiction for the past 30 years. The Institutes for Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Science, Agricultural Economy, Agricultural Mechanization and Electrification, and Fruit and Vegetable Growing are under the jurisdiction of the State Agro-Industrial Committee, while the Institute For Hydrotechnology and Land-Reclamation is under the USSR Ministry of Land-Reclamation and Water Resources.

Let us recall some of the many events that have caused harm to our agriculture. We must include the destruction of grasslands, elimination of individual farms, farm integration and establishment of inter-farm associations, the onslaught of land reclamation, and ultra chemical treatment.... All such drives were conducted by departments, in the name of whatever science happened to be under them. In the event one or another such drive failed, science would become the sacrificial goat. We should be thankful to people such as Antanas Snieckus [former 1st Secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee], Vytautas Vazalinskas, and others, that Lithuania was spared even greater losses, because these individuals did not bend to the winds of change.

The dependence of agricultural science on departmental control fails to encourage serious scientific activity. Research becomes trivial and results are increasingly insignificant, since they are primarily appraised quantitively and not for their quality. This type of system undermines the research effectiveness of Lithuanian SSR Academy of Sciences institutes. They are examining republic landscape, ecology, and biology problems without recourse to experimental farms, other stronger bases, and forestry and agricultural institutes. Generally, "global" problems are currently overwhelming "local" ones at the republic Academy of Sciences.

Science is autonomous by nature. This is not the first time that Lithuanian scientists and agrarians have wished to legitimize this principle. There existed a previous desire to found a Lithuanian Agricultural Science Academy, or at least an affiliate of the Academy of Agricultual Sciences (VASKhNiL) in Vilnius. A dozen years ago or so, however, divisions of regional VASkhNiL were established, with the Belorussian Agricultural Academy as the "center's" Western Division, pretending to administer the scientific agrarians of four republics. There remains some opposition still, in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, to such administration from Minsk, but will it last much longer?

Many of our agrarian scientists are suggesting the return of agricultural science institutes, along with their bases, to the Lithuanian SSR Academy of Sciences system, which would then enable them to become equal with the other Academy of Sciences institutes. Although profiles of these six institutes differ, their administration should not be divided, but rather should concentrate various area specialists for common activities, that would guarantee qualified leadership with solid, far-sighted scientific programs, as well as ensure their complexity and fundamentals.

The Agro-Industrial Committee is still preparing to establish an "Agro-Science Scientific Production Association." Alas, these efforts are not as of yet showing any results. Meanwhile institute experimental farms have become even more dependent on rayon agro-industrial associations, rather than on the institutes themselves. The above-mentioned association, that unites institutes, their experimental farms, construction bureaus, economically accountable shops, and others, has a valid position.

Its place, however, is under the jurisdiction of the Academy of Sciences. Agriculture then would be financed by the Lithuanian SSR and USSR (if participating in a Union program) budgets, centralized and individual clients' funding, and would receive a portion of the experimental farm profit. Agricultural institutes, in close cooperation with other Academy of Sciences institutes and higher education schools, would enter into common programs for complex problem research. In accordance with agreements with clients, agrarian scientists would furnish research results and recommendations or designs, after having verified them in their own or in others' experimental farms. Consultations could be held with administrators of agro-industrial committees and planning institutes, and occasionally with individual farms, as these recommendations are being applied in agricultural enterprises, land-reclamation areas, and construction sites.

Perhaps placing agricultural science under the Academy of Sciences would not provide it with total autonomy. It would free it, however, from departmental dependence that would be unavoidable, even with the establishment of an Agricultural Sciences Academy—since that would be a "vassal" of the Union Academy. By becoming a part of the Lithuanian SSR Academy of Sciences, agricultural institutes would cooperate with other republic central institutes on a parity basis.

Perhaps the Agro-Industrial Committee of the Ministry of Agriculture may be hesitant to give up their jurisdiction over science; however, there is no other way: Commands must be replaced by normal client-work superintendent relations. The basic task for agricultual administrative organs remains to establish a well-thought out system of institutes for planning, consultation and other agro-services that would implement the orders worked out by scientists.

Estonian Mine Workers Strike; Demands Met

LD3006195889 Moscow TASS in English 1901 GMT 30 Jun 89

[Text] Kohtla-Jarve June 30 TASS—Workers of three sections of the mine Ahtme of the production amalgamation Estonslanets descended into the pit but refused to start work on the night of June 29/30.

The mine-workers said they would remain underground until their demands were met. Morning-shift workers joined the strikers.

The mine-workers wanted one section of the mine to be closed since its normal operation could not be ensured due to a shortage of mine transport. Idleness affected the workers' earnings.

The miners' advanced the condition that managers of the amalgamation and leaders of the party city committee immediately arrive in the mine. The officials went down to the pit on the same night, heard their demands and suggested that they resume work, promising prompt measures.

Today, the management of the amalgamation decided to close down one section.

Discussions with the leaders of the mine's party and trade union organisations reveal that they were fully informed about the imminent conflict situation but underestimated the fact that the workers' patience was wearing thin.

All sections of the mine are now operating.

Latvian Official Responds to Interfront Demand

PM2206084089 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 14 Jun 89 p 3

[Article by K. Litsis, Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) Council of Ministers administrator of affairs: "At the Request of Interfront"]

[Text] A.G. Alekseyev and I.V. Lopatin, leaders of the International Front of Working People [Interfront] of the Latvian SSR, have submitted to the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee a demand to examine the legality of the resolution adopted by the republic Council of Ministers and the Latvian Republican Trade Unions Council "On Measures To Stop Unjustified Mechanical Population Growth and Regulate Processes of Migration to the Latvian SSR."

Despite the wide preliminary discussion of the draft document by the population and the subsequent explanations in the press and on television, the republic Council of Ministers is still receiving letters in which citizens request explanation and clarification of particular provisions in the aforementioned resolution, which was adopted 14 February 1989.

There are also more peremptory demands. Thus the republican committee of the Construction and Construction Materials Industry Workers Trade Union insists on the lifting for construction workers of Points 9 and 14.2 of the resolution, which specify a 10-year period of residence and registration for admission to the list of those needing improved housing conditions and abolish residence in a hostel as grounds for admission to the list. A similar question was raised by the party organization of the "Rigastroy" Trust.

In light of the above, the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau instructed the republic Council of Ministers and the Latvian Republican Trade Unions Council to re-examine the resolution in question. This instruction was carried out—the question was again discussed comprehensively and thoroughly, and it was decided that there are no grounds to doubt the correctness of the resolution adopted earlier. It remains in force in its original form, with no amendments.

There is no need today to comment on this resolution Number 46 of 14 February 1989 in its entirety. It has been discussed repeatedly and publicized quite widely. Therefore, we consider it expedient solely to answer the questions raised by the Interfront leadership. Thus it considers that Points 9 and 14.2 are in violation of the law and asks to be told who is to blame for this and how they have been punished. A number of other questions demanding explanations are also raised.

Thus, Point 9 says: "...Persons permanently resident and registered in a given settlement for not less than 10 years are admitted to the list of those needing improved housing conditions." Previously a 5-year period was in force. This was laid down by the provision on the procedure for listing citizens needing improved housing conditions and on the provision of housing in the Latvian SSR, approved by the republic Council of Ministers and the Latvian Republican Trade Unions Council in 1983. It follows from this that any change in this norm falls exclusively within the competence of the government and trade unions of our republic. There is no legal infringement here.

Next, Point 14.2 specifies the following amendment to existing legislation: "Residence in hostels is not considered grounds for admission to the list for the provision (improvement) of housing for those needing improved housing conditions." This required an amendment to the Housing Code. It was made by a Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Decree ratified at the republic Supreme Soviet session on 5 May of this year. Thus the law was strictly complied with on this question, too.

The leaders of the Latvian SSR Interfront see the republic Council of Ministers as exceeding its powers in connection with the fact that Resolution No. 46 provides for a contribution of between R15,000 and R25,000 to the nonbudget accounts of the rayon or city soviet executive committee [ispolkom] for each worker and family member brought in from outside the republic. And also, in the cities of Riga and Yurmala and Rizhskiy Rayon, for each worker brought in from other rayons and cities of the republic. They claim that under the Law on the State Enterprise (Association), labor collectives have the use of their own resources and the republic Council of Ministers has no right to dictate terms to them. But it is not a question of dictating terms. The resolution gives every collective the opportunity to decide for itself what suits it best—whether to pay considerable sums of money for those invited in to work, or whether to do without the introduction of additional manpower. We think the majority of working people will vote for the latter, although this will mean that the enterprise must develop along a more difficult path—the intensification of production, rather than simply the extensive increase of capacities.

Of course, Resolution No. 46 sets difficult tasks for industry, construction, and a number of other sectors. But such measures must be adopted. It is a question of the future of the republic's indigenous population, which, as a result of uncontrolled migration processes, has become a minority in its own territory and has begun to lose its traditions, unique culture, and language.

It is equally important that the unjustified mechanical population growth does considerable damage to the social sphere, including trade and consumer services to the population. That has become a heavy burden on every one of us, regardless of our national or social origin.

We have no alternative but for all the republic's inhabitants to rally closely and make matters right without help from outside. It is necessary to skillfully redistribute the available manpower so that agriculture, industrial production, construction—the republic's entire national economic complex—do not suffer. To this end, in the conditions of republican economic accountability, the structure of our economy must be brought strictly into line with the interests of the population and the existing work force.

It will not be easy to overcome these difficulties.

Take just one problem: housing. Last year, contrary to expectations, this problem was further exacerbated. The construction workers failed to meet plan targets. Some 18,900 apartments were commissioned. That is 4,100 fewer than in 1987. At the same time, 32,400 families were admitted to the list, while only 18,400 families from the list received housing. The number of families on the list at the ispolkoms, enterprises, and organizations had reached 160,000 by the beginning of this year. In the existing situation citizens on the general list will be waiting for 15-20 years to receive housing.

Not the least important role in this was played by the high level of mechanical population increase, which was almost twice the natural population growth in the last 20 years. The mechanical growth coefficient is the highest of any of the union republics. This problem was most acute in Riga. It was no longer possible to leave this process unregulated.

The former administrative edict system of economic management prompted ministries and departments to expand production construction to the detriment of housing construction. On the one hand, cadres were brought in from other regions to expand industrial enterprises, while on the other hand the residual resources for the fulfillment of the housing program and the development of the social sphere in general dwindled.

Under these conditions there was an urgent need for the republic government to adopt the resolution "On Measures To Stop Unjustified Mechanical Population Growth and Regulate Processes of Migration to the Latvian SSR." It stops the further exacerbation of social problems and creates the preconditions for their more successful resolution.

However, despite the obvious need for the adoption of this resolution, there are still doubts about some of its provisions. In particular, on the expediency of the gradual elimination, by 1996, of hostels of the dormitory and room type, with the exception of educational establishments' hostels. Some people erroneously believe that those living in hostels will be left without a roof over their heads. That is not true.

Those who live in hostels and are in the waiting line to receive well-appointed housing will definitely receive it. Those who are not in the waiting line and have not yet been resident for the necessary 10 years will not be admitted to the list as yet, but as the hostels are eliminated, that is, by 1996, they will be provided with housing. A more complex situation arises in connection with the elimination of hostels if people are living there who have severed their labor links with enterprises and organizations. For this category of citizens the enterprises, in conjunction with local soviet ispolkoms, will adopt well considered, humane decisions in each case, in accordance with the principles of social justice.

The republic Council of Ministers will strictly monitor the situation to ensure that the utmost sensitivity and solicitousness is shown toward people by all the officials involved.

Thus, there is every reason to suppose that the measures stipulated in this resolution will reduce the social tension attendant on the mechanical population growth.

And last, the elimination of the possibility of bringing in manpower from outside will force ministries, departments, and their enterprises to accelerate the introduction of modern equipment and technology and advanced forms of labor organization—and only in this way to embark on the path of intensive development of production.

Latvian Front's Independence Appeal Criticized

PM2606155389 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Jun 89 Second Edition p 2

[Correspondent O. Meshkov report: "What Direction? Concerning an Appeal by the Latvian People's Front Council"]

[Text] Riga—On the last day of May an event took place in the republic that had a very powerful impression on many of its residents. The Board of the Latvian People's Front [LPF] Council published in the youth newspaper PADOMJU JAUNATNE an appeal proposing that all groups and branches of that sociopolitical organization discuss the question of Latvia's sovereignty outside of the USSR state system.

Not an ordinary case, you will agree. The matter was first raised before a nationwide audience by USSR People's Deputy V. Alksnis speaking from the congress rostrum. He cited the main part of that document and drew this conclusion: The mask is off. What was formerly only whispered is now being discussed quite openly. In the tense atmosphere of the Congress of People's Deputies, when there were so many blunt speeches and rejoinders, V. Alksnis' words somehow went unnoticed.

But in the republic itself the council board's appeal produced a broad response. And what a response, because after all it was a matter of the basic interests of the entire population of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR]! True, at the time that the appeal was published many of the most authoritative members of the LPF Board were at the congress as part of the Latvian delegation and it was quite understandable that people may have thought: Perhaps the radically-minded members of the LPF were simply taking advantage of an opportune moment? Back in Moscow, however, in reply to a Latvian news agency correspondent's question on whether the text of the appeal had been coordinated with those members of the council attending the congress, E. Inkens, a leader of the LPF, replied: "I cannot say that it was; the council board elaborated it on the spot. But I cannot deny that we did not sense the movement toward such a document."

Then at a recent council session the aforementioned appeal was firmly supported by an overwhelming majority. As a result, the already tense atmosphere in the republic became all the more charged. Recently the local press published a Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau resolution. It notes that a serious development has taken place in the LPF's activity and considerable changes in its leadership's goals are being perceived. "The declaration of a kind of referendum on such an important question as the state independence of Latvia"—we read in the resolution—"and the ease with which slogans devoid of economic or political underpinning are changed indicates the inconsistency and political shortsightedness of the LPF's leaders."

What do the republic's inhabitants themselves think about the present situation and the appeal by the People's Front council? Here, for example, is the opinion of Peteris Grishko, a former Latvian Red Rifleman:

"I support the introduction of Latvian as an official language in the republic. I support the introduction of republic economic accountability. All this will help to solve better the problems that have accumulated in interethnic relations. The LPF, incidentally, has insisted and continues to insist on that. But I categorically reject Latvia's withdrawal from the USSR. The situation, in my view, now is that the People's Front has acquired very great strength and in many ways dictates the development of events. That must be taken into account. And such ill-considered appeals by its leaders are all the more dangerous, therefore."

Here is the opinion of Andris Ruch, a production engineer at the "Avtoelektropribor" plant and member of the LPF Board Council in Riga City's Proletarskiy Rayon:

"Withdrawal from the USSR is unrealistic. We will simply disappear; no one in the West needs us. The discussion ought to be about improving our federal relations. Latvia is already de jure a sovereign state. It is necessary to ensure that its independence, guaranteed by the USSR Constitution, becomes de facto. There should be a treaty between the union as a whole and each union republic, and it should be mutually beneficial. It is necessary to ensure that the republics have an interest in strengthening the union. And here is another point I would like to make: If the Second LPF Congress in the fall adopts an orientation toward withdrawal from the USSR, then I, as a CPSU member, will withdraw from the People's Front."

[Meshkov] "But what do your comrades in the People's Front think?"

[Ruch] "To be honest, there are those who support the council's appeal. Quite a few of them, too. But the Communists, as far as I have noticed, for the most part adopt a realistic stance and are against withdrawal from the USSR."

My interlocutor's words reminded me of the speech by A. Gorbunov, chairman of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, at a news conference given by the republic's people's deputies. He said then that any social organization that initiates such a discussion must be aware of the responsibility for the consequences of the political tension it may generate. What is being proposed is essentially a referendum, but the holding of referenda is the prerogative of the republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium.

Commenting on the decision, the LPF's leaders insist that this is just a discussion among People's Front members. But is the theme of the discussion not too important for that? That is why the aforementioned Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau resolution notes that the event in question is not simply a discussion but a desire to incline public opinion toward a categorical decision.

The Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau has called on the republic's Communists to show wisdom and political farsightedness in the situation that has been created. Party committees and all primary party organizations must also define their stance. One thing is beyond doubt: There must be painstaking and effective work to explain the essence of the party's present nationalities, economic, and social policy, and this work must really get through to people.

Unsanctioned 17 Jun Latvian March Described

PM3006155789 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 20 Jun 89 p 4

[Article by I. Birin under the rubric "We Report the Details": "Such Is the Price of Walks"]

[Text] Early last Saturday drivers travelling along the Pskov highway noticed a small group of young people carrying posters and heading on foot in the direction of

Riga. To most of them this small column came as no surprise—they had seen leaflets in recent days which read:

"Attention! The youth association 'For Fatherland and Freedom' announces that the previously declared peace march through the streets of Riga is being called off because the Rauna section of the Movement for Latvia's National Independence is arriving in Riga 17 June as part of a march organized throughout Latvia.

"The youth association 'For Fatherland and Freedom' invites everyone to join this march, meeting it 17 June at the terminus of the No. 6 streetcar route on the Yugla at around 1700 hours in order to proceed from there to the Liberation Monument."

So the pilgrims on the Pskov highway were the participants in the march from Rauna in Tsesisskiy rayon.

So what? we may shrug our shoulders. A group of young people walking from Rauna to Riga; let them be. I have been told that in the thirties a man walked to Moscow from Vladivostok. And another, to get himself noticed, walked pushing an empty barrel in front of him. But he got very tired and stopped for the winter in Irkutsk. There would be nothing special about this walk, of course, had the procession from the Yugla to the Liberation Monument not been banned earlier by the Riga City Soviet Executive Committee. So the cited leaflet was deliberately provocative and represented a fairly nasty intrigue.

Then Latvian radio decided to add a bit of spice to the situation that was being cooked up: It, too, called on the inhabitants of Riga to meet the young people from Rauna, and it did not fail to mention that the march as such was banned.

The upshot was that the couple of dozen marchers were joined by 300 people at the Yugla. And immediately appeared national flags and the by-no-means hastily inscribed traditional banners: "Down with the occupation of Latvia!" "Occupationists go home!" "Freedom!" "Independence!"...

The procession set off toward downtown Riga. We must give the participants their due: They kept to the sidewalk and strictly respected the traffic signals. However, this did not change the crucial fact that the organizers of the march did not have the authorities' permission to hold this event.

The first time the column was stopped was at the "Yugla" movie theater, and later again at the Institute of Physical Culture. It was explained to the demonstrators that they were breaking the law and disrupting order in the city. However, in reply there were only shouts that got nastier and nastier. The small number of unarmed militiamen, whose cordon was effortlessly broken by the demonstrators pushing with their shoulders, was reinforced by sturdy forces armed with rubber truncheons. When the reinforcements became an insurmountable obstacle in the path of the column, V. Bugay, chief of the Riga City Internal Affairs Administration, proposed to the march participants that they proceed by streetcar and end their escapade.

However, the admonitions were to no avail. The demonstrators alighted from the streetcar at "Detskiy Mir" and tried to get through to Lenin Street so as to continue their march to the Liberation Monument along the central thoroughfare. However, in the area of F. Engels, K. Marx, and P. Stuchka streets militiamen blocked their way. Again there was shouting and threats, and the banners and flags were used to oppose the guardians of law and order. And, as frequently happens on these occasions, hooligans and criminals, jumping on the bandwagon, tried to masquerade as the main champions of the national liberation movement. Among the most active, it was possible to single out Liga Kruminya, movie operator at the Ya. Raynis Museum in Yurmala. The selfsame Kruminya whose extravagant behavior attracted attention during the incident at the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee building in which Riga theater actors took part.

The militia refused to be drawn into a fight and to resort to the use of force; they strove to keep the event peaceful. A number of overexcited demonstrators were taken to a nearby bus, where they talked to them, let them cool off, and then sent them on their way. Four were taken to the Proletarskiy, Kirovskiy, and city militia departments. These measures seemed to work: The demonstrators politely promised not to disrupt order and to put away their paraphernalia.

However, the politeness did not last long. Near Kirovskiy Park shouts were again heard and order was again disrupted. Against this backdrop the enthusiastic welcome given to the demonstrators at the Liberation Monument by several hundred people seems incomprehensible: After all, hooliganism, disobedience, and the flouting of the legislation in force has nothing in common with politics. As the saying goes, tell me who your friends are, and I....

As readers must be aware, large militia contingents were used to protect citizens from the disturbance caused by the aforementioned march. Now take a look at the following report: On Saturday 17 June, 1 mugging, 1 robbery, 1 incident of grievous bodily harm, 1 sexual assault on a juvenile, 4 thefts of state property, 14 appartment burglaries, and 5 car thefts were committed.

Do you appreciate the current price of walks such as the one that began in far-off Rauna?

Zaykov Welcomes 'Critical' Moscow Gorkom Debate

PM2906140989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
24 Jun 89 Second Edition p 3

[Yu. Kazmin report: "Honest Discussion. Notes After the Plenum"]

[Text] Moscow City—A Moscow CPSU City Committee [Gorkom] plenum was held 21 June. PRAVDA has already reported that it examined the question of the work of the Moscow City party organization under present-day conditions. An account of the report by L. Zaykov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Moscow party gorkom [title as published], has been published. But readers expressed a desire for the newspaper to discuss the debates, too.

It would hardly be stretching the truth to say that this is the first time I have written a report on such a heated [nakalennyy] meeting. The atmosphere of forthrightness [raskovannost] and passion that prevailed at the 19th party conference and the Congress of USSR People's Deputies had been transferred here to Staraya Square, where the plenum of Moscow Communists was held.

Both at the CPSU Central Committee April (1989) Plenum and the Congress of People's Deputies it was noted that the party sometimes lags behind the processes taking place in society. This has required Communists and party committees to make immediate amendments to their activity.

"If we want to further fulfill our mission of being the political vanguard—and society needs such a vanguard force—we Communists and our party need to restructure ourselves faster than society as a whole," L. Zaykov noted in his report.

This author attended the rallies and meetings that preceded the Congress of People's Deputies. There I noted with sorrow that the city's party aktiv often loses out in arguments against informal leaders. Party cadre workers lack the ability to handle facts, arguments, and an audience, and sometimes simply lack party principledness and boldness. Not for nothing were the words of the nonparty member and writer Valentin Rasputin, USSR people's deputy, cited yet again at the Moscow party gorkom plenum: "It used to be an advantage to join the party. That is why it lost its authority. Now it has become a disadvantage to join the party; more than that, it has become dangerous. And leaving it at such a time is by no means a question of courage, as it may seem to some unsophisticated people, but the same calculation that drew them previously to the party."

What ways of stepping up the role of the party among the masses and its prestige and efficiency were suggested by the plenum participants? The idea of the need to strengthen party ranks, cleanse them of ballast, make extensive use of new work approaches, closely link these with the improvement of Muscovites' real lives, and actually strive to demarcate the functions of party, soviet, and economic organs was clearly expressed. As was, above all, the idea of urgently taking measures to liberate the activity of rayon committees [raykom] and primary party organizations.

It is no secret that the restructuring of party work is proceeding under very complex conditions whereby a qualitatively new economic basis and structure for our society are being shaped at the same time. Things are by no means fully clear as yet. That it why it is very important to listen to the opinion of Communists and nonparty people on how the party should work under the new conditions and which levers and pedals need to be operated in order to ensure that Muscovites enjoy the fruits of restructuring more quickly.

In order to prove its right to be society's political vanguard, the party and its leaders are obliged, however hard it may be, to channel the unambiguous and sharply growing activeness of the population into restructuring and increasing the personal contribution of everyone for this work, A. Bryachikhin, first secretary of Sevastopolskiy party raykom, said.

As if developing this idea, L. Gracheva, leader of a team of plasterers at the "Mosotdelstroy-8" Trust, noted that it is now time for Communists, party committees, and primary organizations to take up front-ranking positions and stop being on the defensive. She called for work to be launched to prepare for elections to the local soviets.

"During the preparations for the plenum," she said, "I encountered the following questions. There is currently a great deal of criticism that the party is allegedly losing its positions and losing workers and the intelligentsia from its ranks. But, in my view, this is a normal process. Perhaps I'm putting it bluntly, but the people leaving are those who have lost faith not just in the party but in themselves. They are trying to dodge their responsibility.

"It has long been clear that during the years of stagnation the party was infiltrated by people with an eye to the main chance, various kinds of liabilities, if not scoundrels and rogues, of whom the CPSU has continually cleansed itself. Now this process has become somewhat spontaneous, and people are starting to leave the party of their own accord."

I. Melnikov, secretary of the Moscow State University Party Committee, noted: The main difficulty at the present stage is that the party currently does not have an integrated ideological platform. Yet this is the basis for practical propaganda work. It is to the shaping of this platform, in its opinion, that the CPSU Central Committee should devote its attention, and the university's Communists are prepared to participate most actively in elaborating such a program. He said that the Moscow State University conference of Communists had proposed that the CPSU Central Committee hold a partywide discussion in the fall of 1989 on the questions of democracy within the party and changes to the CPSU Statutes, that the 28th CPSU Congress be held in the first half of 1990, and that an extraordinary conference of the Moscow City party organization be held this fall.

Examples were cited of so-called "political pussyfooting." When we talk about the reasons for the devaluation of moral values, particularly among young people, we are talking about the most varied reasons, and important reasons at that. But in our desire to please some people and not annoy, offend, or alienate others, we deliberately sidestep the fact that every day a weighty contribution to the demoralization of young people and society is made by the excessive flow of the propaganda of cruelty, violence, and spiritual aridity.

The plenum resolutely demanded the restructuring of the work of the gorkom, raykoms, and primary party organizations in the spiritual and moral sphere. And then, as one speaker noted, certain sections of society have started airing the formula that allegedly "socialism needs to be cured by capitalism..." This destructive idea preys on our people's tragic fate and on the CPSU's shortcomings and unfinished business, which have hindered and continue to hinder the party in resolving the tasks of restructuring.

The Moscow Communists' plenum sharply aired the idea that many party organizations today are incapable of rebuffing malicious and demagogic attacks. They prefer to stay silent even when in the dishonorable political contest for the layman our opponents spew forth artfully concocted accusations of "partocracy," "plutocracy," "elitism," and claims that the party is "divorced from the people." They try to convince people that the future lies with something akin to "democratic capitalism" rather than with socialism. They essentially demand that we abandon our strategic goals and Marxism-Leninism.

I flicked through my notebook again and again, listened to the recording made at the plenum, and became convinced that both the report and the debates were consonant with what is currently being said by Muscovites and what is worrying the city's Communists. There was no longer any self-justification or attempts to focus the discussion on economic matters. There was a serious political dialogue about the party's work under present-day conditions and its role and place in the new stage of restructuring.

Of course, one would like to hear more detailed arguments about how to nurture party leadership cadres more quickly, how to restructure the work of CPSU educational establishments in line with the demands of the time, and how to raise the intellectual level and fighting qualities of Communist leaders. We would like to hear about the ways and means by which the Moscow party organization intends to strengthen cadres and their vocational and ideological training.

In the opinion of a number of speakers, the party gorkom and party raykoms have not yet managed to raise control over adopted decisions and instructions to a modern level. And this, as a rule, is an open invitation to irresponsibility and loss of prestige. Is not this the source of negative trends which some party organizations have likened to the conservative forces impeding restructuring?

The gorkom was criticized in many speeches. It was criticized for still frequently lagging behind the realities of social life, wasting time on sessions, and raising more economic issues than political issues at the bureau. Serious rebukes were leveled at the city's ideological workers.

Specific, businesslike proposals were also made. For instance, it was proposed to introduce dual party registration [dvoynoy partuchet] for Communists with a view to stepping up party work at people's places of residence. Communists themselves should initiate rallies at certain stages of the city's political life. The influence of party committees' elective aktiv on the work of the apparatus should be stepped up. New people and enterprising leaders should be sought and nominated more boldly.

Surely the idea put forward by Ye. Papugin, assistant foreman at the "Trekhgornaya Manufaktura" Combine is worthy of consideration: Apparatus leaders and workers at the gorkom, party raykoms, the Moscow City Soviet, and rayon soviets should be registered with [vstat na uchet v] party organizations at large enterprises. After all, following the October Revolution the party cell at "Trekhgornaya Manufaktura" was reinforced with such outstanding party figures as Podvoyskiy, Krupskaya, and other Central Committee members. And it was largely thanks to their painstaking work that the combine's party organization became one of the most reliable strongholds of both the Central Committee and the Moscow City Gorkom.

...Following the plenum I talked with Lev Nikolayevich Zaykov. I wanted to hear a party leader's opinion of the discussion.

"I'm satisfied," he said. "The conversation was honest, frank, and principled. Of course, we cannot love criticism. But it is an irreplaceable aide in the cause of renewal. As you have probably noted, the entire report was intended to make people critical and prompt them to seriously analyze the situation in the city and the party organization. The plenum participants supported this approach."

New Military Commandant on 'Incidents' in Baku

NC3006180289 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri
1600 GMT 30 Jun 89

[Notice by the Military Commandant of Baku City Special District]

[Text] In general, the situation in the republic's capital has remained unchanged. However, a number of incidents caused by (?the excahnge of insults) between citizens of various nationalities in the (?Vekili), Narimanov, and Oktyabr rayons in Baku were recorded on

25, 26, and 27 June. The activities of individuals who wish to create tension in order to carry out their malicious intentions and who trifle with the national feelings of the people will be resolutely obstructed.

I urge all the citizens, particularly those who have recently arrived in Baku, to act with caution, comply with international traditions and rules, and respect each other.

I wish to recall that the curfew hours from 0100 to 0500 remain in force in accordance with the special situation in the city. Mass gatherings and meetings are banned.

[Signed] Major General Sokolov, military commandant of Baku City Special District [rank, name, and title as heard].

23 Jun Speech by Armenia's Arutyunyan

NC2906105089 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 27 Jun 89

[Address by Suren Arutyunyan, first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee and people's deputy, at the 23 June Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet session on the results of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and the urgent problems facing the republic: "With Certain Abridgements"—ARMENPRES headline]

[Text] Yerevan, 27 Jun, ARMENPRES—The current session of the republic's Supreme Soviet is to discuss the most crucial and perturbing problems facing the survival of our people. The immediate and long-term consequences of the destructive earthquake, the alarming ecological situation, and the soul-destroying problem of Artsakh [NKAO] which has become a pan-national idea, have led to extreme social and psychological tension resulting in an exceedingly complex situation.

We must face the fact that problems accumulated over decades and the destructive earthquake have ruined the republic's economy. The people's social dissatisfaction has led to social insecurity.

We must strengthen our forces and capabilities to emerge from the situation.

In our endeavors to solve the burning problems facing the republic we must give profound thought to the results and lessons of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies recently concluded. Of course, it is still early to make an exhaustive and unequivocal assessment of it. Nevertheless, it is indisputable that the congress played an indispensable role in forming a clear picture of the existing situation in the country; it convincingly confirmed that restructuring is a fact and that the democratic processes in the country are receiving new impetus.

The inner logic of the development and qualitative transformation of the circumstances demonstrate that in each region the restructuring is first of all touching upon the phenomena that are most acute and contains deep inner contradictions. To arrest their resolution artificially or to evaluate incorrectly local problems causes the issues of general union concern to be downgraded and enhances the negative trends. The Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] problem proves this.

No other problem was discussed to such an extent at the Congress of People's Deputies as interethnic relations. Comrade Gorbachev underlined in his address that sufficient attention was not devoted to the interethnic problems during the first phase of restructuring and that this situation must change.

The distortions of ethnic issues during the anti-people policy of Stalinism and the benign indifference of the period of stagnation gave rise to deep dissatisfaction among the people. Hence, it is no coincidence that the wave of new transformations in this sphere surfaced, at the initiative of the people.

In our case, the supreme problem demanding a solution is the national one because it has become the focal point and manifestation of people's social dissatisfaction and spiritual and national insecurity.

Thus, aware of the complexity and acutness of the situation, we devoted special attention to that very issue in our addresses at the Congress of People's Deputies.

The situation existing in the republic and in the region and the real causes for the explosion of people's dissatisfaction were presented from a correct and principled position. For the first time our people's concerns and agony were comprehensively conveyed throughout the world by such a highly authoritative congress. Everything was done to formulate a correct public opinion of all the problems distressing us deeply so that these problems would be recognizable and acceptable to all. Without conceding to the prejudice dominating many opinions, it was shown that artificially turning the NKAO problem into a territorial dispute, or otherwise distorting the problem, is incompatible both with the principles of Lenin's nationalities policy and with the logic and spirit of restructuring.

The thwarting of attempts at the congress and at the Supreme Soviet to declare the presence of Karabakh representatives as illegal not only confirmed the deputies' principled stance but that the old attitudes and behavior leading to gross violation of the oblast's sovereign rights must end.

The people's deputies from various regions to the congress referred on many occasions to the NKAO problem and attempted to propose suggestions for its resolution.

Our position is that the oblast's population itself must decide its destiny by exercising its free will through a plebiscite. From the podium of the congress and later during contacts we expressed our conviction that the functions of the party and soviet administrative bodies in the NKAO must be reinstated; and the Special Administration Committee must be given such mandates as to enable it to secure the oblast's full independence and its subjection to the center.

We should not only be consistent in an effort to find a just solution to the NKAO problem, but should also provide effective assistance to our compatriots now and contribute to the social, economic, and spiritual development of the oblast. There is a reference to this in the statement submitted for your examination. However, I would like to mention that efforts in this direction are extremely insufficient. Here one observes the wholly unjustifiable psychology of procrastination, lack of initiative, and factors that disrupt the orderly ties between the NKAO and the republic.

Aside from the complex and grave situation that has developed here, we must overcome all of those too. We must utilize all our power and capacity for a solution to the problems of reviving the oblast as well.

Slightly more than half a year has passed since the tragic day that befell our people.

It is not for the first time that we have spoken of the enormity of the grave disaster and the expressions of sympathy and compassion for us.

The discussion today of the problems related to eliminating the consequences of the earthquake at the republic's Supreme Soviet session should once again assist the comprehensive reassessment of the work done so far and the future tasks of restoration.

This must encompass all those aspects of the implementation of the restoration work that relate to the radical renewal of the republic's economic, social, and spiritual life. The session must outline practical ways to utilize productively and efficiently the enormous help extended to us; an atmosphere of stimulating practical work should be created for realization of the pan-national plan.

The activities of the last months, in particular of the last period, toward the elimination of the consequences of the earthquake inspired the people with hope and conviction that the destroyed property will be restored as quickly as possible and life will return to normal.

At present, comprehensive measures are being worked out to extend until October the temporary sojourn of those families that had been evacuated from our cities and villages to sanatoriums in different republics. Work is being done to organize the medical treatment and recuperation of the crippled and injured who have lost relatives, before all else to place children and students in the best foreign clinics and sanatoriums as well as in the country's best facilities. For years to come we will have to engage in social and psychological rehabilitation of our compatriots. Tens of thousands of people are probably experiencing psychological damage. Therefore, our priority is to establish rehabilitation centers.

You are aware of the consistent, purposeful, and difficult work carried out by the Central Committee Politburo commission to eliminate the consequences of the earthquake, including the coordination of the activities of hundreds of organizations throughout the country.

Already nearly 50,000 builders and experts from various economic branches of the union republics and army servicemen have been involved in the restoration work during the current year. Nearly 40,000 people from our republic are helping in the restoration work. Large numbers of student-construction teams are being organized. A massive amount of construction and transportation equipment has been concentrated in the disaster area; a number of urgent organizational and administrative problems have been resolved.

It goes without saying that people want to see construction completed and to have at least a shelter before the winter sets in. The first residential buildings are already being commissioned. Hundreds of homeless families from the villages of Spitakskiy, Akhuryanskiy, Noyemberyanskiy, Amasiyskiy, Gukasyanskiy, and Stepanavansky are already living in the new cottage-type houses. The first residential buildings have been commissioned in Kirovakan and in the new town of Spitak. It is important to mention one aspect here: The objective of the preparatory period was to create the means to begin construction of hundreds of buildings at the same time. The people have undertaken the construction of large-scale residential buildings, schools, kindergartens, hospitals, clinics, shops, and grocery stores.

Of the enterprises damaged by the earthquake, 120 out of the 170 are wholly or partially operational and productive. The foodstuff enterprises and the operation of other centers ensuring a normal life in the disaster zone have been basically restored.

The farmsteads and the irrigation networks are being restored in the villages. The spring agricultural work in the disaster areas has been basically completed successfully and the rural economies are reviving.

Efforts are being made to utilize sensibly the assistance provided by foreign firms and organizations.

A great number of families wish to build their own houses. They have already been paid nearly R400 million in compensation. By a special decision of the union government, the number of credits has been raised and a certain number of credits are being issued at a discount. Already the construction of 4,000 private houses has begun. The amount of private house construction is increasing daily.

Now, about a no less important problem:

No matter what the specific situation in the republic is, we have no right to remain out of step with the new principles of socioeconomic policy being implemented all over the country. In our present grave situation the destructive effects of the administrative command system of economic management and of bureaucratic red tape are felt more strongly. The deepening and the development of the economic accountability relations and the establishment of a new structure of mutual ties of hierarchy with the center based on the expansion of sovereign rights of the republics are vital requirements. The republic's government and state planning organization must soberly assess the sitaution and must activate in earnest the work in the formulation of concepts that emanate from the specifics of our territorial-economic parameters. Already, relevant bodies of large numbers of scientists and experts have been set up. Alternative concepts of the republic's economic accountability are being worked out; and once they are drawn up they will be submitted to public examination.

Today, we must not only restore the socioeconomic potential of the disaster zone, but also overcome the direct and permanent impacts of the earthquake on all areas of socioeconomic life.

Sensibly utilizing the aid provided by foreign countries and imbuing new spirit and content into foreign economic ties could play a major role in the solutions to complex and multiple problems facing us.

The restructuring and the new political thinking endorsed by our country have created the most conducive conditions for that. There are further opportune preconditions in our republic for cooperation with foreign countries. Dozens of countries and organizations are not only providing compassionate assistance to heal the wounds caused by the earthquake, but are also proposing plans for durable cooperation. Our compatriots abroad want to participate with great dedication in the republic's renaissance.

Following the tragic events of Sumgait, the word "refugee" has again cropped up in our lexicon. With the appearance of that word, 220 thousand Armenians were forced to flee their homes in Azerbaijan. The presence of homeless refugees is an imprint on the political climate and is sharpening people's feeling of national insecurity.

No matter how complex the refugee situation is, it must be resolved, because it involves people who have suffered for no reason at all—the elderly, women, and children. We have already taken a series of measures in that direction.

We have managed, through the union government, to solve in principle many problems related to employment, housing, house exchange, private house building, and allocation of plots and credits for that purpose, and other types of assistance for those Armenians forced to abandon their permanent residences. The union government has established a procedure to compensate them for their losses. A special administration attached to the republic's Council of Ministers is being formed to deal with the problems of the refugees.

Despite this, the efforts are disorganized. We share the people's justified dissatisfaction. The republican commission dealing with refugee affairs must promptly assess the situation and do everything to speedily resolve the grave and deplorable problems distressing people.

I would like to stress that each and every republican supervisory board, organization, responsible party member, all of us, must work with a profound feeling of civic responsibility to alleviate the difficulties of our compatriots.

It would probably be correct to hear a separate report from the government commission on refugee affairs during the next session.

The deplorable ecological situation is one of the most serious problems distressing the people, engulfing the entire public in a wave of restiveness. The agenda includes many problems that should have been solved long ago. At present we have chosen to improve upon the republic's ecology and to close or revamp industries that are hazardous to the people and the environment. In the solutions to the ecological problems, our sole starting point and criterion is the people's health, to create the best conditions for people's life, work, and recreation. In accomplishing that task we will rely heavily on public opinion.

The unacceptable degree of pollution in the atmospheric and hydrological environment of the republic's capital, Alaverdi, Kirovakan, Razdan, and Ararat cities, and a number of other settlements; profligate use of limited land and natural resources; and the pan-national Lake Sevan problem require special care and concern.

Lately, certain practical steps have been taken. Compared to the previous year the capital investments allocated for this purpose have increased by about 15 times. The closure of "Rubber 1" production unit at the Nayirit scientific-production association enabled substantial reductions in waste output. A number of morally and physically obsolete and ecologically hazardous production lines at the Kirovakan chemical factory were shut down. Recently two production lines at the Alaverdi mining and metallurgical combine were also closed down; these lines will be reorganized to produce consumer goods.

The population is particularly distressed by the fact that even today, as a result of the hazardous waste output from Nayirit scientific-production association, the ecological situation remains tense in the capital. The investigations conducted recently at our request by the special union commission indicated that production cannot continue in its present form.

Sevan's fate is a source of real concern. The decisions on the improvement of the ecological situation of Lake Sevan are not being sufficiently carried out. The deadlines for commissioning the structures for water conservation and environmental protection are not being met. The participants in the "Baykal movement" international conference, convened recently in the republic, also expressed serious concern about the situation that has developed around Sevan.

Restructuring also made possible a reawakening of national memory. National self-awareness these days is assuming a new quality and is freeing itself of hypocrisy and distortions.

The democratization of our life and the awakening of a national spirit confirmed once again that history is the collective memory of the people, its biography. There could be no civilized people without historical memory.

Numerous pages of Armenian history containing memorable events and personalities who have a deserved place in the memory of the people were either misrepresented or generally banished from the pages of history during the years of personality cult and the subsequent stagnation period.

An extensive state draft plan has been prepared to bring about a high degree of teaching and propagation of Armenian history. Many burning questions awaiting answers are included in this plan, which gives priority to quality textbooks for schools and higher institutions that satisfy modern requirements.

Enormous attention is being given to the measures for the use, further improvement, and comprehensive application of the Armenian language. These measures aim at legally strengthening the role of the Armenian language in administrative and scientific usage.

We must persistently and link-by-link recreate the entire chain of historical truth. Our people must know and learn our history as it really is. They must know and assess each historical event on its merits.

Already, certain steps have been taken in this direction.

The national liberation movements toward the end of the last century and at the turn of the 20th century must be revealed and assessed, as is their due, and the 1915 genocide of Armenians must be given a final recognition and an appropriate assessment.

The Armenian Communist Party Central Committee will consistently continue its work in uncovering the closed pages of the Armenian people's history, and of gathering the masses of our people, dispersed all over the world, around Soviet Armenia.

Recently a monument was raised in Udzan village of Ashdarakskiy to symbolize the immortality of the memory of the Armenian fedayeen. We are getting ready to commemorate General Andranik's 125th birthday anniversary at an appropriate state-level ceremony. All the heroes of the Armenian people's national liberation struggle must be placed on their deserved podiums.

In evaluating the permanent national values and historical events, it would be desirable that the diaspora of Armenian political forces, and the national, religious, and cultural organizations exhibit a tolerant approach and place issues of pan-national significance above the passing interests. One should not forget that everything should be aimed at serving the people, at solving the numerous problems facing them, and at the lofty objective of gathering the Armenian masses, dispersed all over the world, around pan-national interests.

As you are already aware, the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee, in its September 1988 plenum, assigned itself the task of reviewing and reassessing our approach toward national policy issues in general and toward the diaspora in particular. It is no secret that for years our relations with the diaspora have been given a political coloring. It is a pity that our relations have not gone beyond specific cultural contacts and tourism. We must raise our relations from that level. We, both in the republic and in the diaspora, must discard old stereotypes. Soviet Armenia must fully become a motherland for all of its exiled children.

The processes of the revolutionary transformation gripping the country, the deepening of the democratization and the expansion of openness have provided unprecedented impetus to the social and political activity of the republic's workers. One of the new manifestations of this is the existence of diverse self-employed public associations and organizations. Our scientists, representatives of our creative intellectuals, and renowned indiviudals of the republic are also participating in this work.

These associations on the whole aim at putting into application the creative potential of men and intend to actively assist the deepening of restructuring through concrete deeds and aim at solving the problems facing the republic.

We have a positive approach toward those organizations whose plans and actions comply with the requirements of the revolutionary transformation of our society; heal the prevailing psychological atmosphere and morale problem in the republic; help muster all the resources of society; and solve the accumulated social, economic, spiritual, national, ecological, and other problems.

I consider it necessary to reiterate that we are ready for profitable and constructive dialogue and cooperation with any non-official organization and association as long as their activities are in line with the basic interests of the people and are not unconstitutional and illegal in nature.

Our future work schedule is full. Today each of us has a tremendous responsibility to the present and the future. We, all of us, are not only participants in the renaissance of Armenia, but also the responsible agents for its destiny. Therefore, it is our duty to extricate the republic from the critical situation and deliver it in cohesion and unity. [applause]

'State of Emergency' Laws Discussed

PM3006131089 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 26, 25 Jun 89 p 10

[Feature compiled by Dmitriy Radyshevskiy: "State of Emergency. Lawyers Discuss What Sort of Law We Need for Extreme Situations"]

[Text] "A curfew (a state of emergency, an extraordinary regime) is being introduced on the territory of the republic (region or city)...." An announcement of this kind sounds the alarm: Extraordinary measures are taken under extraordinary conditions. But what do these measures imply? And how do they regulate our entire life—the actions of the soviets and party organs, of the army, the press and the public? These quesions are not easy to answer because they are not adequately specified in our legislation.

One thing is obvious, however: Even in the most critical situations people must act according to the law and be protected by the law. Their life must not be ruled by "closed" instructions. Probably one of the most important problems is the elaboration of a draft law on a state of emergency followed by a nationwide discussion.

A Bit of History

Vyacheslav Seregin, LLM, Chief of the Military Law Department at the Lenin Military-Political Academy:
On November 11, 1917, when General Krasnov launched an offensive on Petrograd, the city's revolutionary military committee declared a state of siege. Subsequently, a state of emergency, material law, a state of siege and the like were proclaimed in many cities and provinces of Soviet Russia by the provincial executive committees, the councils of defence and military commissars. The reasons were different, ranging from severe drought to the "population's lack of consciousness." On April 3, 1925, the Central Executive Committees of the USSR Council for People's Commissars adopted the first "All- Union Statute on Extraordinary Measures for Safeguarding Revolutionary Order." The statute outlined the grounds for taking such measures, among them "counter-revolutionary instigation against Soviet power."

The Constitutions of 1918, 1924 and 1936 made no mention of extraordinary measures. In 1938, however, an additional clause was added to Article 49 of the 1936 Constitution to the effect that the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet had the right to proclaim martial law.

How is the question formulated in the present Constitution adopted in 1977? According to Article 121, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet is vested with the right to proclaim—in the interests of defence of the USSR and the security of its citizens—martial law (or a state of emergency) throughout the country or in a particular locality, with the consent of the Supreme Soviet Presidium of the respective Union Republic.

No Need for Different Terms

Inga Mikhaylovskaya, LLD, professor at the Academy of the USSR Ministry for Internal Affairs:
We should probably decide on our terminology: Some say "a state of emergency," others "martial law," still others "a state of siege," "an extraordinary regime," and so on. Foreign legislation has only one term for it: "a state of emergency." I think we, too, should give this preference. It is also necessary to define clearly and substantiate legally the term "a state of emergency," to make it comprehensible to all citizens. Normative acts regulating routine work are no good here—they have no force of law.

Generally speaking, a state of emergency introduced throughout the country or in a particular area restricts the rights and freedoms of citizens (for example, the freedom of movement). These restrictions, however, are imposed only for a certain period and must be strictly regulated.

There must be a clear-cut procedure for adopting the decision proclaiming a state of emergency. This will prevent extraordinary measures being taken unlawfully. If legality is violated, it will not be difficult to pinpoint those responsible for the violation.

It is essential to specify all the reasons for imposing a state of emergency, its duration, the territorial bounds, and the procedures for appealing against wrong decisions.

Dmitriy Kovachev, LLD department head of the All-Union Research Institute of Soviet State-Building and Legislation:
Canada's legislation clearly defines when a state of emergency is called for. Its law of 1988 says that a state of emergency is proclaimed to ensure the public well-being and public order, in the event of an international crisis or the outbreak of war. A state of emergency intended to ensure the public well-being is introduced during natural calamities and industrial catastrophes. It gives the authorities the right to evacuate people, to restrict freedom of movement and to issue orders on the requisitioning of property. Violations of public order which really endanger national security may lead to banning rallies and meetings and to limiting freedom of movement in the troubled areas. In the event of an international crisis, the government has the right to control the activity of industrial enterprises, to prohibit

citizens from leaving the country, to requisition property and permit searches and detention without court orders. In the event of war the government can issue any order it deems necessary.

Who imposes a State of Emergency, and How?

Feliks Reshetnikov, LLD, department head at the All-Union Research Institute of Soviet State-Building and Legislation:

The "state of emergency" institution exists in about 80 countries. In many states it is envisaged constitutionally. In the majority of countries the right to impose a state of parliament is required, the time-limits of such an approval ranging in various countries from 48 hours to one month.

I. Mikhailovskaya: The draft law which needs to be prepared should take into account the federal structure of our state and provide for the local authorities' participation in decision-making.

Lev Simkin, LLM department head at the All-Union Institute for Advanced Legal Studies:

The absence of clear-cut regulations regarding the introduction of a state of emergency often leads to tragic consequences. In Tbilisi it was Iliya II, catholicos-patriarch of all Georgia, who warned the participants in the meeting about the possibility of troops being used to disperse them. For some uncertain reason, the authorities issued no warning to that effect. The law we are speaking about here should determine who is to inform the population about a state of emergency, and how. In Tbilisi, a curfew was announced literally a few minutes before it came into force, whch immediately led to a human casualty.

D. Kovachev: Foreign legislation emphasizes that the state of emergency must be substantiated and that when imposed, the suspended rights and freedoms must be listed in detail.

Doctrine of Intelligent Bayonets

Anastoliy Maydykov, LLD, professor at the Academy of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs:

There is one more important question which needs legislation: the duty of the authorities to render assistance to those citizens who suffer because of the extraordinary circumstances. At the same time, the regulations must make a point of the responsibility citizens must bear for resisting the authorities' legitimate actions. During a flood, for example, boats and other vessles may have to be requisitioned from the population for rescue purposes. Resistance in such a case may cost many human lives. Of course, legislation must also envisage compensation for those whose property is requisitioned. A thought should also be given, I believe, to differentiating remuneration for work under extraordinary conditions, as well as to the professional standards of people carrying out the extraordinary measures, to their rights and obligations and their responsibility for ignoring authority.

F. Reshetnikov: The responsibility borne by those who execute orders is indeed a big problem. There was probably no order to use sapper spades against participants in the Tbilisi meeting.

But what sort of order was carried out, and at what stage exactly, is unclear. There is a doctrine in foreign criminal law which encourages unconditional implementation of an order. Only the person issuing the order is responsible for it. As for the one who carries it out, he is only held responsible for failure to comply with the order. This doctrine is challenged by another one, the so-called doctrine of intelligent bayonets. According to it, every soldier and policeman must think for himself whether the order issued to him is lawful and in accordance with the legal norms and the Constitution and act as he deems fit. I think the truth lies somewhere between these two extreme approaches: If the order is downright criminal and unlawful its executor should bear a measure of responsibility, as well.

V. Seregin: The Red Army regulations adopted in 1924 expressed exactly this approach: The fulfillment of a deliberately criminal order was punished by law. Today, however, a serviceman is obliged to carry out any order. As for using servicemen during a state of emergency, this question has not been regulated thus far.

Boris Kurashvili, LLD, a leading researcher at the Institute of State and Law, the USSR Academy of Sciences: I think the law on a state of emergency must draw a clear line beteen the functions of the army and those of the internal troops. According to Article 31 of the USSR Constitution, the duty of the Armed Forces is to defend the country against aggressors. Extending these functions is dangerous.

L. Simkin: I think there may be a situation warranting the army's immediate interference. Sumgait is a case in point. But all circumstances demanding such an interference must be specified.

Protected Belorussian Radiation Zone Violated

18001272 Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 4 Jun 89 p 4

[Article by Ye. Kozulya: "When an Ukase Is Not an Ukase"]

[Text] Yet another preserve has appeared on the map of Belorussia—the Polesskiy State Radiation-Ecological Preserve. It was created not for its own sake, but as the result of the situation that came about after the accident at the Chernobyl AES [nuclear power station]. This was done for the purpose of "...ensuring the preservation of the territory and the bodies of water with all their inherent natural features and systems, and the strict observance of the nature preserve program..." and, of course, for conducting certain scientific work.

Some 142,000 hectares of meadows, fields, forests, dozens of populated points abandoned by people... The care and supervision of such a territory requires no small number of specialists armed with equipment and means of transportation and communications and having scientific support. The BeSSR [Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic] Academy of Sciences and the BeSSR State Committee for the Protection of Nature, in developing a position on the preserve, preliminarily determined the staff to number 887 people. It was envisioned that in the future this figure would be reduced to 453. There are 53 workers there today. This is the staff with which Director Aleksandr Dmitriyevich Konopatskiy works; he has taken upon his shoulders this far from heavenly corner of Polesye [woodlands]. And the problem is not only one of finding people who wish to work in the dangerous zone, but also one of financial provisions, which for now, alas, are only on paper.

The inadequately effective preservation of the reserved territory led to a state where during the most recent winter-spring period alone over 1,000 cubic meters of plantings exposed to radiation were cut here without authorization. The forest areas (there are over 75,000 hectares in the preserve) have been deprived of the most elementary fire protection: Over 3 years the block clearings have overgrown and protective mineral strips have not been renewed, and as a result the first alarming signal: A fire that sprang up on the territory of the Ukraine covered 100 hectares of the preserved zone in Narovlyanskiy Rayon with a firestorm. Over 40 hectares of forest burned up, as well as several housing and farm structures in the abandoned village of Dovlyady. The zone of the fire became a center of radioactive discharge into the atmosphere. No one can predict where the wind carried the remaining radioactive ash...

And here is one other aspect of the problem. The deputy director of the Gomel Oblispolkom [oblast executive committee] UVD [Administration of Internal Affairs], militia Colonel Anatoliy Andreyevich Kuzmenkov, reported that the "Chyrvonaya Ukraina" kolkhoz [state farm] of Braginskiy Rayon conducted sowing work on a 112-hectare plot near the village of Chikalovichi on territory of the preserve, on lands that are excluded from crop rotation. What guided the kolkhoz chairman, M.A. Novikov, in committing this unlawful act? And who called him to account for it?

Incidentally, no one is in a hurry to ask. The militia organs, in accordance with the Ukase on Administrative Responsibility, are taking preventive measures against violation of the program in the radioactive zone. But alas, local justice prefers to remain silent. Thus, V.N. Golovchenko, senior judge of the city of Bragin, has been given for consideration about 100 depositions against those who are not observing the ukase, but on various pretexts he is refusing to review these documents. So, for the judge is it that the ukase is not a ukase? And is it not time that all those involved in the fate of the Polesskiy Preserve understood that it awaits immediate assistance? Not on paper, not by telephone, but actual assistance.

Chlorine Explosion, Mismanagement Examined

18290211 Moscow GUDOK in Russian 24 Jun 89 p 3

[Article by O. Dyachenko, GUDOK correspondent, Khabarovsk: "Delayed Action Explosion"]

[Text] Khabarovsk television and radio stations, after interrupting their regular program at 2000 hours on 13 June, made an emergency announcement: "An 800-kilogram container with chlorine exploded in the water intake works on Zayachiy Island, causing a group of people to be poisoned. Measures are being undertaken to eliminate the aftereffects of the accident."

The sun burned mercilessly. And only at the dam, washed by the waters of the Amur, was it cooler, and it was here that children from the entire district gathered to go swimming in a pond. A lot of containers with chlorine in the area of the pumping station did not even arouse the curiousity of the boys who were all over the place. At first no one thought anything of the sharp bang that came from the direction of the pumping station. And only when a yellowish-green cloud shot up into the sky and then quickly rushed downward did the people intuitively sense trouble, and they started to scatter.

The acrid, suffocating odor of the chlorine made it difficult to breathe. Many began to have fits of coughing, and vomiting started. One hundred and seventy persons, mainly children, were in the stricken area. Many of them went for help to the toxicology center of the city hospital, 31 were hospitalized, and six were in critical condition.

Within a matter of minutes, employees of the militia, firemen, sailors, and ambulances arrived at the scene, and all of those who were afflicted were quickly taken to the hospital. And on the morning of the following day, the state of their health did not arouse any fears. Fortunately, on that day the weather in the area of the container explosion was calm and windless. Therefore, the radius of the accident seemed insignificant. The chlorine, which is heavier than air, settled in the nearest hollow, killing vegetation all around.

In the opinion of a commission that was looking into the causes of the accident, the explosion occurred spontaneously and, in all likelihood, because of the "aging" of the metal.

While not disputing the opinion of the specialists, I, nonetheless, would like to share some thoughts. The containers, one of which exploded, are manufactured in the PPR [Polish eople's Republic], and they are filled and checked at the plant in Usolye-Sibirskoye. An open railroad freightcar travelled on three routes—Eastern-Siberian, Transbaykal, and Far-Eastern—with the containers. One of which was getting old and was on the verge of exploding. This could have occurred at any moment. And what would have been the result if this had occurred at a large railway station, immediately in the vicinity of the station where there were a lot of people?

At the plant, where the containers were filled, no attention was paid even to the fact that practically all containers (this was established during weighing) were heavier than the authorized norm or were simply overfilled. The consignee, the Kabarovsk gorvodokanal [city water supply], also did not give enough thought to this fact. Back in March a railcar with dangerous freight was sent from the Amur Dalnevostochnaya station, but there was no room for the freight at the special warehouse. The entire shipment of these containers was stored in the open, and only covered with tarpaulin.

G. Pchelnitseva, the acting chief of the Amur station, assessed the situation that had developed rather categorically. Galina Mikhaylovna, it seems, has long since been predicting what happened, or something like it. Here are her reasons. The departmental spur track, over which there are shipments of not only dangerous but also special category freight, does not meet elementary requirements for safe shipment. The ties have rotted, and the spikes can be pulled out by hand without any difficulty. The owners of small vessels from the boat station give the railroad workers a lot of trouble. They pilfer the spikes and use them to fasten metal rods and ropes to the embankment.

As a result of this situation, in December of last year it became necessary to close the section for unloading special category freight and the entire departmental spur line had to be recovered more than once. But the necessary organizational conclusions did not follow. There was also no response to the instructions sent by the chief of the station to A. Lepesheva, first secretary of the Red Fleet raykom [rayon committee] of the party, and to V. Vasilchenko, chairman of the ispolkom [executive committee] concerning the terrible state of affairs in the sector where dangerous explosions were possible.

The tragedies of recent months and days are a compelling reason to look at the problem of safety in a different way. The Far East did not escape a serious acident either. Thus, in Komsomolsk-na-Amur the valve of a chlorine cylinder was broken. A sulphuric gas leak occurred at one of the plants in Primorye. A railcar, loaded with cylinders of liquified gas, tilted on the Vladivostok line and the leakage was noticed during the trip. Luckily, there were no casualties in these cases. But this in no way means that the full danger of the existing situation can be underestimated.

One cannot but be alarmed also by the fact that employees at traffic, locomotive, railcar, route, and signals services, everyone who is directly involved with the movement of trains, have virtually no means of protection against the effects of toxic substances. Thus, at the Amur station, where special category and dangerous freight arrives regularly, gas masks and chemical sets are stored under lock in the firefighting tools shed. According to the words of G. Pchelintseva, other than mice no one has looked into the shed for a long time. At other stations even rodents have nothing to live on. And if there should be an accident, it is hardly likely that appropriate instructions will be of any help.

The railroads need advanced firefighting systems, modern personal protection equipment, medical preparations, and reliable transportation and communications. But the main thing is that there is a need for very strict warning measures and utmost responsibility for the fate of people and the state of the environment.

Economic

TASS Cites Ryzhkov Interview in BUSINESS WEEK

LD0107090989 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0715 GMT 1 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow, 1 Jul (TASS)—"We are looking with optimism at the future of our foreign economic relations, but we understand that there are many barriers ahead which are necessary to overcome—both within and outside the framework of our own economy," Nikolay Ryzhkov, head of the Soviet government, noted in an interview with BUSINESS WEEK magazine, in which the discussion concerned the development of the USSR's foreign economic links and of the possibility of the USSR participating in international economic organizations. The interview has been published in the June edition of PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK [Government Herald], the mouthpiece of the USSR Council of Ministers.

As Nikolay Ryzhkov said, "There are still quite a few barriers to extensive cooperation, but on our side we are removing them." He noted that recently an undoubted enlivening of economic links has taken place in new areas with the FRG, Italy, Sweden, Finland, Great Britain, and a number of other countries.

Regarding economic links with the United States, Nikolay Ryzhkov remarked: "It cannot be claimed that everything is going as it should. Unfortunately, the political dialogue is running ahead of economic relations, and we do not understand very well why two great powers cannot make progress in this matter, cooperate more closely, or trade with each other." The head of the USSR government sees the reason for this in the fact that "unlike other capitalist states, the U.S. economy is significantly more politicized."

Disclosing the prospects for developing joint enterprises in the USSR, Nikolay Ryzhkov announced that over 400 such enterprises with a combined authorized capital of some $2 billion have now been registered in the country. One-third of it is made up of foreign investment. "We regard this as evidence of foreign business interest in joint ventures in the USSR and as recognition of the acceptability of Soviet investment legislation," Nikolay Ryzhkov declared.

Replying to a question on the possibility that the USSR might take part in international economic organizations, Nikolay Ryzhkov announced that the Soviet Union is a participant in about 300 intergovernmental organizations and maintains contacts with a further 400 organizations—both intergovernmental and nongovernmental.

Rounding off the interview, Nikolay Ryzhkov emphasized that "international economic organizations have, in the USSR, an enterprising and conscientious partner".

Commission Members View Taxation Policy

LD0207202689 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1000 GMT 2 Jul 89

["In the USSR Supreme Soviet Permanent Commissions" program, presented by (Mikhail Zmeyenkov), with Viktor Nikolayevich Yaroshenko, Yevgeniya Kirillovna Malkova, and Vladimir Vitalyevich Skvortsov, members of the Soviet of the Union's Commission for Questions of Labor, Prices, and Social Policy—recorded]

[Excerpts] [(Zmeyenkov)] Over the past week, a general review of governmental forces has been taking place at the first session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. It is an issue of the utmost importance, for overcoming the complex social and economic situation in the country will depend to a large extent upon those who head the work of the branches of the national economy. It is not surprising, therefore, that the people's deputies who are members of the USSR Supreme Soviet were very careful in their approach to the examination of every candidature put forward for a top government post. The candidates themselves were of the opinion that they faced their most difficult examination at the sessions of the commissions of the chambers—the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities—which made the decision on the presentation of the candidate to the USSR Supreme Soviet. Far from all of them managed to pass that examination. [Passage omitted: Each candidate was carefully examined at the joint sessions of the Supreme Soviet; the government is no longer formed in secret from convenient people; in the new government we see a well-known scientist like Leonid Abalkin]

The session will continue its work on Monday. The commissions, too, have been at work during the past few days. We now present a recording of a conversation that took place at our improvised roundtable with Viktor Nikolayevich Yaroshenko, Yevgeniya Kirillovna Malkova, and Vladimir Vitalyevich Skvortsov, members of the Commission for Questions of Labor, Prices, and Social Policy of the Soviet of the Union of the Supreme Soviet.

[Yaroshenko] We all are members of the Commission for Questions of Labor, Prices, and Social Policy. The name of this commission, which we inherited from the days before restructuring, is not absolutely accurate. We have decided to rename it somewhat; it will become the Commission for Questions of Social Protection, Labor, Wages, Prices, and Taxation Policy. We three, in particular, are members of the subcommission on taxation policy. It is a relatively small subcommission, formed only recently. We are working now on an agenda for our work up to the end of the year. There is a lot for us to do, since there are very many problems that need tackling urgently. In the first place, there is the Council of Ministers' decree on the taxation of cooperatives, which the session will have to either confirm or reject. That draft bill is giving rise to objections and doubts on our part. We want to listen to those who have drawn up this bill, beforehand in our subcommission, and it is not ruled out that we might suggest that further work be done on it, that we might put forward our own alternative, or that we might take it as a basis for further work in conjunction with the USSR Ministry of Finance and the State Planning Committee.

[(Zmeyenkov)] Viktor Nikolayevich, does an examination of the situation in the national economy with regard to the production of consumer goods find a place in your agenda?

[Yaroshenko] Yes, of course. We consider that no amount of administrative measures aimed at expanding the production of consumer goods will help the situation; those are half-measures, which already have exhausted their usefulness since we have used them repeatedly. It would, therefore, be possible to provide incentives for the development of consumer goods, particularly inexpensive goods, goods for pensioners, and goods for the less well-off. This would be accomplished through tax concessions, through giving additional tax concessions to enterprises that turn out inexpensive products in order to prevent these inexpensive products from being driven out of the range of goods available. [Passage omitted: (Zmeyenkov) asks Yaroshenko what is being done at the tractor enterprise where he works to step up production of consumer goods and is told that minitractors are being made]

[(Zmeyenkov)] Yevgeniya Kirillovna, it is your turn to speak now.

[Malkova] Given that I work in the services sector, taxation as a whole affects me, too, very much. I am in the state sector and I am very concerned that some of the very good and front-ranking people, people with high qualifications who have been given much, are going over to the cooperative sector. Of course, we have nothing against the cooperatives, we wholeheartedly support them because there is not a single civilized country that does not have this; that is clear. We are in favor of individual labor activity, but of course, we also are in favor of the state and cooperative sectors being on equal terms, of the state sector also having an interest. Another reason it must not be impaired is the fact that there are 43 million families in our country living on slender means, and the state sector is capable of providing relatively cheap services. I think that the taxation we are going to deal with will provide some results. Everyone has to be given an interest. Indeed, where I work, when a young worker starts he receives very small wages, but if he goes off to the cooperative sector he gets three times as much. We already have received a mass of letters from voters who suggest solutions to different issues. This kind of feedback from the population is there and we will visit the enterprises and talk about what we have been working out, about specific provisions. We are only just beginning to work out the law and it is very important to discuss all these issues thoroughly.

[(Zmeyenkov)] Could you give an example of this feedback, in which voters question you about what you are doing or where they make suggestions?

[Yaroshenko] Yes, the voters reacted very quickly to the fact that a subcommission on taxation policy had been set up. We already have started to receive specific suggestions, letters signed by dozens and even hundreds of people in which the unfairness of our taxation system is analyzed. In the first place, there is a total lack of any taxation strategy or tactics: New ones that have been adopted or are being adopted are individual or meager ones that contradict each other. There is no consistency. For example, the taxes on cooperatives have been changed three times in the past 18 months. This gives rise to an atmosphere of uncertainty over the future. The cooperative tries not to invest in development because it does not trust the state, which is always rushing from one side to the other. Our task now, the task of our commission, is to work out a strategy and tactics so that it can be adopted at the second congress or at the Supreme Soviet, and so that cooperatives, people working individually, and people working in the state sector can be confident that if taxes are going to change, they will change is some definite direction and according to some definite rule. For example, the poverty line is drawn at, say R100, for the sake of argument. Then people who are below that line will not pay any taxes. They must know and be sure of this. On the other hand, when incomes rise sharply for a particular group of the population, they must know that up to certain limits and certain proportions this will mean an increase in their taxes, but taxes have to be fair. For example, the tax must relate to the number of people in the family. If soneone is living on his own and is receiving R300 for himself, then that is a lot, but where someone else is getting R500 and has five childrne, then that is much, much less. So taxes have to be paid according to the number of people in the family; it must be differentiated. There must be a flexible scale, a flexible system. We want to work out the tactics and strategy, then that skeleton can be filled out with a mosaic of individual taxes, linked with and balanced against each other. Taxes can be neutral; they are not likely to trouble you. They can act as incentives, as I was saying about consumer goods and inexpensive goods. They also can be prohibitive, in cases where some type of activity has to be banned. We have not yet determined these levels. For example, we have been asked now to examine a bill and a decree in which the tax on cooperatives, say, goes up to 60 percent, though it is well-known that worldwide the prohibitive scale begins above 40 percent. In other words, if we want to stifle some kind of activity artificially, then we impose a tax-rate higher than 40 percent. Taxes up to 60 percent are being proposed now. Only the shashlik cooperatives will be able to withstand such taxes! All the others, including the production cooperatives, will go out of business rapidly. That would have a whole chain of social and economic consequences. The mass of money in the treasury produced from taxation would be reduced. Goods production itself would fall by a factor of 8-10 times. All young people's fashions, all young people's clothes, are made in cooperatives now. While young people are putting up quite calmly, relatively calmly, with the absence of sausages, soap, and washing powder, the absence of clothes for young people might lead to a chain of undesirable consequences. Our commission on social protection, in fact, must take all of this into consideration and weigh it up. [Passage omitted: Malkova says that different taxes are appropriate for different types of cooperatives; Skvortsov says that taxation policy is one of the most important ones where people are concerned, and says they are sensitive to the questions asked by the voters.]

[Skvortsov] At the same time, we see that this program has to be more precise, for the responsibility we bear is a very great one. In the very near future, we are going to have to examine a draft law on taxes. This law is so imperfect that we simply cannot accept it in the wording in which it is being put to us. A great amount of work has to be done. [Passage omitted: Malkova says these laws are worked out in offices, whereas we come from enterprises; (Zmeyenkov) asks Skvortsov about his background and the efforts his enterprise is making to provide consumer goods for the market; Skvortsov says they even have a direct sales shop for the automobile parts they make; Yaroshenko speaks about the feedback he receives from people who take part in sessions of a voters' club in his constituency who have put forward their own idea of what a flexible, progressive taxation scale should look like: Our objective is to insure a well-balanced, all-around approach to insuring the social protection of our voters]

[(Zmeyenkov)] Viktor Nikolayevich, do you not consider that the policy for consumer goods production being implemented today is acting as an incentive for their production?

[Yaroshenko] No, in general terms it has to be said that the first session of the Supreme Soviet to a certain extent repeated the scenario of the congress. First of all, we should have examined the structure and the functions of the council of Ministers, the way the main tasks, the main social tasks, will be resolved by that structure. Are there links in that structure—ministries, departments, and so on—which will solve them? After that, we should have examined the candidatures of the ministers, the premier, the deputy chairmen, and so on, but it was all done the other way around. To begin with, we were invited to discuss the candidatures of the ministers. It was all done the wrong way around.

[Skvortsov] I fully agree with Viktor Nikolayevich that the issue should have been resolved in a more planned and purposeful way. The ministers themselves came to our commission. We asked them not just questions concerning social problems, though that is the main job of our commission, but they said themselves that this was the first time they had undergone such an examination. We did not set about deciding immediately whether to recommend or not recommend them; we met them on a preliminary basis and then once again. Lira Ivanovna Rozenova was recommended by the government, the State Prices Committee, but we noted her lack of a precise program of how to bring the country out of its present situation with prices and price setting. We asked her to be more precise the following day when we would be hearing her officially in two commissions, the Commission on Veterans and our commission. On the following day, we saw that our suggestions had not been taken up; things were going in the old way and we decided that we simply could not put our confidence in such a person. That was the overall position: One was in favor, 12 abstained, and the remainder were against. This shows that there is no policy of making compromises in the Supreme Soviet now, and that there is not going to be.

[Yaroshenko] Yesterday, we examined the candidature of Comrade Valeriy Vasilyevich Sychev for the post of chairman of the State Committee on Quality Control and Standards. We noted with satisfaction that there was social orientation, a socioeconomic orientation in his program. We talked about living standards, poverty line provision standards, and so on, and we understand that changes are being contemplated in the work of this committee, with a stepping up of its economic activity and economic influence on the quality of output, and so on. His candidacy received 100-percent support. [Passage omitted: Skvortsov speaks about the way feeling about a candidate emerged]

[Yaroshenko] Furthermore, taking into account the fact that the commission opposed a number of candidates so firmly, we now have been given the right to propose candidates for these vacant posts ourselves, by way of legislative intiative, so to speak.

[Malkova] For the first time, this is for the first time, it must be said.

[Yaroshenko] Now we are drawing up such a list and we will put it to the government. If it is a compromise solution of a kind, we will begin to discuss these candidacies in our commissions. I am referring to the vacancies.

[(Zmeyenkov)] A final question. What are the commission's plans for its future work?

[Yaroshenko] We have compiled a plan only as far as the end of the year. The session is currently in progress and during this we will discuss one decree, in fact, one bill. There will be meetings with voters in order to try to learn their views, their feedback. Then there will be work with the Finance Ministry and Gosplan [State Planning Committee], the authors of these bills. We will be collecting information about the ways in which similar problems are solved in other countries: in the developed, capitalist countries; in China, which is of very great interest to us; and in the socialist countries. By the end of the year, we will be working out the general principles of the concept and strategy of taxation policy, in general. This is more important now than any specific law or bill. Jointly with Comrade Abalkin's committee, perhaps, and with Popov and Shmelev, and representatives of other commissions, we will be working out a long-term strategy and current tactics for a taxation policy.

[Skvortsov] If I can put it more briefly, in figurative terms we need to diagnose the reasons for the sickness. In the process of our work, we are trying to sort out the reasons and make a diagnosis of the sickness affecting the country's taxation policy. This is a very complex issue; perhaps we will not manage to do it all during the first stage, but this indeed is where we must begin.

[Yaroshenko] We are now asking for material and are trying to find out how economic relationships were controlled during the period of the New Economic Policy. There is a very great deal that is of interest there, and in fact, it was taxation policy that made it possible to move forward from the requisitioning of farm produce to taxation in kind and to the development of our economy. It was taxation policy that enabled Stalin to stifle the New Economic Policy and take the country to the edge of famine in the 1930's. We are troubled now, therefore, by some proposals that might do enormous economic damage to our state, so the analogy with the New Economic Policy here is not by chance.

Agricultural

Nikonov Speaks at Lianozovo Dairy Combine

PM0207180989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Jun 89 Second Edition pp 2, 5

[TASS report: "To Resolve Urgent Problems More Quickly"]

[Text] Questions of further increasing production volumes, improving the quality and extending the range of products, and improving working and daily living conditions for working people in the dairy sector were examined during a visit to Lianozovo Dairy Combine by USSR People's Deputy V.P. Nikonov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

During his familiarization with the shops there was a lively, interested exchange of opinions on ways to establish an efficient rhythm in all technological sections as quickly as possible, on the resolution of social tasks, and on the broad participation of workers in production management.

A meeting with the combine's collective was held after the end of the work shift. Addressing the gathering, the CPSU Central Committee secretary shared his impressions of the work of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and dwelt on urgent aspects of the party's agrarian policy.

Our country's Congress of People's Deputies, he said, is essentially the first congress of soviets to be held since Vladimir Ilich Lenin on the basis of developing the broad democratization of society, openness, and glasnost. This openness has become a very real political school for our entire people. It has shown that it is necessary to struggle for true democracy. It is necessary not in words but in practice to involve the people everywhere as widely as possible in the management of production, social processes, and, in general, all phenomena of life. Socialism, which we are building in accordance with renewed concepts, must really be the creative work of the masses.

The congress also showed that the political culture of a certain section of the people's elected representatives is not always high and does not always accord with good human qualities. In short, we have not yet determined the facets of real democratization or fully mastered true political culture and understanding of freedom as a conscious need to obey social morality. We feel that on the political plane, although we consider ourselves a competent people, we have to work in very, very great earnest. The Politburo has drawn the conclusion that the democratization process must on no account be halted; on the contrary, it must be deepened by extending glasnost and involving as large a number of people as possible in active social life. This is one of the chief conclusions.

The second conclusion, the CPSU Central Committee secretary continued, is that we must step by step wage the struggle by society as a whole for broad people's power, for the democratization of society, and for a rule-of-law state in which the citizen bears the same degree of responsibility before the state as the state does before the citizen, and we must march forward together. At the same time we cannot fail to see the tendency to forget an important thesis: Democratism and glasnost must be developed on the basis of firm order in everything and strict labor and technological discipline. This is why the demand for a return to the basic doctrines of the 27th party congress and to the decisions of the 19th party conference is so urgent today.

After the CPSU Central Committee April Plenum the party took a very serious step forward in elaborating the theoretical points of restructuring and choosing the main areas of this very extensive process. Reforms are being implemented in the economy, in education, and in the political sphere. At the same time people have begun displaying a stormy activeness under the conditions of broad political transformations. What is important now is to use political means in work with people to ensure that the tasks that have been set for the economy are resolved in full in every collective.

Our people express different views on this topic, V.P. Nikonov pointed out, particularly at the rallies that have recently been held very frequently by various kinds of informal organizations. Criticism is heard: There is none of this, there is not enough of that, something else is being resolved badly... Indeed, no special movement toward improving the people's material life is apparent. The growth percentages that we achieve, say, in the agro-industrial complex are plainly inadequate given the present increase in the population. As a result, the shortage of goods remains and phenomena arise such as speculation in food—which, in the final analysis, gives rise to social injustice. This can only be eliminated through the labor of every collective and every person. And if we say that no one must be indifferent to restructuring and that it is a really revolutionary process, it will become such, above all, when the person's quite different activeness has been ensured in the process of labor and his own life on the basis of the new thinking. This is what real emphasis must be placed on.

Going on to touch on problems of the Lianozovo Dairy Combine, the speaker recalled that for several years in a row Muscovites pinned on this enterprise their hopes for a considerable improvement in the city's supply of a most valuable product. However, construction proceeded badly and took a long time. It is already quite a long time since the first lines began to be tested and commissioned, and yet just 20 percent of the capacities have been started up. Construction workers did slipshod work, installation workers did poor-quality work, and some equipment had to be purchased in full [dozakupat]. And the hopes that people were pinning on this food production have still not been realized. Many responsible persons were punished recently for tardiness, sluggishness, and a careless attitude to the matter. The paramount task now is to bring the combine up to its design capacity in a short space of time in terms both of the volume of milk processed and of the range of products. It is no less important to ensure product quality. The latest equipment must have the appropriate techniques. High qualifications and strict technological and labor discipline are needed. People must be taught everything progressive.

Assessing the enterprise's role in the country's modern food complex, the speaker employed a graphic comparison of it with the most progressive position in resolving the food problem, where "the living pulse is no longer just felt—you can see it with your eyes." There are many such enterprises in Moscow, he remarked. The frozen-foods plant at Biryulevo, for example, is in the same situation. Muscovites could have been getting 500,000 ready meals from there already this year, but they will get them only in 18 months' time owing to the sluggishness of those entrusted with starting up production. Some people, while criticizing the stagnation times, apparently fail to notice that they themselves are using the same methods.

A situation whereby the most important food enterprises fail to be commissioned is inadmissible. For this affects people's mood.

The Congress of People's Deputies, consonant with the basic ideas of the 19th party conference, defined the main work tasks as everything connected with man. This applies above all to food, then to housing, and next to the creation of all kinds of conditions to make life easier for man.

What is needed now is a steep turn toward the new thinking in the economy, and its orientation toward meeting people's needs. The possibilities for implementing just such an approach have been created. Look, the CPSU Central Committee secretary said, how much energy we expend to normalize the situation in the world and to reduce the billions spent on defense. This period, when we have not yet renounced the old thinking nor come to the new one or, at least, we have not determined its main parameters, is extremely complex. This is why we must conduct a businesslike discussion with one another and call each other to account in a more businesslike and creative way.

V.P. Nikonov answered questions from participants in the meeting.

Question: We are very concerned about the role of state acceptance representatives at the city's dairy industry enterprises. Not having modern measuring equipment, they essentially act as a brake on an increase in production volumes. This holds up work considerably.

Answer: When product quality is guaranteed but the checkers "harass" you, this really is a hindrance which lowers labor productivity and depresses the mood. But why has our dairy industry ended up among the sectors subject to state acceptance? Because the quality of its output is directly linked to man's health. I agree in principle that in modern production with a "closed" process the role of state acceptance must be different. And it is necessary to examine the question not of eliminating state acceptance but of concentrating it in places where help is needed: to influence the quality of raw materials, and so forth. We need state acceptance, but we must seek areas in which it will be of the greatest benefit. So as to be hurt neither morally nor materially, it is necessary simply to struggle for immediate acceptance of top-quality output.

Question: The replacement of equipment which in many enterprises has been working three shifts for decades is a very painful problem. What is being done to resolve it?

Answer: You know that a large group of defense enterprises is now involved in this work. And there is very strict control here over what is done and purchased. These questions will be discussed comprehensively at the highest level in the next few days. [Answer ends]

A number of questions raised at the meeting concerned the improvement of the economic management mechanism in the agro-industrial complex and, specifically, in the dairy industry, the search for incentives for highly productive creative labor at every workplace, and the retention of cadres.

Answering them, V.P. Nikonov analyzed, in particular, the causes slowing up the course of the economic reform. All the conditions for economic accountability seem to have been elaborated, and everything seems to have been provided for, he remarked. But we frequently forget that every specific thing needs a master. And the majority of enterprises in the agro-industrial complex still do not have a real master. So it turns out that everything goes OK if a conscientious, well educated person works, but if not—things turn out differently. The areas of reform have been worked out correctly, but it has not yet become radical because man has not been involved in the active search for an improved process. And this cannot be achieved unless the appropriate organizational and social conditions are created and help is given.

The Congress of People's Deputies sought collectively to analyze the course of the radical economic reform in order to consolidate and impart stability to its positive aspects and, at the same time, to highlight the mistakes made.

The shift that the economy has begun to make toward the person is to the credit of restructuring. More apartments are being built, in the course of conversion military plants are increasing production of consumer goods, the services sphere is expanding more vigorously, and the human factor is having a greater influence on production. At the same time, the CPSU Central Committee secretary remarked, it has not been possible to resolve the fundamental problems of restructuring the economy and bringing it up to a modern level.

The financial system has been thrown off balance, a big disproportion has formed between the commodity and money masses, and there remains a shortage of goods in everyday demand.

Labor and production efficiency is still inadmissibly low. What is the chief reason for failures? Unfortunately, there are many. But the chief thing, the speaker emphasized, is that a real modern model of the economy has not been created. We work in the old way, but we receive in the new way. We must arrive at the new model by transferring all economic links to full economic accountability and self-financing and widely developing the lease and cooperatives. The strategic concept of the reform and its main areas have been defined correctly. But there is a great deal of inconsistency, indecisiveness, and halfheartedness and many zigzags and even deviations in practical execution at all levels. A great deal was said about this, incidentally, at the Congress of People's Deputies.

For the reform to work for restructuring, it is necessary to change planning methods, employ financial levers, and improve wholesale prices, taxes, and labor remuneration conditions more boldly and vigorously. The reform also requires a combination of different forms of ownership and their flexible relations.

Not even the best programs can quickly get the economy out of its difficult position. We have one way out—to work conscientiously.

V.P. Nikonov said in conclusion:

"The active wave of universal participation in state affairs that rose up at the congress will hardly subside until the people really take into their hands the management both of production (I do not mean technological production but the organization of matters) and of all social life. We must work and work on these matters—do an infinitely great deal of work. And the remarks addressed to your enterprise must be accepted with understanding of the acuteness of the problem in the country as a whole. Every year a large number of enterprises remain uncommissioned, plus there are also delays over starting up production. One thing is written in the plans (and promises to the people are based on this), but in fact we are let down now by one, now by another, now by yet another.... A decisive stop must be put to this."

Academician People's Deputy Urges Land Ownership

PM3006131489 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 26, 25 Jun 89 p 12

[Article by People's Deputy Vladimir Tikhonov, member of the V.I. Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences: "Land Ownership. We Need an Economic System Based on Land Ownership"]

[Text] Nobody expected the Congress of People's Deputies to make decisions, but it was assumed that it would close with the proclamation of the economic concept perestroika is heading towards. This didn't happen.

I think the agrarian problems were the most unlucky at the congress. The words of deputies representing farmers had a tragic tone: "On behalf of those who grow wheat and love the soil we demand that you, people's deputies, ask the country's leadership to put the problem of the countryside at the forefront of society's political life. Let the people feed themselves!" The deputies applauded and...passed over it. They confined themselves to appeals that it is necessary to show more "boldness(?)" in leasing out the land, repeating that the problems connected with it must be entrusted to the local soviets. It was a reminder of the 1861 reform: freedom to the peasants and land to land owners. Well, today's collective farm chairman or director of a state farm does not want to lease out land to farmers, and it looks as if he is not going to.

But the time of slogans ended long ago. Incantation does not help, promises to put farmers on equal terms without resolute action are regarded as ludicrous. Just look at the project of the State Committee for Prices? It is expected to put the purchasing price of one kilogram of meat (in live weight) at 4 roubles, and of one kilogram of wheat at 40 kopeks. The price of a kilogram of meat in the shop could soon go up to 11 or 12 roubles, and bread to 50 kopeks. What will be the reaction of the customer?

It is not the fault of the farmer but of those who rule over him with the backing of the apparatus, are steadily inflating the prices of machines, equipment, fertilizers and building materials. The farmer is given no choice and is doomed to pay 48,000 roubles for a grain harvester, and up to 4,500 roubles to get a place for a cow in the yard.

The cause—which only poet Yevgeniy Yevtushenko spoke about at the top of his voice at the congress—lies in excessive departmental monopolism. Its strength and danger are particularly great because department monopolies have fused with the state apparatus and farmers are now unprotected.

The land, too, is monopolized. Long gone are the times when it belonged to the farmer, when it was declared the property of the whole people. In 1928, the "leader of peoples", preparing the extermination of the peasantry as a social group, declared the land state property, and in 1933, issued a directive which gave Party and state bodies the right and obligation to run the economy through collective farms, set up by force. The farmer ceased to be a master. The land lost its owner. The chronic agricultural depression set in, alternating with crises.

I am sure we will not get out of the permanent crisis unless we recreate a system of land ownership, give the land to the peasant. This means radical land reform.

Its essence must be to restore the demand of the revolution, cancelled in 1928: to turn the land into the property of the whole people. This means that state ownership of land must be abolished, that the Soviets must grant land to those who can cultivate it. The owner of the land must be able to choose independently the form of management: with or without the collective farm, as a cooperative or a family concern. All management forms should be equal economically and legally. The owner of land must be the owner of produced goods, enjoying full rights.

The state has the right to own land on an equal footing with the farmer. It may preserve state farms if this is economically profitable. But it can also grant its farms full independence, leasing the land to them, or providing them with the opportunity to reorganize into cooperative, group, individual or other farms.

I have long felt that land relations in the country should be based mainly on leaseholding. My trips around the country showed that I was wrong. For example, a Lithuanian farmer can show you the exact plot of land on the collective farm field which used to belong to his great grandfathers, grandmothers and parents. Will he agree to lease his own land?

I believe that Republics must be given the right to choose the form of land ownership. The land is becoming a property of the Republic's people. People themselves must decide whether to lease land to a farm, or to hand it over for good and receive payment only in tax based on ground rent. This, incidentally, was envisaged by the Law on socialization of land, adopted on Lenin's initiative in February 1918 during development of the Decree on Land.

The right to regulate land ownership and land relations should not belong to the state with its apparatus, but to elected bodies of Soviet Power, people's representatives.

The hereditary right to possess land and the right to choose a form of management are the only conditions that may ensure the revival of a stable, effective agriculture. We have already gone through many forms and methods of revitalizing agriculture. If they produced any effect, it was insignificant and short-lived. Our best collective and state farms (making up not more than 10 per cent) can hardly compete with the average American, Dutch or Finnish farm.

But I back the appeal of the farmer-deputies to the congress to avoid forcible dissolution of collective farms. Each form—collective, group or individual—must have an equal right to possess land and equal economic possibilities for management.

At the same time I oppose all privileges and state "oxygen bags", paid for by the taxpayer and generously handed out to those who cannot or do not want to run the farm efficiently. The system of parasitic complacence was created as a forced measure to moderate the impoverishment of peasants, engendered by state monopolism. But, saving the peasant from poverty, this system at the same time corrupted him, destroyed his moral code, led him to disrespect labor and its results. People like Sholokhov's "grandfather Shchukar" and Mozhayev's chatterbox Yakush could be found in villages even before this. In the collective and state farm system they formed a considerable social stratum. And it is not the village that generated them but the unconstitutional actions of the authorities and the system of distribution imposed by them.

Land reform will call for radical changes in the economic functions of the state. It will have to give up its customary non-economic criteria, which won't work when the land owner is running his own farm and is the owner of produced goods. The state will have only one method of influencing the farmer—economic regulation of the market. This is the most complicated function. Our State Committee for Prices will hardly be able to cope with it. It has become a custom in our country to impose prices and taxes, first of all, as a means of fiscal pressure—in the spirit of that governor of a town described by satirical writer Saltykov-Shchedrin. Having led the campaign to combat defaulters, he burned 33 villages and received 2 roubles and 50 kopeks for this operation.

But the state must regulate the market in order to have the production structure the country needs, and more important in order to protect the farmer and the consumer from monopoly.

Along with a measure against monopoly the state must establish effective control over the industrial as well as agricultural technology to protect consumers and the environment.

The state must also protect the property of consumers. A system of social compensation must be worked out for those strata of society which may not, owing to reasons beyond their control, be protected from unfavourable market conditions.

What must be done today? More active work must be done "between sessions" so that the necessary economic concept can be submitted for consideration by the second congress in autumn. I think that this way of approaching the problem is quite realistic.

Need for Peasant Farm Association Discussed

PM3006113589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
14 Jun 89 Morning Edition p 3

["Topical Letter": "What Is Needed Is an Association of Peasant Farms"]

[Text] Individual peasant farms and cooperatives producing agricultural products have gained recognition. The CPSU Central Committee March (1989) plenum talked of these forms of production organization having equal status with kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms] and of the creation of equal economic conditions for them. The plenum's political declaration was trusted by the broadest strata of the population.

But in practice the creation of peasant farms is encountering serious obstacles. It is 3 months now since the plenum, but an efficient mechanism for transferring land on leasehold to peasant farms on behalf of local soviets has not yet been created. Nor are conditions equal when it comes to supplying them with equipment, construction materials, and other means of production, which, as before, are distributed on a centralized basis between kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Problems of providing peasant farms with finance and credit have not been resolved. These and other problems are considerably inhibiting the formation of the new sector of the rural economy. This is the reality.

The experience of a few peasant farms which, despite everything, managed to start work shows that each of them has an acute need for legal and social protection and technical and scientific backup. They cannot solve these problems alone. The acute nature of the situation was repeatedly stressed at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, where speakers talked of the need for reliable legal guarantees for peasants.

The organizing committee of the association of Russian peasant farms and cooperatives is operating in Moscow and is preparing a conference. At the conference the intention is to discuss the association's draft programs and statutes and questions of organizing independent regional unions and convening an All-Russian Congress of Representatives of Peasant Farms and Cooperatives.

The organizing committee believes that the aim and content of the future association's activity will be to unite the efforts of the public and the peasants interested in creating a competitive new farm sector for the rural economy. Set up on a strictly voluntary basis, the association would take it upon itself to organize a peasant Cooperative Bank and to promote the formation of the peasant farms themselves and the cooperative system providing production, legal, and scientific services for them.

The conference will start work 15-16 July in Moscow. All interested individuals and organizations are to send applications to attend to IZVESTIYA or the journal SELSKAYA MOLODEZH. The journal's address (for telegrams) is Association, SELSKAYA MOLODEZH, 5a Novodmitrovskaya, Moscow A-15. Applications to arrive not later than 30 June. Telephone numbers for information: 209-37-63, 285-80-04.

[Signed] A. Yemelyanov, All-Union V.I. Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences [VASKhNIL] academician and USSR people's deputy; V. Tikhonov, VASKhNIL academician and USSR people's deputy; V. Bashmachnikov, doctor of economic sciences and consultant at the CPSU Central Committee Socioeconomic Department; A. Berdyshev, doctor of agricultural sciences and agricultural cooperative chairman; V. Vershinin, candidate of economic sciences and sector leader at the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Agricultural Economics; V. Yefimov, candidate of economic sciences and chairman of the "Kolos" consultancy cooperative; T. Kadyrov, chairman of the "Snyatinka" agricultural cooperative; and Yu. Soglayev, chairman of the "Sadovaya Elita" cooperative.

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21 Jun-1 Jul Agricultural Developments Reported

LD0307044789

[Editorial Report] The following is a compilation of reports on agricultural developments in the USSR carried by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian on 21 June-1 July, unless indicated otherwise. Times of broadcast, given in GMT, are in parentheses at the end of each item.

21 June

In Uzbekistan, winter grain has been harvested on 100,000 hectares as of this morning. Because of unfavorable weather, cereal crops have not yielded the results expected. For example, in Andizhan Oblast combine operators are averaging a post-threshing yield of only 30 quintals per hectare on irrigated areas. Nor are drylands any consolation: Wheat and barley have turned out stunted, which is naturally making havesting difficult. (0600)

Kazakhstan grain elevators are preparing for the new harvest. One quarter of the 400 grain procurement enterprises are ready. (1100)

Mass procurement of feed is underway in Tambov Oblast. (1100)

22 June

No fileworthy items monitored.

23 June

Harvesting of winter cereals has begun in the southern parts of Kirghizia. The republic's target this year is more than 1.5 million tonnes of grain. (0204)

24-25 June

No fileworthy items monitored.

26 June

The farms of the valley areas of Kirghizia have started the second moving of perennial grasses. (2230)

27 June

The grain reception enterprises of the Ryazan Non-Chernozem Zone Belt will dry and process 1 million tonnes of grain from the new harvest. This means that they intend to receive 60,000 tonnes of grain during every 24 hour period (0400)

28-29 June

No fileworthy items monitored.

30 June

Winter wheat and barley have been harvested from 100,000 hectares in Uzbekistan's Kashka-Darya Oblast. The work is difficult owing to the disruption caused by the dry spring. The crops are low in height, and the combine drivers are having to be extremely careful, slowing down the operation. Corn harvesting will begin soon. The corn harvest is expected to be good. (0600)

1 July

Grain-cutting in Kirghizia is gaining pace. Drought has to a large extent prevented a good harvest; therefore the quality of harvesting is being counted on. Teams are provided with special equipment to reduce losses during harvesting. During this year the republic's grain producers are intending to gather more than 1.5 million tonnes of grain. (0204)

Scientific

Foreign Experts Study Radiation Protection

LD0107141489 Moscow TASS in English 1751 GMT 30 Jun 89

[Text] Moscow June 30 TASS—On request of the USSR Government, the World Health Organisation (WHO) sent a group of experts to the USSR to analyse the questions of effective radiation protection for the population living in the area of high radioactive levels due to the Chernobyl accident. The group consisted of Prof. D. Beninson, chairman of the International Commission on Radiation Protection (ICRP) and director of a department of the Argentine Atomic Energy Commission, Prof. P. Pellerin, chief of Radiation Protection Services of the French Health Ministry, member of the ICRP, and Dr. P. Waight of Canada, chief of the Radiation Protection Section of the WHO Secretariat.

The group attended a meeting of the national radiation protection commission of the USSR, visited the Mogilev and Gomel regions of Belorussia, held meetings with local medical staff and population's representatives in the cities Cherikov and Chechersk, and had meetings with scientists of the Belorussia Academy of Sciences. In the Ukraine, the group visited the Radiation Medicine Centre of the USSR Medical Science Academy and took part in discussion with scientists of the centre and Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. Prof. P. Pellerin visited the district centre Narodichi. All the meetings have been shown on TV and covered by the press.

On the basis of all discussions the expert group endorsed and supported the proposal of the National Radiation Protection Commission of the USSR to adopt the concept of a lifetime dose of 35 rem (for 70 years) as a limit following the accident. The value of 35 rem is based on international assessments of the risk to health from ionising radiation. The experts felt that a dose level, and not a ground deposition level, was the appropriate limit. The experts volunteered the view that, had they been requested to set a level for the lifetime dose, they would have chosen a value of the order of two to three times higher than 35 rem.

WHO experts also noted that in some cases, scientists who are not well versed in radiation effects have attributed various biological and health effects to radiation exposure. Meanwhile these changes are much more likely to be due to psychological factors and stress. Attributing these effects to radiation not only increases the psychological pressure in the population and provokes additional stress related health problems. It also undermines confidence in the competence of radiation specialists.

The experts were convinced that the 35 rem lifetime dose was the minimum to consider to relocate people which should be based on the local conditions, the costs involved and individual preferences. The experts noted that the lifetime dose limit included the contribution from contaminated food and that the Soviet standards were similar to the levels adopted by the European Community for unrestricted trade in food and lower than the WHO guidelines for contaminated food. It was also noted that the importation and consumption of uncontaminated food, if feasible, could significantly reduce the dose from ingestion. Food processing, filtering and other measures can also reduce the level of food contamination.

The experts noted with satisfaction that they had access to all information. However, in view of the perception that the data was not freely available, every effort should be made to ensure that the information is made available on a routine regular basis, perhaps through the appropriate academies of sciences and medicine in the republics.

The experts praised the efforts in dealing with the accident in Chernobyl and its aftermath. They are of the opinion that the experience gained by the Soviet scientists who dealt with this catastrophe places them in the forefront of nuclear accident management and they have a unique opportunity to assist other countries in the development of their emergency plans. The scientists expressed the hope that this expertise will be sought by and made available to the appropriate organisations whose programs are directed towards emergency preparedness.

Military

Lizichev Addresses Academy Graduates

PM3006122189 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Jun 89 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed report: "Military Academy Graduation"]

[Text] Another student graduation has taken place at the V.I. Lenin Military Academy. The ceremony was opened by Lieutenant General A.G. Sitnikov, chief of the academy political department.

The gathering was addressed by Army General A.D. Lizichev, chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate. He conveyed greetings from USSR Defense Minister Army General D.T. Yazov, who cordially congratulated the students on successfully completing their training.

Army Gen A.D. Lizichev dwelt on the tasks the students will be tackling in the forces in the atmosphere of democratization and glasnost and urged them to devote all their effort and knowledge to restructuring, to inspire troops by word and deed to implement in full the tasks facing military collectives, to constantly increase vigilance, and to strengthen combat might.

Officials View 'Adequate Defense Sufficiency'

PM3006130689 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 26, 25 Jun 89 p 6

[Colonel Vladimir Dvorkhin and Colonel Valeriy Torbin article: "On Real Sufficiency of Defence. Military Specialists' Point of View"]

[Text] Questions about what is meant by adequate defence are being discussed more and more often in the media. The article "Minimum deterrent: utopia or a real prospect?" by Radomir Bogdanov and Andrey Kortunov (MN No 23, 1989) is, in particular, devoted to this question. This and other such publications are aimed at assessing the existing correlation of nuclear forces of the sides, at giving their own proposals on lowering the arms levels and, at the same time, to help shape public opinion. The article mentioned above declares that the USSR at present has considerably more strategic nuclear warheads than are needed for defence. More than 95 per cent of these can be liquidated unilaterally without harming our security. The authors think that for a "minimum deterrent" it is enough to keep only 500 nuclear warheads on SS-25 mobile land-based, single-warhead missiles and on the ballistic missiles of the Delta-4 submarines. They suppose that this would be quite enough to do "unacceptable damage" to the US in a retaliation strike and should deter the US from making the first massive nuclear strike. More than that, the authors design a "worst-case scenario" when, as a result of a first nuclear strike by US high-precision missiles and operation of the systems of anti-submarine warfare, the USSR will have left only 50 warheads out of 500. Then the US ABM [antiballistic missile] will neutralize nine-tenths of the 50 missiles, so that 5 warheads would hit targets in the US. The authors think that even these means would be enough to create "unacceptable damage".

In connection with these declarations, we deem it necessary to voice a number of circumstances that reflect some results of the research into strategic stability problems.

First of all we should determine what it is that keeps a potential aggressor not only from making a first nuclear strike, but also from political pressure and blackmail, based on military-strategic superiority? The authors of the article regard such a factor to be only the threat of making the "unacceptable damage". However, its magnitude depends on military-economic, geopolitical, historical, socio-psychological factors, and cannot be assessed, as it is done in the article, by simple speculation.

At the same time, even if the magnitude of the "unacceptable damage" could be assessed quantitatively, then a guaranteed making of this strike should be an obligatory condition of deterrence. But how is it possible to guarantee that out of 500 warheads, left for making the "unacceptable damage" strike, their necessary number would be preserved after a massive strike by several thousand American warheads and activities of the anti-submarine means (even without taking into account that approximately a half of the submarines armed with ballistic missiles are in bases and a part of the mobile, land-based missiles are in places of permanent deployment)? And what about the necessity of having at least minimum reserves to counter the possible scientific and engineering "breakthroughs" which can "discount" some component of strategic arms? The authors completely ignore all these and many other problems.

The attempt made to consider the "worst-case scenario", in which we'll have left no less than 5 warheads—even after the US puts into operation its space and land-based ABM systems, now being worked out on the SDI programme—and they would inflict "unacceptable damage" on the US, seems to be simply groundless. With such a correlation of strategic attack and defence means of the sides, i.e., in case the USSR disarms unilaterally, we can talk only of one guarantee—that the nuclear potential left in the USSR would definitely be liquidated completely and many times over!

It is possible to remind the readers, that the SDI programme, when it originated, was aimed at a reliable liquidation of several thousand Soviet warheads. However, the realistic obstacles on the way to creation of such an efficient ABM system led to the change in viewing its possible capabilities—there is more and more often talk about the possibility of deploying a limited ABM system, that could intercept only from several dozens to hundreds of warheads, i.e., to neutralize our retaliatory strike. Therefore, the unilateral reduction of strategic weapons to the level analyzed by the authors of the article in MN would make it extremely easier for the US to deal with the problem of setting up an efficient ABM system. Their proposal, of course, merits applause on the part of the SDI programme in the US.

It is necessary to stress here that profound research rather than the dubious arguments used by the authors of the article of the type "as we see it", "in our opinion", "apparently", "who can say", "they'd hardly want" and others, is the basis for determining the composition of strategic attack weapons, the strategy of their combat use and conditions for disarmament.

The analysis shows us that the reliable and approved factor of deterrence is the military-strategic parity, which is understood as an approximate equality of the combat possibilities of the sides' strategic nuclear forces in various forms of hostilities and which should be kept intact at all levels of reduction of the strategic attack weapons.

The article "Minimum Deterrent: Utopia or a Real Prospect" declares: "That we have accumulated much more than necessary is obvious." One can agree with this granted that it relates both to the USSR and the US and the reductions must be mutual.

The history of development of nuclear weapons shows that at the period of its nuclear superiority, the US professed military doctrines which were aimed at beginning a nuclear war against us in connection with any sharpening of the situation that would have a bearing on its national interests. Practically these doctrines were implemented in the many plans of a surprise nuclear attack on the USSR. Since November 1945, when it was planned to bomb 20 Soviet cities, the number of targets on our territory was endlessly increasing, as the nuclear capability was accumulated, and reached several thousands. The possibility to keep peace for over 40 years was only possible thanks to the achievement of the military-strategic parity, which was a historical gain of the Soviet people.

The detailed account of the decoded plans of nuclear attack on the USSR as started by the printing of a series of articles under the common title "Pentagon: a Stake on Victory in Nuclear War" in the magazine Foreign Military Review (No 5, 1989). In particular, it is mentioned in the account that the US experts came to the conclusion that the use of 200 A-bombs cannot bring a decisive defeat to the USSR and, therefore, the power of the strike must be considerably increased. One should not forget such conclusions when determining the number of warheads needed for delivering a strike to inflict "unacceptable damage".

As we know, a number of publications in our papers gave official and quite truthful data on the correlation of the USSR and Warsaw Treaty countries armed forces, on the one side, and of the US and NATO Bloc - on the other, including nuclear arms. As for nuclear weapons, the studied data confirms the existence of military-strategic parity. The US, Great Britain and France do not reject this. The 50 per cent reduction of strategic attack weapons of the USSR and the US is the next step in a lowering of the level of counterforce. The amounts of nuclear warheads of both sides (no more than 6,000) envisaged by the draft treaty secure the military-strategic parity, that has taken shape, on a lower level. However, the further reduction of the strategic attack arms (more than 50 per cent) would already take account of nuclear weapons of other countries, in particular, of Great Britain and France, who already have nearly 700 warheads. In this sense, we can agree with academician Andrey Sakharov who thinks that more profound reductions of strategic attack weapons would call to take account of many other conditions, including the existence of the ABM systems (the collection Nothing Else Is Given, Moscow, Progress, 1988).

At the same time, when analyzing the practical activities of the US in developing strategic attack arms, one can not but see its aspiration to achieve military superiority and violating of strategic nuclear parity in its own favour. In particular we see this in the US leaving the SALT-2 Treaty, which our country continues to abide (the Americans have exceeded the level of MIRV missiles). The US continues to strictly fulfill all of its programmes of strategic arms. The attack capability of its strategic attack forces increased by about 20 per cent in 1988 alone.

The acceptance of a defence doctrine and reduction of nuclear weapons demand profound research on the assessment of defence sufficiency, which would keep the strategic parity on a level guaranteeing necessary retaliatory activities. In this connection, the non-argumented and little-competent discourses on the possibility of unilateral reduction by the USSR of strategic nuclear weapons and appeals for a "minimum deterrent" on this basis are of a disoriented nature. The authors of such articles do not bear responsibility for their conclusions and proposals and, the more so, for their country's defence. The proposed unilateral reduction and the practically complete reduction of nuclear weapons, when relevant accords haven't yet been achieved cannot be considered justified and approved. Such illusions printed in our press will not bring use, when they are imposed on readers who are not always prepared to assess such complex problems.

The Soviet government is persistently conducting a foreign policy aimed at a reduction of the strategic attack weapons and their complete liquidation. It is obvious to everyone that we have no alternative for a reduction and liquidation of nuclear weapons. At the same time, the reduction and liquidation of nuclear weapons will be justified only if this will be done by both sides, simultaneously, keeping a strategic parity at each stage of their reduction.